The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it makes a normative idea analysis concerning organ donation, by comparing the perspectives of utilitarianism and classical liberalism. Secondly, it applies these perspectives on the Swedish legislation, in order to understand it in a political philosophical view. As a theoretical framework, the paper uses the two perspectives´ overarching ethical standpoints, but also try to discern their views on four - for the topic -appropriate concepts, these being the concepts of liberty, consent and self-ownership. These are then bundled together into two so-called ”ideal types”, to use for making normative statements about what the most morally right legislation would be concerning organ donation. In utilitarianism, an agent-neutral overall happiness is at the forefront, which leads it to prioritize an increase in donations over the autonomy of the individual. This makes the case for a conscription of organs or the softer notion of an opt-out system. Classical liberalism focus more on the right to self-ownership and negative liberty, and therefore argue for an opt-in system, which requires the explicit consent of the individual. Lastly, the paper makes the claim that the Swedish legislation falls in a category inbetween the normative judgements of the two perspectives, as it prescribes an opt-out system, but reserves the right of the family to refuse a donation, in case the deceased had not made a choice ante mortem.