The special role courts play in a democracy requires designers of constitutions to consider the delicate trade-offs between democratic accountability and judicial independence. This dissertation analyzes the decisional consequences of state supreme court institutional structures. States utilize several types of election and elite reconfirmation, and each method carries a systematically different risk of incumbent defeat. My theory predicts that as reappointment uncertainty increases, judicial independence decreases. I define judicial independence as decisions made by judges using only considerations that are internal to the rule of law. I measure judicial independence by quantifying the external influence of partisan, elite, popular, and economic pressures applied to judges. I conclude by considering the normative implications of the empirical findings. Because judicial independence is a problem of optimization, not maximization, constitutional designers hope to strike a balance between some form of judicial accountability, popular constitutionalism, and judicial independence. / text

State supreme courts are autonomous institutions with significant power. Yet, despite this authority, state supreme courts routinely rely on one another to explain why and how they reached their decisions. This puzzle of why state supreme courts cite each other in their opinions led me to pose two questions. First, under what conditions do state supreme courts cite other states supreme courts? And second, to whom do they turn for guidance? To answer these questions, I propose a new theory for evaluating state supreme court citations, the social learning model. I borrow policy diffusion’s learning mechanism and I pair it with network theory and methods to explain peer-to-peer state supreme court citations practices. I argue that courts are social actors who interact, influence, and learn from one another, and the citations are communications by and between the courts. To model citations between courts, I apply a temporal exponential random graph network analysis model or TERGM. TERGMs simulate the evolution of the state-to-state citation network by including aspects of both the courts and the network structure. I argue that only by understanding how networks and issue areas evolve can we begin to understand how courts and justices make decisions. The network approach to citations specifically tests these endogenous relationships, it also directly models the complex dependencies of citation networks. My findings demonstrate the courts became more connected over time and no single state supreme court leader emerges. I find that citations are endogenous; what one court does affects other courts. I also discover that the area of law matters a lot and it is insufficient to pool all legal issues into a single model. Finally, state supreme courts do not cite state supreme courts who look like them. Overall, the evidence suggests the courts are learning from each other. The courts’ written language discloses the mechanism. Courts state their own case law does not provide a solution to the question presented and they must seek answers elsewhere. Additionally, the courts do not always cite the same state, as we would expect from emulation. Together, these findings demonstrate that state supreme courts are connected, they learn from one another.

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Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / This paper examines the history that influences the rate at which female justices are elected and appointed to state supreme courts. There are different variables like judicial campaign activity, limited pool, role expectations of women and advocacy that influence the selection process. I pick the states with the earliest history of selecting female justices (Ohio and New Mexico) and the states that selected female justices last (South Dakota and West Virginia) to address some of the variables mentioned above that have influenced the use of feminist jurisprudence on the bench. After selection, I examine if it is possible for said judges to use feminist theories (like liberal feminist theory) in decision-making processes on the bench. Specifically, can we, in fact use feminist theory to understand the decision making of female state Supreme Court justices? For the most part, I find that we can imply that they do and are additionally interested in creating policy and programs based on the decisions made. Does this change with political party affiliation, race and sexual orientation of the female judges? I determine that more research needs to be conducted in this area on the courts of last resort at both the federal and state level.

While there has been a substantial body of research on interest group activity in U.S. federal courts, there has been comparatively little analysis of interest group engagement with state courts. Given that state courts adjudicate the vast majority of cases in the American legal system and very few cases are appealed to the Supreme Court, understanding why organized interests participate in these courts is of great importance. The present study analyzes interest group involvement as amicus curiae in all state courts of last resort from 1995-1999 to examine what factors motivate organized interests to turn to the courts. The results indicate that interest groups are primarily motivated by their policy goals in deciding which cases to file amicus briefs in, but that they are limited in their ability to file by institutional constraints unique to state courts of last resort. This research provides insight into interest group behavior, state courts and the role organized interests play in influencing legal outcomes in the American states.