In the first chapter I define the concept of reasonable consideration by squeeze out on the basis of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the European Union. In the second chapter are compared basis laws which regulate the purchase of participating securities in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, together with the EU legislation. The third chapter deals with the legislation for the surveys in compared countries. The fifth chapter deals with economic aspects of the determination of adequate consideration in connection with the views of experts in the field. The sixth chapter provides concrete examples of the determination of reasonable consideration in the Czech and Slovak Republic, including the major differences. The final chapter compares legislation in the Czech and Slovak Republics, and proposes ways to eliminate existing deficiencies.

The thesis disserts on particular takeover techniques, both generally and with respect to the specific regulation by Czech law, considering the relevant rules of acquis communautaire. The paper is focused in particular on takeover bids, public offers for purchase or swap of shares, squeeze-out, sell-out, purchase of business establishment and mergers. The objective is to analyze the subject-matter both from legal and economic point of view, with respect to tax and accounting implications. The thesis contains also the analysis of suitability of particular takeover techniques for specific types of investors, with respect to the aims and intents pursued.

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This work deals with valuable consideration when changes of ownership of equity securities occur in connection with corporate changes in joint-stock company, especially with unwilling changes -- rise of registered capital with excluding the priority subscription right (§ 204a/5 of the Commercial Code), unwilling transfer of shares on the major shareholder (§ 354 of the "Act on the changes of commercial companies and associations") and squeeze out (§ 183i of the Commercial Code). Valuable consideration defines relatively in detail the Takeover Bid Act. This framework could be to certain extent analogically used for valuable consideration in unwilling transaction. However, its definition itself offers a considerable room for interpretation, so is also seized as the independent secondary topic (chapter 1). The main topic concerns two basic aspects. The first is a company evaluation. In this aspect we will take a look only at the dependence of the expert providing the evaluation on major shareholder (chapter 5). Work aims at the second problematic aspect of unwilling transaction - a premium over the valuable consideration for the infringement of right (chapter 2, especially section 2.4.). The work also deals with unevaluated risks of minority shareholders in the period beginning the day to which the company was evaluated to time of the pay out of ownership (chapter 4).

Les sociétés sont traditionnellement classées en sociétés de personnes et sociétés de capitaux. L’intuitus personae constitue le fondement sur lequel repose cette distinction. Fort présent dans les sociétés de personnes, l’intuitus personae serait, en théorie, absent dans les sociétés de capitaux. Toutefois, cette distinction classique ne correspond plus, aujourd’hui, à la réalité. Nous assistons, en effet, à la résurgence de la considération de la personne dans les sociétés de capitaux à travers le développement de techniques contractuelles dont le but est de contrôler l’accès à ces sociétés. Ce mouvement de personnalisation a été renforcé par le législateur, d’abord, par la création de la société par actions simplifiée, mais aussi par la reconnaissance, dans les sociétés cotées, de la notion de concert ou encore d’un droit de sortie au profit des actionnaires minoritaires. La consécration de la validité de l’exclusion, qu’elle soit conventionnelle ou le résultat d’un mécanisme spécifique du droit des sociétés comme le retrait obligatoire ou le coup d’accordéon, participe également de ce phénomène. Cette présence a des conséquences majeures sur le fonctionnement de ces sociétés, mais aussi sur le droit des sociétés en général. En effet, d’une part, la reconnaissance de la primauté des relations entre actionnaires sur les capitaux offre une nouvelle perspective de la notion d’affectio societatis et du principe majoritaire. Et d’autre part, la mise en oeuvre de l’intuitus personae dans des sociétés dans lesquelles il est censé être absent affecte la cohérence même du droit des sociétés en anéantissant la summa divisio sur laquelle ce droit est bâti et en dénaturant le choix du pluralisme juridique, fait de longue date par le législateur français, qui commande en présence d’une pluralité de structures offertes aux opérateurs, une distinction de chacune d’elles reposant sur des critères précis et invariables. / Companies are traditionally classified into partnerships and joint stock companies. Intuitus personae is the basis for this distinction. Clearly present in partnership companies, intuitus personae is, in theory, absent in joint stock companies. However, this traditional distinction does not correspond today to reality. We are, in fact, witnessing a resurgence of the consideration of the individual in joint stock companies by means of contractual techniques whose aim is to control access to these companies. This resurgence has been further strengthened by the legislator, first by the creation of the status of simplified stock company and also by the recognition in listed companies of the existence of concerted action and a right to voluntary withdrawal benefiting minority stockholders. The admission of the validity of exclusion, either conventional or resulting from mechanisms specific to company law such as a squeeze out or even an “accordion squeeze”, add to the growth of this phenomenon. This presence of intuitus personae has major implications on the functioning of joint stock companies and on company law, in general. Indeed, on the one hand, the primacy of shareholder relationships over capital offers a new perspective of the notion of affectio societatis and the principle of majority rule. On the other hand, the introduction of intuitus personae into companies where this concept should have been absent affects the coherence of company law by destroying the summa divisio basis on which this law is founded and by distorting the legal pluralism long ago adopted by the French legislator which, in the presence of diverse legal structures, necessitates a distinction amongst them based on precise and invariable criteria.