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The present study addresses the question of how taxpayers' perceptions of government and tax authorities are influenced by media coverage. The effect that national political topics, such as tax legislation and the expenditure of tax revenues, have on the tax payer is examined. Tax compliance depends on trust in authorities, i.e., a commonly shared belief that politicians and tax authorities act in order to promote social welfare, and the perceived power of authorities, i.e., taxpayers' perceptions of tax authorities' ability to detect and pursue tax crime. We investigate the influence of specific tax related information in the news on intended tax compliance. Results from a questionnaire-based experiment with 487 employees indicate that media coverage influences the indicated trust in tax authorities, as well as the perceived power of governmental institutions, and consequently, has an impact on participants' intended tax compliance. The findings suggest that governments should actively engage in the provision of relevant information on tax matters. This would increase both trust in the state and the authorities as well as awareness of their power regarding the enforcement of tax laws, effectively acting as a means to regulate taxpayers' behavior. (authors' abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

We analyze the impact of tax policy on the market entry of firms in the presence of corruption and tax evasion. In a world with corruption, firms must bribe corrupt officials to enter the market. For a given level of bribes, higher tax rates and stricter enforcement of taxation decrease tax evasion but typically reduce market entry. However, when the level of bribes reacts to tax policy, higher taxes and stricter enforcement of taxation can have a double benefit. Up to a certain threshold, for which we develop a simple rule, stricter enforcement increases market entry and reduces tax evasion.