This dissertation examines Peruvian ministries' implementation of administrative decentralization, 2003-2006, and identifies factors shaping their decentralization policymaking. In administrative decentralization, implementation involves translating broad guidelines into sectoral transfer policies. Sectoral policymakers who execute decentralization mandates are, therefore, responsible for relinquishing authority and resources to subnational governments. Despite this challenging situation, little is known said about factors-- or otherwise--shaping the implementation of administrative decentralization. The initiation of state decentralization programs throughout Latin America has been examined and largely attributed to national political factors, rather than technical considerations. However, transferring power is not an assured outcome of national politicians' decisions to decentralize. This study explores a process that continued to be shaped by ministries after national political actors ceased to be involved; after a rapid start of top-down reforms, administrative decentralization virtually stalled under their control. Peruvian policy sectors are very heterogeneous, suggesting a need for distinct approaches to reform. Nevertheless, ministries' collective failure to implement rapidly has been attributed to generalized resistance to relinquish authority. This view is consistent with a bureaucratic politics-type understanding of public policymaking. However, my comparative analysis of decentralization policies reveals that self-interested resistance is significant but does not coherently explain policymaking or variation between policies. Furthermore, while resistance is ubiquitous, there are different types of resistance to reform, coming from autonomous offices, top policymakers, or the Presidency. In contrast, institutionalist lenses identify rules and processes that significantly condition possibilities for administrative decentralization. Policymakers face distinct challenges and opportunities in each sector; some ministries had deconcentration programs underway when national reforms started. While institutionalist lenses elucidate distinct conditions for reform, focusing on "audacious reformers" highlights the role of individual agency. The exceptional case of Health features a complex organization led by a reform-minded minister to the forefront of reforms. All three approaches to analyzing the implementation of administrative decentralization are complementary in providing coherent accounts of sectoral policymaking. Different combinations of institutional conditions, sectoral characteristics and individual motivations are ultimately responsible for variation among approaches to reform. Administrative decentralization emerges, not as one process, but as a constellation of particular paths of reform. / text

Thesis (Ph.D.)--RAND Graduate School, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references.

The work motivation construct is central to the theory and practice of many social science disciplines. Yet, due to the novelty of validated measures appropriate for a deep cross-national comparison, studies that contrast different administrative regimes remain scarce. This study represents an initial empirical effort to validate the Public Service Motivation (PSM) instrument proposed by Kim and colleagues (2013) in a previously unstudied context. The two former communist countries analyzed in this dissertation—Belarus and Poland— followed diametrically opposite development strategies: a fully decentralized administrative regime in Poland and a highly centralized regime in Belarus. The employees (n = 677) of public and nonprofit organizations in the border regions of Podlaskie Wojewodstwo (Poland) and Hrodna Voblasc (Belarus) are the subjects of study. Confirmatory factor analysis revealed three dimensions of public service motivation in the two regions: compassion, self-sacrifice, and attraction to public service. The statistical models tested in this dissertation suggest that nonprofit sector employees exhibit higher levels of PSM than their public sector counterparts. Nonprofit sector employees also reveal a similar set of values and work attitudes across the countries. Thus, the study concludes that in terms of PSM, employees of nonprofit organizations constitute a homogenous group that exists atop the administrative regimes. However, the findings propose significant differences between public sector agencies across the two countries. Contrary to expectations, data suggest that organization centralization in Poland is equal to—or for some items even higher than—that of Belarus. We can conclude that the absence of administrative decentralization of service provision in a country does not necessarily undermine decentralized practices within organizations. Further analysis reveals strong correlations between organization centralization and PSM for the Polish sample. Meanwhile, in Belarus, correlations between organization centralization items and PSM are weak and mostly insignificant. The analysis indicates other factors beyond organization centralization that significantly impact PSM in both sectors. PSM of the employees in the studied region is highly correlated with their participation in religious practices, political parties, or labor unions as well as location of their organization in a capital and type of social service provided.