This thesis examines the current Chinese foreign policy, planning and practice in terms of the strategic cultural studies which was developed and used by the United States during the cold war to accurately interpret the strategic thinking of the Soviet Union. The studies, after 30 years of evolution has made its contribution to the interpretation of national strategic behavior as well. The strategic cultural studies, however, has also aroused widespread concern because it entirely breaks the traditional boundaries of disciplines, science and culture, philosophy and strategic research, trying to interpret the strategic phenomenon in terms of ideology and culture, and clarifying the relevance of the phenomenon¡¦s past, present, and future. More importantly, the strategic culture studies questions the concept of structure of realism that a nation is a single, common, non-historical, and rational actor, but assumes that the strategic environment and its response are the results of historical building and social learning. The establishment of China¡¦s national policy at different times has been determined by two factors: the ever-changing domestic and international environments and the influence of its national leader. So after four national leaders and from the perspective of China¡¦s national strategy, the CPC foreign policy can be basically divided into two periods: prior and post reform and opening up. Before the 1978 reform, China was forced to deal with the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and the then national leader Mao Zedong decided to adopt its foreign policy largely based on the "war and revolution,". As a result, China classed all the countries around the world by means of international class struggle, and utilized the strategy of the united front to confront them. While it helped China to raise its national self-esteem, national unity and morale , most of the time the nation had to pay a painful price due to the ignorance of reality . Since China began to adopt the policy of reforming and opening up in 1980s, the nation has changed its strategic development course from politics to economy, making it necessary to ponder its foreign policy rationally; therefore, the national interest has become the fundamental directives of it. International observers note that China has moved from the "war and revolution" to "peace and development", and the peripheral peace has become the core issue of the nation¡¦s foreign policy. Ruled by Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, China¡¦s comprehensive national strength has risen rapidly, and its regional and even global influence has been increasing at the same time. The responsibility of a great power and the national image have become increasingly important to China., so based on Deng Xiaoping's diplomatic policy , Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, in response to domestic and international evolution of the situation, have continued to put forward such diplomatic discourses as "great power diplomacy", "new security concept", "peaceful rise", and "harmonious world", with particular emphasis on culture. It can be perceived that while enhancing the traditional national strength, China also emphasizes on the influence that culture has exerted on international community. And the PRC has been stressing "Chinese characteristics", which has made a great impact on the international community dominated by the Western values . "Beijing Consensus" and "China threat " are the direct reflection of this trend. Contrary to the Cold War, military forces nowadays can not completely reflect a nation's influence. In the 21st century, A nation¡¦s influence has a new name: an international image, which can only be obtained through moral, intellectual, scientific, artistic, economic, cultural and other achievements by a nation. They can be perceived as an ideal projection of international image. This development has made the CCP's foreign policy, regardless of political, economic, security and cultural aspects, change from isolation to participation and cooperation with other countries. As China¡¦s comprehensive national strength increases, its demand for the international responsibility and authority will increase accordingly, which is a correct way a nation should act diplomatically. However, this will inevitably lead to restructuring of the international authority, causing the counter-attack of the old forces. An all-out confrontation will eventually arise in the cognition of both power and values. Thus, the reaction of powers like the United States will become the restrictions and challenges of CPC's foreign policy. Facing the rise of Chinese influence and intertwined with the power struggle of the United States and China, Taiwan has to deal with these complicated issues with maximum discretion, and it will surely become a major issue in developing our own foreign policy .

In this dissertation, I investigate the characteristics and quality of liminality among the Tibetan exile community in Dharamsala, India, and the United States. I argue that the quality of their liminality defines this exile community’s ability to maneuver and voice their influence to geo-political community of states that surround them, all while within their liminal condition. The Tibetan exile people live as stateless foreigners in India but have a better standard of living and better opportunities to acquire transnational resources than their surrounding host community. In the U.S., Tibetan diaspora people live as asylum-seekers and naturalized Tibetan-Americans but have established a popular political campaign (which enjoys the support of considerably many Americans) addressing the plight of Tibetans imposed by China. I argue that the Tibetan diaspora have achieved this unique social and political success as a marginalized community by adopting a cultural practice that I call “flexible liminality.” Flexible liminality is a Tibetan cultural practice that helps transient people adjust to any situation, people, and geo-politics circumstance. Flexible liminality relies on two factors: first, political interest from various nation-states; second, a group’s ability to adjust their cultural practices to match external influences. In the case of the Tibetan exile community, it is important to note that they are excluded by multiple nation-states (China, India, the Western countries) in different ways simultaneously. Therefore, the world collective of Tibetan refugees are not fixed in one state of liminality but experience a variety of liminalities in relation to different nation-states. Second, the Tibetan exile community has adjusted their cultural practices to assimilate with host communities in whichever countries their exile-hood has landed them. Since Tibetans cannot acquire Indian citizenship, the Tibetan exile community uses India as a space to promote their political activism against China, and form better relationship with Western foreigners. In Dharamsala, the Tibetan community has organized institutions that guides Tibetan individuals to form relationships with foreign tourists, and acquire skills (i.e. language, behavior, education, philosophy) that would help them assimilate better when resettling in Western host countries. In both, Dharamsala and the U.S., the Tibetan diaspora have a cultivated cultural practice to advocate Tibetan political plight against China, and to communicate Tibetan religio-socio traditions with the foreign host community. As a result, Tibetans are able to achieve political popularity, and to socially draw empathy from foreign communities that aids in producing a space for Tibetan cultural preservation in exile. The case study on Tibetan exile community sheds a new light on the study of marginality/liminality. This dissertation showcases that there can be a spectrum for the quality of liminality that goes from flexible at one end to inflexible at the other end. Not all exile groups have the same condition of liminality, being an exile community can be beneficial or crippling somewhere in the spectrum. Tibetan exile community has achieved a flexible end of liminality in exile but there are other exile groups who may not have the same maneuvering ability as the Tibetan exile community. This theory of flexible liminality can be used to better understand the lives of exiles by characterizing and measuring the quality of their liminality.