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This investigation resulted from a pilot research paper prepared in conjunction with a graduate course on the Civil War. This study suggested that the Federal blockade of the Confederacy may not have contributed significantly to its defeat. Traditionally, historians had assumed that the Union's Anaconda Plan had effectively strangled the Confederacy. Recent studies which compared the statistics of ships captured to successful infractions of the blockade had somewhat revised these views. While accepting these revisionist findings as broadly valid, this investigation strove to determine specifically the effectiveness of Admiral Farragut's West Gulf Blockading Squadron. Since the British Foreign Office maintained consulates in three blockaded southern ports and in many Caribbean ports through which blockade running was conducted, these consular records were vital for this study. Personal research in Great Britain's Public Record Office disclosed valuable consular reports pertaining to the effectiveness of the Federal blockade. American consular records, found in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. provided excellent comparative reports from those same Gulf ports. Official Confederate reports, contained in the National Archives, various state archives and in the published Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies revealed valuable statistical data on foreign imports. Limited use was made of Spanish and French consular records written from ports involved in blockade running. Extensive use was made of Senate and House documents in determining Federal blockade policy during the war. The record of the Navy's enforcement of the blockade was found in The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies. The contemporary reports of Union and Confederate governmental officials was found in James D. Richardson's respective works on The Messages and Papers, and in the published diaries of Gideon Welles and Gustavas Fox. Contemporary newspapers and first hand accounts by participants on both sides provided color and perspective. In evaluating the performance of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, a review of the international laws governing blockading was undertaken, emphasizing America's traditional posture regarding the blockades of other nations. Under Gideon Welles, the Federal navy became a powerful and efficient force, although the navy's enforcement of the blockade often resulted in serious diplomatic embarrassment, especially from maritime incidents occurring near the mouth of the Rio Grande River. Nearby Matamoros, Mexico virtually became an international trade mart for Confederate cotton and imports. However, much contraband trade was conducted through blockaded Gulf ports such as Galveston, Texas. It is concluded that the West Gulf Blockading Squadron performed only satisfactorily at best. This did not result so much from innate limitations as from outside factors. Among the latter were the open door at Matamoros, the Lincoln administration's diplomatic timerity and national policies that authorized a type of cotton trade with the south. Further, the better vessels were assigned land campaign priorities. The statistics of the cotton trade in this portion of the Confederacy show that cotton exports were significantly high. Most of these exports egressed via Matamoros, but a high percentage existed through blockaded Gulf ports. The fact that 10,000 bales of cotton left the heavily guarded port of Galveston in the last six months of the war indicates the inefficiency of the West Gulf Blockade. It appears that the West Gulf Blockade was effective enough to create scarcity but never effective enough to seriously interdict the flow of trade. That the Trans-Mississippi Confederacy was largely sustained by imports underscores the blockade's limited effectiveness.

<p>Ett utvecklande ledarskap anses påverka organisationens motivation och prestation i positiv riktning. Försvarsmakten har sedan 2003 använt Gerry Larssons teori om det utvecklande ledarskapet som grund för ledarskap inom organisationen. Teorin anses vara gångbar såväl i militära sammanhang som i civila organisationer. Syftet med denna uppsats är att utifrån Försvarsmaktens ledarskapsmodell om Det utvecklandeledarskapet undersöka till vilken grad modellen tillämpas vid flygvapnets divisioner. Delar av frågeformuläret Utvecklande Ledarskap Ledarbedömning användes för att kartlägga den genomsnittlige ledarstilen. De 56 personerna som besvarade frågeformuläret gjorde det utifrån deras uppfattning av ledargestalter inom deras division. Resultatet visar att den genomsnittlige ledaren agerar genom handling och genom att vara föredöme. Ledaren tar viktiga beslut, står för dessa och är beredd att försvara dem. Han/hon uppfattas som relativt bra på att ge stöd till medarbetare i situationer där stöd behövs. Däremot uppfattas ledarensom sämre på att konfrontera medarbetare när deras beteende eller resultat inte överrensstämmer medverksamhetens mål. Behovet av konfrontation kan framkallas av divisionens gruppsociala problem eller av enskildas felaktiga handlingar eller dåliga prestation.</p> / <p>A developmental leadership is considered to affect the motivation and performance in a positivedirection. Since 2003, the Armed Forces have been using Gerry Larsson’s theory of the developing leadership as a basis for leadership within the organization. The theory is considered to be viable both in military contexts as in civil organizations. The purpose of this paper is to investigate to what extent the model is applied by the Air Force squadrons, using the Developmental Leadership theory. Parts of the Developing Leadership Questionnaire were used to identify the average leadership style. The 56 persons responding to the questionnaire did so based on how they perceive the leaders within their squadron. The results show that the average leader is acting through action and by being an exemplary model. The leader makes important decisions, stands accountable for them and is prepared to defend them. He/she is perceived as being fairly good at providing support to colleagues in situations where supportis needed. However, the leader is perceived as being less able to confront colleagues when their behavior or performance does not comply with the operational goals. The need for confrontation can be provoked by the division’s group-social issues or by the individual’s incorrect actions or bad performance.</p>

Ett utvecklande ledarskap anses påverka organisationens motivation och prestation i positiv riktning. Försvarsmakten har sedan 2003 använt Gerry Larssons teori om det utvecklande ledarskapet som grund för ledarskap inom organisationen. Teorin anses vara gångbar såväl i militära sammanhang som i civila organisationer. Syftet med denna uppsats är att utifrån Försvarsmaktens ledarskapsmodell om Det utvecklandeledarskapet undersöka till vilken grad modellen tillämpas vid flygvapnets divisioner. Delar av frågeformuläret Utvecklande Ledarskap Ledarbedömning användes för att kartlägga den genomsnittlige ledarstilen. De 56 personerna som besvarade frågeformuläret gjorde det utifrån deras uppfattning av ledargestalter inom deras division. Resultatet visar att den genomsnittlige ledaren agerar genom handling och genom att vara föredöme. Ledaren tar viktiga beslut, står för dessa och är beredd att försvara dem. Han/hon uppfattas som relativt bra på att ge stöd till medarbetare i situationer där stöd behövs. Däremot uppfattas ledarensom sämre på att konfrontera medarbetare när deras beteende eller resultat inte överrensstämmer medverksamhetens mål. Behovet av konfrontation kan framkallas av divisionens gruppsociala problem eller av enskildas felaktiga handlingar eller dåliga prestation. / A developmental leadership is considered to affect the motivation and performance in a positivedirection. Since 2003, the Armed Forces have been using Gerry Larsson’s theory of the developing leadership as a basis for leadership within the organization. The theory is considered to be viable both in military contexts as in civil organizations. The purpose of this paper is to investigate to what extent the model is applied by the Air Force squadrons, using the Developmental Leadership theory. Parts of the Developing Leadership Questionnaire were used to identify the average leadership style. The 56 persons responding to the questionnaire did so based on how they perceive the leaders within their squadron. The results show that the average leader is acting through action and by being an exemplary model. The leader makes important decisions, stands accountable for them and is prepared to defend them. He/she is perceived as being fairly good at providing support to colleagues in situations where supportis needed. However, the leader is perceived as being less able to confront colleagues when their behavior or performance does not comply with the operational goals. The need for confrontation can be provoked by the division’s group-social issues or by the individual’s incorrect actions or bad performance.

This study explores the role of the Royal Navy's North American squadron in protecting Britain's colonies and trade in North America from 1847 to 1815. The squadron had its origins in the war of 1739--48, when it became clear that a fleet based on the eastern Atlantic or the West Indies could not adequately support operations in the North American theatre. The British naval establishment, however, even when North America was the principle theatre of war, never developed as strong an attachment to the North American squadron as it did to its fleets in the West Indies or other theatres. It was, with a few notable exceptions, generally treated as one of the lesser commands of the Royal Navy, and rarely received more than secondary consideration from the Admiralty. This was especially true during the Napoleonic Wars, in which the North American station was viewed a one of the 'quiet' stations, especially when compared to the more active stations in the West Indies. / England's main priority was in defeating France, and she was willing to achieve this at the expense of antagonizing the United States, leading to an unnecessary war with them in 1812. Yet even when faced with a new war in North America, the needs of the squadron were considered of secondary importance to the war in Europe, and several months passed before sizable reinforcements were sent to the North American theatre. Even when the war in Europe ended in 1814, the British leaders continued to treat North America as a secondary theatre. Their efforts to gain victory were at best half-hearted, and the government was more interested in demobilizing the navy to cut costs than in defeating the United States. / The War of 1812 brought little glory to England or the Royal Navy, and there was much criticism in the way the conflict was fought after the war. The inability of England's leaders to correctly read the situation in the United States or to understand the American threat led them to send forces inadequate to wage more than a limited war in North America. Despite this, the performance of the North American Squadron in this period was far more commendable than has generally been acknowledged, especially in light of the handicaps set upon it. This work will give a detailed description of the operations of the squadron, to give a better understanding of its role in this period.

Note: / This study explores the role of the Royal Na'vy's North American Squadron in protecting Britain' s colonies and trade in North America from 1807 to 1815. The squadron had its origins in the war of 1739-48, when it became clear that a fleet based on the eastem Atlantic or the West Indies could not adequately support operations in the North American theatre. The British naval establishment, however, even when North America was the principle theatre of war, never developed as strong an attachment to the North American Squadron as it did to its fleets in the West Indies or other theatres. It was, with a few notable exceptions, generally treated as one of the lesser commands of the Royal Navy, and rarely received more than secondary consideration from the Admiralty. This was especially true during the Napoleonic Wars, in which the North American station was viewed a one of the 'quiet' stations, especially when compared to the more active stations in the West Indies. / Notre étude trace le role de la marine britannique en Amérique du Nord entre 1807 et 1815. L'origine de la flotte remonte à la guerre de 1739-48, quand c'était devenu évident que les flottes dans le secteur de l'est Atlantique ou dans les Antilles n'étaient pas capables de supporter des opérations en Amérique du Nord. Mais cette flotte était rarement considérée comme une des flottes importantes dans la marine britannique. Ceci était le cas durant la guerre contre Napoléon, quand la flotte américaine protégeait un secteur perçu comme tranquille comparativement à la flotte antillaise, elle plus active.

M.A. (Historical Studies) / The Korean War was the first of the “hot wars” of the twentieth century’s Cold War. The three-year conflict (1950-1953) saw the United States joined in its efforts to defend South Korea by a multinational United Nations force drawn from twenty other member states. South Africa, in an effort to both endear itself to the United Nations and to back up its own vociferously anti-communist rhetoric, sent a single Air Force Squadron, 2nd Squadron (the Flying Cheetahs), to aid in the United Nations efforts. This study examines the everyday living and combat conditions of this squadron’s personnel, as well as the challenges they faced and the motivation behind their activities in order to gauge their morale and its effect upon their operations and lives during their deployment in the Far East. Flying in combat from late 1950 right to the Armistice, the South African squadron operated efficiently and with considerable zeal, earning it the respect of the United Nations, but even more so that of the United States Air Force with which they flew. The unit was awarded the Presidential Unit Citations of both the United States and the Republic of Korea. This study seeks to shed light upon the ever changing living and combat conditions, motivation, equipment and leadership experienced and utilised by the 800 plus South Africans throughout the war, so as to provide an indication of the morale of the air and ground personnel of 2nd Squadron who served during this conflict.

Note:

Of the large amount of writings concerning the Civil War only a small percentage pertains to the Federal Navy's role. This is understandable since this was primarily a land war. A few of the Navy's exploits such as the capture of New Orleans, the sinking of the Alabama, the capture of the Florida in Brazilian waters, and the Trent affair received great amounts of publicity, but the majority of the naval activities were of a routine nature, each individually warranting little notice but collectively contributing immensely to the final Federal victory. The purpose of this paper is to show in detail the role of only a portion of the Navy, the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, during this struggle.

Flying Squadrons are the very substance of an air force. By its nature, the air service is a highly technical one requiring both complex machinery and sound human judgement to function at its peak. The smallest independent unit of an air force is the squadron. Squadrons have a discrete status which makes them ideal candidates for in-depth study. This thesis examines the impact of technology and command on a single squadron's operations because technology and command have been and will remain pivotal in determining the success or failure of the air service. Although the Australian No 1 Squadron has existed almost continually from 1916 to the present, this thesis only examines a specific period of its life. The period 1916-1958 was chosen since the squadron formed as an independent Australian Flying Corps unit in January 1916, served in both World Wars and the Malayan Emergency, returning to Australia to resume domestic operations and training in 1958. Of significance to the work, during the specified period, the Squadron was controlled by both the Army and Air Force, by both the British and Australian Governments, had successes and failures and was an operational and a training unit. The Squadron has thus mirrored the growth and changes experienced by the developing Air Force as a whole. The main purpose of examining such a squadron is that it provides an insight into the development and thinking of the RAAF and highlights pitfalls evidenced in technological and command problems which still plague military staff today. In examining the operations and operational effectiveness of No 1 Squadron, three determinants have been specifically examined: technology, that is the aircraft flown, the commanding officer's personality and his methods and the organisational structure under which the Unit operated. Naturally, all three matured as doctrine, knowledge and experience also matured. The Thesis concludes that when the Squadron is winning, it is generally technology that creates the relative advantage and when loosing, strong leadership in the form of command must come to the fore. The results obtained support the thesis in keeping with contemporary RAAF doctrine, that technology and command strongly impact squadron operations and hence, operational effectiveness.