yes / [Introduction]International commitments and measures to prevent, reduce and combat uncontrolled or illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) holdings and flows are widely understood to encompass not only the weapons but also their ammunition. This is obviously necessary. Thus the UN Programme of Action to Prevent Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) includes many commitments that apply to ammunition as well as to small and light weapons. Progress in implementing the PoA includes many measures concerning ammunition, including: controls on transfers; preventing diversion to illicit trade; marking, record-keeping and tracing; weapons collection; secure storage; and destruction.1 Unfortunately, progress in implementing the PoA in relation to ammunition remains particularly patchy and inadequate. This is partly because it has too often been considered as a residual category. Negotiations and programmes to control SALW have tended in the first instance to focus on the weapons systems, and have then been deemed to apply, `as appropriate¿, also to ammunition. But control and reduction of ammunition raise their own distinct and challenging issues. Without focused attention, and clarification of what is meant by `appropriate¿, controls and measures on ammunition have often been neglected or mishandled.[Executive summary] The 2001 United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) and other associated Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) international commitments and measures are widely understood to encompass not only the weapons but also their ammunition. Unfortunately, progress in implementing the PoA in relation to ammunition remains particularly patchy and inadequate. This is partly because it has too often been considered as a residual category. But control and reduction of ammunition raise their own distinct and challenging issues. This relative neglect is resulting in large numbers of avoidable deaths and injuries.

yes / The United Nations will convene the `UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects¿ in June/July 2001. The `2001 Conference¿ is now the primary focus for international efforts to strengthen and develop co-ordinated and comprehensive global action to prevent and reduce the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. A powerful international coalition of States, international organisations and civil society groups is uniting to promote effective global action. Expectations for the 2001 Conference are high and public awareness of the opportunities it offers is growing. It is critical that the 2001 Conference is a success. The 2001 Conference must achieve agreement on an effective International Action Programme to prevent and reduce small arms and light weapons proliferation and combat illicit trafficking in such weapons. This International Action Programme should reinforce, co-ordinate and extend measures being taken at local, national and regional levels. In addition to establishing an appropriate set of international norms and standards, the 2001 Conference should achieve agreement on specific international action on the problems associated with small arms and light weapons. The specific objectives of the 2001 Conference are currently undecided. This paper, the first in a series of briefings, outlines a proposed scope for the Conference. It further proposes concrete objectives and practical agreements which could be achieved during the Conference. It is hoped that the proposals and recommendations presented will contribute to efforts to secure a comprehensive and progressive framework for the Conference.

yes / As the agenda for the United Nations (UN) 2001 Conference on The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects takes shape, governments should begin to identify a set of standards, mechanisms and specific agreements that will help consolidate, reinforce and co-ordinate regional and national measures to address the problem of the proliferation and misuse of small arms. An important element of this approach will be to build upon the wealth of regional and national experiences and perspectives that illustrate the different contexts in which efforts to combat the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons have occurred. At the same time, agreements reached at the UN 2001 Conference should be substantial, establishing an agreed comprehensive `international action programme¿ f o r sustained global effort on this complex problem. However there remain issues and concerns that are common to all regions: these should be identified and addressed internationally within the context of the UN 2001 Conference. This briefing, the second in the Biting the Bullet series, reviews some of the current regional e fforts on small arms and light weapons. It identifies common approaches that have been used in different regions to counter the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, these include: law enforcement and crime control; supplier restraint and transparency; national legislation and regulation of arms; and arms reduction and control. The briefing analyses initiatives using these approaches that are moving forward in West Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa, the European Union (EU), and the development of cooperation between EU Member States and other countries and regional organizations, including Cambodia and the Southern African Development Community. The briefing identifies the impact and priorities of these initiatives, suggesting ways in which the UN 2001 Conference is both relevant to the region and what the region can contribute to the outcomes of the Conference. The briefing concludes with recommendations on the ways in which regional processes can be reinforced and further developed by the international community, focusing especially on the contribution of the UN 2001 Conference. Experience is showing that much of what happens nationally and regionally needs reinforcement and further development with assistance from the international community. The UN 2001 Conference comes at an important time for providing the framework ¿ through the international action programme ¿ to develop, reinforce and c o-ordinate these national and regional processes, through developing appropriate international norms, standards, programmes and mechanisms. Using the illustration of combating illicit arms trafficking, this briefing outlines some of the processes that could be taken forward through the UN 2001 Conference which would build upon and strengthen national and regional eff o r t s . The briefing contains an annex, which provides background information on many current regional and international initiatives, including those in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and inter-regionally, such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

yes / Measures to enhance the security and management of legal stocks of small arms and to reduce `surplus¿ weapons are clearly essential components of an effective international action programme to combat illicit trafficking and prevent and reduce the proliferation of small arms. Many of the weapons of concern are lost from official stockpiles through theft, corruption or neglect. Moreover, the existence of large quantities of `surplus¿ small arms is a major factor in the excessive availability and flows of these weapons. The primary responsibility for measures to address these problems lies with governments. Regional and international organisations involved in any way with managing and disposing of small arms also have important responsibilities to take action. Nevertheless, this is a global issue, and the entire international community should play a role in developing policies on the management of stockpiles and the disposal or destruction of surplus weapons. This briefing outlines the dimensions of the issues, drawing on recent experience, and identifies ways in which an international action programme could usefully be developed to address them.

yes / Since April 1998, the Vienna-based UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice has been negotiating the draft Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (hereafter referred to as the Firearms Protocol). This Protocol will be the first global measure regulating international transfers of small arms and light weapons, and should have a tremendous impact on both the legal and the illicit manufacture and trade in firearms. The draft agreement seeks to combat and criminalise trafficking in firearms, through the development of harmonised international standards governing the manufacture, possession and transfer of commercial shipments of these weapons. While the final outcome of the Protocol relies on the outcome of negotiations in February 2001, the draft agreement contains provisions which commit states, among other things, to: l Adopt legislative measures to criminalise the illicit manufacture, trafficking, possession and use of firearms; l Maintain detailed records on the import, export and in-transit movements of firearms; l Adopt an international system for marking firearms at the time of manufacture and each time they are imported; l Establish a harmonised licensing system governing the import, export, in-transit movement and re-export of firearms; l Exchange information regarding authorised producers, dealers, importers and exporters, the routes used by illicit traffickers, best practice in combating trafficking in order to enhance states ability to prevent, detect and investigate illicit trafficking; l Co-operate at the bilateral, regional and international level to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms; and l Consider developing systems to require arms brokers, traders and forwarders to register and obtain licences for their transactions. The Protocol places a premium on international co-operation, information exchange and transparency. The provisions in the Firearms Protocol are an important complement to those being developed for the UN 2001 Conference. Issues such as improving the ability to trace small arms and light weapons through effective marking systems, regulating the activities of arms brokers and building international norms on the responsible disposal of surplus small arms are common to both initiatives.

yes / Efforts to combat and prevent illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weaponsEfforts to combat and prevent illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) are obstructed by lack of capacity to trace sources and lines of supply for arms. Such efforts are necessary in order to identify points of diversion or loss of responsible control so that actions can be taken to tackle the problems. This hampers efforts to prevent future loss and diversion, for example, or to close down unauthorised or destabilising arms supply networks. Measures to enable tracing of sources and lines of supply of SALW are therefore a priority. Because of the international scope of the flows of SALW, such measures need to be taken by all states and all other relevant members of the international community. International standards and mechanisms to enable tracing need to be established and developed as a priority. An effective international system to enable tracing of sources and flows of SALW requires three essential elements: adequate marking to uniquely identify each weapon; detailed and accessible record-keeping; and mechanisms for international co-operation in tracing sources and lines of supply of SALW. At present there are substantial weaknesses and problems in each of these three areas. (SALW) are obstructed by lack of capacity to trace sources and lines of supply for arms. Such efforts are necessary in order to identify points of diversion or loss of responsible control so that actions can be taken to tackle the problems. This hampers efforts to prevent future loss and diversion, for example, or to close down unauthorised or destabilising arms supply networks. Measures to enable tracing of sources and lines of supply of SALW are therefore a priority. Because of the international scope of the flows of SALW, such measures need to be taken by all states and all other relevant members of the international community. International standards and mechanisms to enable tracing need to be established and developed as a priority. An effective international system to enable tracing of sources and flows of SALW requires three essential elements: adequate marking to uniquely identify each weapon; detailed and accessible record-keeping; and mechanisms for international co-operation in tracing sources and lines of supply of SALW. At present there are substantial weaknesses and problems in each of these three areas.

yes / Evidence suggests that many of the arms transfers to the worst affected conflict regions and human rights crisis zones are organised and trafficked by arms brokering and transport agents. Targeting those states with weak national export controls and enforcement, unscrupulous brokers and transportation agents organise the transfer of arms and security equipment to a range of illegitimate end users such as criminals, terrorists and human rights abusers. Arms brokers can be defined as middlemen who organise arms transfers between two or more parties, often bringing together buyers, sellers, transporters, financiers and insurers to make a deal. They generally do so for financial gain, although political or religious motivation may also play a part in some deals. Often such brokers do not reside in the country from which the weapons originate, nor do they live in the countries through which the weapons pass or for which they are destined. As a result, such `third party¿ arms brokering is notoriously diff i c u l t to trace, monitor or control. Arms brokers work very closely with transport or shipping agents. These agents contract transport facilities, carriers and crews in order to move arms cargoes by sea, air, rail or road.

yes / The 1990s witnessed a change in the way wars were fought as the amount of available weaponry increased and the types of actors engaged in warfare multiplied. The opening up of the international arms trade, in particular with new buyers and more channels of supply, has raised concerns about who purchases weapons and for what use. Afeature of this changing nature of conflict has been the continuing, if not growing, presence of mercenaries and the emergence of private companies contracted to provide military and security services. These range from logistical support and training to advice and procurement of arms and on-the-ground intervention. This briefing highlights how the activities of mercenaries and private military and security companies can contribute to small arms proliferation and misuse and examines steps the international community can take at the UN Small Arms Conference and elsewhere to effectively combat mercenarism and regulate the activities of private military and security companies. The role played by these companies relates not only to provisions contained in the contracts they sign with their clients to provide large amounts of weaponry, but also how the military and security services and training that they provide contributes to the demand for weapons in the regions where they operate. There are a number of ways in which mercenaries and private military and security companies are involved in small arms proliferation. These include: l Arms brokering and transportation activities l Violations of UN arms embargoes l Impact on human rights and humanitarian law l Driving demand for small arms Various measures already exist to ban the activities of mercenaries and regulate some of the activities of private military and security companies either through national legislation or international agreements. However, there is concern these efforts are neither comprehensive nor accepted widely enough to effectively control the activities of mercenaries and private military and security companies.

<p>It is an unfortunate and cruel reality that both government and armed groups used child soldiers during armed conflict. Child soldiers have become an integral part of government forces as well as insurgent groups in Africa and elsewhere. Most of them are being exploited as combatants, while others perform functions, such as porters, spies who are able to enter small spaces, cooks, messengers, lookouts, and even suicide bombers. Some of the most disturbing aspects of child soldiering are that some of them are being forced to kill or are themselves killed, sexually abused and are exposed to drugs. The use of child soldiers in conflicts is not a recent phenomenon and has indeed become a common practice that characterises modern conflicts. Recruitment is usually carried out forcefully or voluntarily by both government and rebel forces. The difference between these two types of recruitment is not always clear since their decision to join is always influenced by external factors. Examples of such reasons for voluntary recruitment include the desire to revenge, adventure, peer pressure, and need for belonging and survival. Concerning the reason for survival, some argue that, the children do not actually choose freely to become combatants, but are rather forced by circumstances. There are numerous reasons for the continuous targeting of children by armed forces and armed groups. These include shortage of combatants, the fact that children are easy to train physically and psychologically, and also that children are obedient and are readily available. The recruited children are compelled to take part in brutal induction ceremonies, where they are threatened and forced to kill or witness the killing of someone they know.</p>

<p>It is an unfortunate and cruel reality that both government and armed groups used child soldiers during armed conflict. Child soldiers have become an integral part of government forces as well as insurgent groups in Africa and elsewhere. Most of them are being exploited as combatants, while others perform functions, such as porters, spies who are able to enter small spaces, cooks, messengers, lookouts, and even suicide bombers. Some of the most disturbing aspects of child soldiering are that some of them are being forced to kill or are themselves killed, sexually abused and are exposed to drugs. The use of child soldiers in conflicts is not a recent phenomenon and has indeed become a common practice that characterises modern conflicts. Recruitment is usually carried out forcefully or voluntarily by both government and rebel forces. The difference between these two types of recruitment is not always clear since their decision to join is always influenced by external factors. Examples of such reasons for voluntary recruitment include the desire to revenge, adventure, peer pressure, and need for belonging and survival. Concerning the reason for survival, some argue that, the children do not actually choose freely to become combatants, but are rather forced by circumstances. There are numerous reasons for the continuous targeting of children by armed forces and armed groups. These include shortage of combatants, the fact that children are easy to train physically and psychologically, and also that children are obedient and are readily available. The recruited children are compelled to take part in brutal induction ceremonies, where they are threatened and forced to kill or witness the killing of someone they know.</p>