Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Available also from UMI Company.

While many scholars have ignored the cases that constitute the total litigational input to the U.S. Supreme Court, some have examined the possibility of a set policy or agenda for gatekeeping,or determination of which cases will be heard. This study is concerned with the methodological implications of gatekeeping analysis in relation to other studies and Court procedure generally, and the Burger Court from 1971 through 1973 specifically. The data consists of cases listed in the Appellate Docket Index to U.S. Law Week. The study seeks to clarify: 1) the relative strengths of origin and type of case as factors in the decision of the Court to hear a case, 2) the differences in summary and formal bearing policies, and 3) the amount of change or evolution in Court gatekeeping policy during the period. The findings indicate the presence of an active policy relative to the origin of cases in state or federal courts, while civil litigation was found to have greater access to the Court than criminal cases, linked apparently in part to the findings for civil liberties questions. Tax cases received no consistent treatment in the selection process. The conclusion indicates that the Burger Court, as of 1973, had developed no set agenda in relation to the factors studied, but does aot dismiss the possibility that if additional factors are studied over a longer period a pattern may emerge. / M.A.

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Why do interest groups participate in state courts of last resort by filing amicus curiae briefs? Are they influential when they do? This dissertation examines these questions using an original survey of organized interests that routinely participate in state supreme courts, as well as data on all amicus curiae briefs and majority opinions in over 14,000 cases decided in all fifty-two state supreme courts for a four year period. I argue that interest groups turn to state judiciaries to achieve the dual goals of influencing policy and organizational maintenance, as amicus briefs can help organized interests achieve both outcomes. Furthermore, I contend that amicus briefs are influential in shaping judicial policy-making through the provision of legally persuasive arguments. The results suggest that interest groups do file amicus briefs to both lobby for their preferred policies and to support their organization's long-term viability. Additionally, the results indicate that organized interests also participate in counteractive lobbying in state courts of last resort by filing amicus briefs to ensure their side is represented and to dull the effect of oppositional amici. The findings also demonstrate support for the influence of amicus briefs on judicial policy-making on state high courts, as amicus briefs can influence the ideological direction of the court's majority opinions. Overall, this research extends our understanding of interest group lobbing in the judiciary and in state policy venues, and provides insight into judicial politics and policy-making on state courts of last resort.

While there has been a substantial body of research on interest group activity in U.S. federal courts, there has been comparatively little analysis of interest group engagement with state courts. Given that state courts adjudicate the vast majority of cases in the American legal system and very few cases are appealed to the Supreme Court, understanding why organized interests participate in these courts is of great importance. The present study analyzes interest group involvement as amicus curiae in all state courts of last resort from 1995-1999 to examine what factors motivate organized interests to turn to the courts. The results indicate that interest groups are primarily motivated by their policy goals in deciding which cases to file amicus briefs in, but that they are limited in their ability to file by institutional constraints unique to state courts of last resort. This research provides insight into interest group behavior, state courts and the role organized interests play in influencing legal outcomes in the American states.