Despite a vast research of Russia’s means of power, including its military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, no comprehensive comparison of Russia’s exercise of power in Georgia and Ukraine has been accomplished, even though they are the most prominent cases of post-Soviet states that have been subjects for Russian military aggression. This study compares the forms of power Russia has been using to implement its foreign policy objectives in Ukraine and Georgia, in order to identify Russia’s power-related behavior and strategies, through an abductive qualitative approach with a comparative method. Russia’s means of power are analyzed through the glasses of the analytical framework of Joseph Nye’s concepts of command power, soft power and smart power. The findings suggest that Russia’s main foreign policy objectives, related to the post-Soviet space, are to prevent the establishment of a pro-Western orientation in the region, make its neighboring countries dependent on Russia, establish closer ties with its neighbors and incorporate them in the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), but also to achieve military supremacy in the region. It is further apparent that Russia uses similar strategies and means of power in Georgia and Ukraine, both through military actions and economic pressures, that can be categorized under command power, but also through diplomatic means, other economic means, informational tools and co-optation. However, in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives most efficiently, Russia combines command power and soft power. This study can contribute to the research of other dominant countries and unequal relationships; and from the learnings of this study, early warning signs or scenarios with certain foreign policy moves can be detected in other dominant countries’ exercise of power towards less powerful states.