Efforts to control small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the periods following violent conflict can have positive or negative impacts on peacebuilding efforts. Similarly, peacebuilding activities can both support or endanger efforts to place SALW under greater control. Despite the regular occurrence of SALW control and peacebuilding activities in the same time and space in post violent conflict contexts, there is insignificant analysis of how the two sets of activities interrelate, and how these interelationships can be strengthened to improve the contribution that SALW control efforts make to peacebuilding, and vice-versa. The effects of interrelationships over time (contingency); in the same geographic space (complementarity) and the effects of public perceptions and social construction are particularly important and provide a framework for establishing these interrelationships through analysing a wide universe of cases of SALW control attempted in countries emerging from violent conflict, five mini-cases studies and a major analysis of interrelationships in Kosovo.

Efforts to control small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the periods following violent conflict can have positive or negative impacts on peacebuilding efforts. Similarly, peacebuilding activities can both support or endanger efforts to place SALW under greater control. Despite the regular occurrence of SALW control and peacebuilding activities in the same time and space in post violent conflict contexts, there is insignificant analysis of how the two sets of activities interrelate, and how these interelationships can be strengthened to improve the contribution that SALW control efforts make to peacebuilding, and vice-versa. The effects of interrelationships over time (contingency); in the same geographic space (complementarity) and the effects of public perceptions and social construction are particularly important and provide a framework for establishing these interrelationships through analysing a wide universe of cases of SALW control attempted in countries emerging from violent conflict, five mini-cases studies and a major analysis of interrelationships in Kosovo.

This paper examines the inter-relationships in post-conflict contexts between DDR programmes and processes on the one hand, and wider arms management and SALW control programmes on the other. It is a contribution to the international project "on DDR and Human Security: Post-conflict security building and the interests of the poor‟, and aims to complement the four other Thematic working papers of this Project. It argues that greater co-coordination, and often integration, between DDR and civilian arms management/reduction programmes is needed to promote human security in most countries emerging from conflict, within the framework of a wider comprehensive strategy for enhancing security from fear and violence that also includes security sector reform.

yes / Historically, UN conferences have been criticised for resulting more in compromises than in commitments to real change, which is also a charge that has been levelled against the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN Small Arms Conference). The consensus-based approach adopted throughout the negotiations had the advantage of binding all participating States to all aspects of the agreed Programme of Action (PoA), but it also ensured that it would be difficult to achieve a sufficiently rigorous and comprehensive agreement on all of the measures required to tackle the trafficking, proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Therefore, in spite of the efforts of many governments and NGOs, the UN Small Arms Conference did not agree sufficiently robust agreements in several areas. Nonetheless, it was a valuable and productive process. The resulting PoA includes a reasonably comprehensive set of key principles and commitments, which provide a basis for taking forward action at national, regional and global levels. The PoAwas agreed by all of the participating States, amounting to more than 100, and each are politically bound to adopt and implement it. Given that the UN Small Arms Conference was the first of its kind, its achievement in generating political will and momentum for efforts to control SALW is important. Although many of the commitments are weaker and less comprehensive than hoped for by many governments and organisations, it is significant that the PoAcontains at least some important commitments in all but two of the `core¿ issue areas raised by States. The two exceptions relate to transfers to non-State actors and to civilian trade, possession and use of SALW, restrictions which were strongly opposed by the USA. Equally, human rights related issues were noteworthy by their absence in the PoA. Whilst the process of reaching agreement began with a far-reaching draft PoA in December 2000 (A/Conf.192/L.4), most of the comments that were tabled on this text during the second Preparatory Committee in January 2001 came from countries that sought to weaken its commitments. The subsequent draft (A/Conf.192/L.4/Rev.1) was therefore weaker, with the result that progressive States faced an uphill task in seeking to strengthen its provisions. The next draft PoA emerged at the UN Small Arms Conference itself in the form of a third draft (A/Conf.192/L.5). Although still limited in a number of key areas ¿ such as export criteria and transparency ¿ this document went further than L.4/Rev.1 in a number of respects and included specific international commitments, including on brokering and tracing lines of supply. This, however, proved too ambitious an agenda for a small group of States and in the end the document that was adopted by consensus (A/Conf.192/L.5/Rev.1) represented a lower-level compromise. Despite the difficulties of agreeing the consensus-based PoA, the process culminating in the agreement was perhaps as important as the agreement itself. UN Small Arms Conference represented the first time that all UN Member States had met to discuss the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects with a view to agreeing a comprehensive set of measures to address the problem. Although many of the commitments contained in the PoAare couched in equivocal language that will allow States to do as much or as little as they like, it is clear that the UN Small Arms Conference has contributed to a much better understanding, amongst all stakeholders, of the nature of the illicit trade in SALW and of the particular concerns and priorities of different countries and sub-regions. It is also clear that although the Programme of Action provides a set of minimum standards and commitments which all states should adopt, it also encourages further action from all States willing to adopt more stringent commitments and stronger programmes. There is a willingness among a number of States to build upon the PoAand take more concrete and far-reaching measures at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels, such as specific arrangements for tracing co-operation, or mechanisms to co-ordinate e fforts to improve stockpile security or weapons destruction. This briefing provides a critical assessment of key provisions in the UN Small Arms Conference PoA. Section 1 measures the overall outcomes of the conference against those that the Biting the Bullet (BtB) project proposed as optimal conclusions, and suggests ways to put the commitments contained in the PoA into practice. Section 2 assesses the implementation and follow-up commitments contained in the PoA, and identifies ways of promoting the implementation of Sections III and IV, as well as options for making the most of the Biennial Meetings of States and the Review Conference in 2006. Section 3 examines funding and resourcing possibilities for the PoA including identifying needs, mobilising resources and matching needs with resources. The final section of the briefing focuses on the way forward, and in particular on how implementation of the PoA could build on existing regional initiatives and develop common international approaches to controlling SALW proliferation, availability and misuse. It also examines how action to prevent and combat the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects can be taken forward at sub-regional and regional levels in conjunction with all major stakeholders, including civil society, in the period leading up to the first Review Conference.

yes / A prerequisite for effective international action to prevent and combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) is that states develop a common understanding of what constitutes the ¿legal¿ trade and therefore what is ¿illicit¿. At the same time, failure to exert e ffective control over the legal trade in SALW opens up possibilities for diversion to illicit markets and end-users and blurs the lines between the legal and illicit trade. All governments are potential suppliers of SALW, since even those with no manufacturing capacity will have the potential to export surplus weapons once owned by their police and/or armed forces. A major concern for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects should thus be to define clear parameters for and to agree on a comprehensive mechanism for controlling the legal trade in these weapons. / British American Security Information Council (BASIC), International Alert

yes / Efforts to combat and prevent illicit trafficking in, and proliferation and misuse of, small arms and light weapons (SALW) are hampered by lack of relevant information-exchange and transparency. International information exchange and transparency arrangements are key elements of each of the main elements of the international action programme on SALW to be launched at the UN 2001 Conference. There is great scope to develop information management and distribution arrangements to disseminate and exchange of relevant information on SALW without seriously compromising national security, necessary commercial secrecy, or law enforcement. Indeed, national security, commerce, crime prevention and law enforcement are generally enhanced by appropriate transparency and information exchange

yes / The 1990s witnessed a change in the way wars were fought as the amount of available weaponry increased and the types of actors engaged in warfare multiplied. The opening up of the international arms trade, in particular with new buyers and more channels of supply, has raised concerns about who purchases weapons and for what use. Afeature of this changing nature of conflict has been the continuing, if not growing, presence of mercenaries and the emergence of private companies contracted to provide military and security services. These range from logistical support and training to advice and procurement of arms and on-the-ground intervention. This briefing highlights how the activities of mercenaries and private military and security companies can contribute to small arms proliferation and misuse and examines steps the international community can take at the UN Small Arms Conference and elsewhere to effectively combat mercenarism and regulate the activities of private military and security companies. The role played by these companies relates not only to provisions contained in the contracts they sign with their clients to provide large amounts of weaponry, but also how the military and security services and training that they provide contributes to the demand for weapons in the regions where they operate. There are a number of ways in which mercenaries and private military and security companies are involved in small arms proliferation. These include: l Arms brokering and transportation activities l Violations of UN arms embargoes l Impact on human rights and humanitarian law l Driving demand for small arms Various measures already exist to ban the activities of mercenaries and regulate some of the activities of private military and security companies either through national legislation or international agreements. However, there is concern these efforts are neither comprehensive nor accepted widely enough to effectively control the activities of mercenaries and private military and security companies.

yes / Small arms and light weapons can enter the illicit market at many stages in their lifecycle. From manufacture, to sale/export, to import, and then to final end use, States must establish and enforce stringent and comprehensive licensing and monitoring systems to ensure that small arms and light weapons (SALW) remain under legal control. The UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and ensuing follow-up process provide States with important opportunities to analyse and compare how existing systems governing the manufacture and trade in SALW are working. They further provide the context in which best practice can be agreed and implemented internationally, and for the discussion of how future trends and developments in SALW manufacture and transfer can be more effectively brought within State control. To this end, this briefing paper covers two separate but closely related issues. The first section of the report will analyse existing State and regional controls on SALW manufacture and examine how international measures, including the UN Conference, can reinforce such controls. In this regard, the growth of licensed production and co-production agreements is highlighted, together with implications for the development of adequate regulations. The second section examines those systems that are currently in place for the authorisation of SALW transfers and for the certification and monitoring of their ultimate end-use. Recommendations for best practice and implications for the UN Conference process are also discussed.

yes / The majority of small arms and light weapons currently in circulation are in civilian possession1. An estimated fifty-nine percent of weapons around the world are in civilian hands and in some regions such as Europe this is closer to eighty per cent.2 While the majority of these arms are used for lawful purposes a significant percentage are not. The misuse of these arms by civilians can cause major damage to people¿s livelihoods, health and security as well as broader repercussion such as hampering economic, social and political development and the provision of health care. One of the more controversial outcomes of the UN Small Arms conference was the failure of states to explicitly commit to more effective regulation of civilian possession and use of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Despite clear evidence of the opportunities for diversion of SALW from civilian possession to illicit trade and the serious impact of this on human security, opposition from some states to any mention of this issue within the Programme of Action (PoA) prevented the inclusion of language concerning the regulation of privately owned SALW. Nevertheless, the Programme of Action does contain limited provisions including the criminalisation of illicit possession of SALW and a requirement that states ensure responsibility for SALW issued by them. This Policy Briefing elaborates on how these and other international commitments should be interpreted and implemented so as to enhance human security.

yes / It is now widely recognised that, to be successful, efforts towards preventing and combating the illicit trade in SALW will require a multifaceted approach which simultaneously tackles the demand for and the supply of these weapons. In this regard, developing and promoting international norms, standards and mechanisms for the effective removal of illicit weapons from circulation is a major challenge for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. There are two distinct scenarios within which weapons collection initiatives operate: the peace-time scenario, where efforts are focused on reducing criminal violence; and the postconflict scenario, where efforts are focused on the objective of conflict prevention through peace-building.