yes / The purpose of this paper is to identify how the presence, proliferation, and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW) negatively impact children in conflict and post-conflict societies. It examines the impact of these weapons on children's well-being, rights and development, drawing on primary research in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Colombia. It was prepared in the context of the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in July 2001 and the UN Special Session on Children. Both are key opportunities to examine fully the impact of SALW on children at the international level and to agree global action to prevent and reduce the spread and misuse of the weapons that endanger the safety and undermine the potential of children. While UN agencies, international governmental organisations, human rights and development organisations have documented abuses committed against children, to date there has been no systematic analysis of the numerous ways in which SALW negatively affect the lives of children in conflict and post-conflict situations, let alone in societies at peace. However, the information that has been collected paints a terrible picture of devastation wrought by SALW. The use of small arms by and against children has both direct effects, which include death and injury, human rights abuses, displacement and psychosocial trauma, and indirect effects, which include insecurity, loss of health care, education and opportunities. These direct and indirect effects have both short and long-term impacts on the well-being, rights and development of children. This paper highlights these direct and indirect costs by drawing on the personal testimonies of youth affected by small arms in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Colombia - countries that have felt the devastating impacts of small arms and are currently at different phases of the recovery process. It is often extremely difficult to separate the impact of conflict from the impact of small arms on children but the human suffering caused by small arms is ultimately immeasurable. Indeed, the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, has called small arms 'weapons of mass destruction' . These weapons often prolong and deepen the consequences of war and also impede post-conflict resolution and reconstruction. If many small arms remain behind after a conflict ends, they can promote insecurity, which in the extreme, may result in a return to conflict. Even in societies at peace, the presence of SALW can fuel crime and violence, and they can also be used by security forces for the facilitation of human rights violations against the civilian population. These weapons have several characteristics that make them ideal for contemporary conflicts and, in particular, the targeting and use of children in war. Many are so lightweight and simple that a child as young as eight can operate and repair them without difficulty. Equally, they can last over 40 years, meaning they can be exported from conflict to conflict through porous borders and lax national, regional, and international controls.

Yes / Small arms and light weapons (SALW) are recognised as increasing the lethality, duration and intensity of conflict with the effects of these weapons lasting for many years. The negative impacts of SALW are often greatest for the most vulnerable groups, including children. There is widespread international recognition of the negative effects of small arms on children, but efforts to control small arms and those to protect children have rarely been linked. The United Nations 2001 Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and the UN Special Session on Children provide unique opportunities to examine the complex issues surrounding small arms and their impact on children, in particular, how the presence, proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons affect the lives of children.

yes / Historically, UN conferences have been criticised for resulting more in compromises than in commitments to real change, which is also a charge that has been levelled against the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN Small Arms Conference). The consensus-based approach adopted throughout the negotiations had the advantage of binding all participating States to all aspects of the agreed Programme of Action (PoA), but it also ensured that it would be difficult to achieve a sufficiently rigorous and comprehensive agreement on all of the measures required to tackle the trafficking, proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Therefore, in spite of the efforts of many governments and NGOs, the UN Small Arms Conference did not agree sufficiently robust agreements in several areas. Nonetheless, it was a valuable and productive process. The resulting PoA includes a reasonably comprehensive set of key principles and commitments, which provide a basis for taking forward action at national, regional and global levels. The PoAwas agreed by all of the participating States, amounting to more than 100, and each are politically bound to adopt and implement it. Given that the UN Small Arms Conference was the first of its kind, its achievement in generating political will and momentum for efforts to control SALW is important. Although many of the commitments are weaker and less comprehensive than hoped for by many governments and organisations, it is significant that the PoAcontains at least some important commitments in all but two of the `core¿ issue areas raised by States. The two exceptions relate to transfers to non-State actors and to civilian trade, possession and use of SALW, restrictions which were strongly opposed by the USA. Equally, human rights related issues were noteworthy by their absence in the PoA. Whilst the process of reaching agreement began with a far-reaching draft PoA in December 2000 (A/Conf.192/L.4), most of the comments that were tabled on this text during the second Preparatory Committee in January 2001 came from countries that sought to weaken its commitments. The subsequent draft (A/Conf.192/L.4/Rev.1) was therefore weaker, with the result that progressive States faced an uphill task in seeking to strengthen its provisions. The next draft PoA emerged at the UN Small Arms Conference itself in the form of a third draft (A/Conf.192/L.5). Although still limited in a number of key areas ¿ such as export criteria and transparency ¿ this document went further than L.4/Rev.1 in a number of respects and included specific international commitments, including on brokering and tracing lines of supply. This, however, proved too ambitious an agenda for a small group of States and in the end the document that was adopted by consensus (A/Conf.192/L.5/Rev.1) represented a lower-level compromise. Despite the difficulties of agreeing the consensus-based PoA, the process culminating in the agreement was perhaps as important as the agreement itself. UN Small Arms Conference represented the first time that all UN Member States had met to discuss the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects with a view to agreeing a comprehensive set of measures to address the problem. Although many of the commitments contained in the PoAare couched in equivocal language that will allow States to do as much or as little as they like, it is clear that the UN Small Arms Conference has contributed to a much better understanding, amongst all stakeholders, of the nature of the illicit trade in SALW and of the particular concerns and priorities of different countries and sub-regions. It is also clear that although the Programme of Action provides a set of minimum standards and commitments which all states should adopt, it also encourages further action from all States willing to adopt more stringent commitments and stronger programmes. There is a willingness among a number of States to build upon the PoAand take more concrete and far-reaching measures at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels, such as specific arrangements for tracing co-operation, or mechanisms to co-ordinate e fforts to improve stockpile security or weapons destruction. This briefing provides a critical assessment of key provisions in the UN Small Arms Conference PoA. Section 1 measures the overall outcomes of the conference against those that the Biting the Bullet (BtB) project proposed as optimal conclusions, and suggests ways to put the commitments contained in the PoA into practice. Section 2 assesses the implementation and follow-up commitments contained in the PoA, and identifies ways of promoting the implementation of Sections III and IV, as well as options for making the most of the Biennial Meetings of States and the Review Conference in 2006. Section 3 examines funding and resourcing possibilities for the PoA including identifying needs, mobilising resources and matching needs with resources. The final section of the briefing focuses on the way forward, and in particular on how implementation of the PoA could build on existing regional initiatives and develop common international approaches to controlling SALW proliferation, availability and misuse. It also examines how action to prevent and combat the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects can be taken forward at sub-regional and regional levels in conjunction with all major stakeholders, including civil society, in the period leading up to the first Review Conference.

La plupart des conflits aujourd'hui sont menés essentiellement avec des armes légères et de petit calibre. Celles-ci sont les armes privilégiées dans les guerres civiles, le crime organisé et les guerres de gang. L'examen des divers aspects de la question des armes légères met l'accent sur l'incidence négative que ces armes ont sur la sécurité humaine, les droits de l'homme et le développement social et économique, en particulier dans les situations de crise, de conflit et d'après conflit. Lutter contre la prolifération des armes légères exige d'agir sur l'offre et la demande en armements, de se préoccuper des stocks d'armes existants et des flux du commerce des armes, tant au niveau des trafics illicites que de celui des ventes légales. Par ailleurs, la problématique des armes légères doit à la fois être abordée de manière spécifique en fonction des caractéristiques particulières de ce type d'arme, mais aussi être incluse dans la question des stocks et des ventes d'armes conventionnelles en général. Grâce à la volonté de quelques Etats et à la mobilisation de la société civile, une réelle dynamique internationale est née il y a quelques années et devrait aboutir à l’adoption d’un Traité sur le Commerce des Armes en 2012. / Most conflicts today are held essentially with small arms and light weapons. They are the weapons of choice in civil wars, organized crime and gang wars. The consideration of the various aspects of the question of light weapons emphasizes the negative incidence that these weapons have on human security, human rights and social and economic development, in particular in situations of crisis, conflict and post-conflict.Fighting against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons requires to act on the supply and demand in armaments, to control existing stocks of weapons and their flow, both at the level of the illicit traffics and legal sales. Besides, the problem of SALW proliferation must be approached in a specific way according to the particular characteristics of this type of weapon, but they should also be included in the control of conventional arms sales in general.Thanks to the will of some States and to the mobilization of the civil society, a real international dynamic was born a few years ago and should lead to the adoption of an Arms Trade Treaty in 2012.

No / This edited volume takes stock of the state of research and policy on the issue of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), ten years after the UN first agreed to deal with the problem. The end of the Cold War originated a series of phenomena that would subsequently come to dominate the political agenda. Perhaps most symptomatic of the ensuing environment is the marked escalation in the scale and dynamics of armed violence, driven by the proliferation of SALW. Events in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia seared into global consciousness the devastating effects of this phenomenon, and of the necessity to engage actively in its limitation and prevention. This edited volume explores and outlines the research and policy on the SALW issue at this critical juncture. In addition to providing a detailed telling of the genesis and evolution of SALW research and advocacy, the volume features a series of essays from leading scholars in the field on both advances in research and action on SALW. It reflects on what has been achieved in terms of cumulative advances in data, methodology and analysis, and looks at the ways in which these developments have helped to inform policy making at national, regional and international levels. Alongside situating and integrating past and present advances in advocacy and international action, Controlling Small Arms also outlines future directions for research and action.

No description available.

No / This article undertakes a critical analysis of what have been labelled humanitarian arms control (HAC) initiatives, most notably, recent agreements to ban cluster munitions and landmines as well as efforts to restrict the proliferation of small arms. The article critiques conventional accounts that view such initiatives as illustrating the potential of global civil society to interject human security concerns into the domain of arms regulation through the exercise of bottom-up power. In order to do this, the article first outlines the concept of securitization, particularly Floyd's discussion of positive and negative forms of securitization and Abrahamson's concept of the security continuum. This is used to frame an analysis of contemporary HAC initiatives that locates them in the much longer history of pariah weapons regulation and the way it relates both to the framing of legitimized weapons and changes in the broader regulation of the conventional defence trade in different eras. In contrast to conventional accounts of the HAC agenda, it is argued that initiatives such as those on landmines and cluster munitions were successful precisely because they were consonant with the same discourse used to legitimize both post-Cold War liberal interventionism and the new generation modern high-tech weapons. Moreover, the extra-securitization of landmines, cluster munitions and small arms has been accompanied by the (relative) desecuritization of the trade in major conventional weapons and associated dual-use technologies, a process that has a number of quite negative effects in terms of arms trade regulation. The article concludes by reflecting on the implications of the preceding analysis both for thinking about processes of securitization and for arms trade non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

No / The illegal proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a global problem, and one consequence of this illicit trade is that regions can become flooded with these guns before, during and following a violent conflict. Effective tracing of these arms requires adequate marking and record-keeping systems as well as improved international co-operation by relevant authorities. This publication argues that the main obstacles to progress in this area are political in nature, rather than technological. Other issues discussed include: the selection of categories and types of SALWs for inclusion in a tracing mechanism; and the structures and institutions required for an effective firearms tracing system.

In late December 2000 the Ministry of Justice and Security of the Argentine province of Mendoza completed the first phase of the programme Canje de Armas por Mejores Condiciones de Vida, hereafter referred to as the Arms Exchange Programme, as part of a multi-faceted long-term approach to transform the public security climate. Two hundred eighty five pistols, revolvers and shotguns were voluntarily turned in by citizens for destruction in exchange for vouchers for foodstuffs and tickets to football games with values ranging from US $50 to $100. Participants were able to make contact with the programme organisers through a toll-free telephone line. Prior to the firearm turn-in component a public education effort was coordinated in the school system that culminated in a violent toy turn-in and destruction drive that brought in thousands of toy guns and video games for public destruction and incorporation into displays of art. The overwhelmingly positive response to the first phase of the programme inspired organisers to launch a second phase of weapons collection on 10 April 2001 including sectors of the province outside the Greater Mendoza area. Although the second phase was scheduled to end on 24 April 2001 it had to be extended on two separate occasions in response to enthusiastic requests from several localities that were not originally scheduled to host the Arms Exchange Programme. The second phase, which lasted six weeks, collected a total of 2,281 weapons and 6,547 rounds of ammunition, bringing in a total of 2,566 weapons and 8,262 rounds of ammunition for both phases combined. Arguably, the town of San Rafael, where 809 revolvers, pistols, shotguns and rifles were turned in over the course of four days, in the southern section of Mendoza province, saw more weapons turned in per capita than any other programme in the world to date.

This briefing aims to highlight and clarify the importance of the availability and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW), and associated armed violence, for development programming in the areas of governance, security sector reform (SSR), and safety, security and access to justice (SSAJ). By doing so the effectiveness of governance, SSR and SSAJ programmes can be enhanced. Moreover, governance, SSR and SSAJ programmes can be developed to contribute more to the reduction of armed violence perpetrated with SALW and facilitated by their availability