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Despite well documented evidence that both the level and diversity of amicus participation in state high courts have been growing, we know little about whether or under what conditions amicus briefs have an impact on court outcomes. This dissertation investigates how interest groups attempt to influence state supreme courts through their participation as amicus curiae. Using an original dataset assembled from content analysis of more than 2300 state supreme court decisions handed down between 1995 and 2010 and spanning three distinct areas of law - products liability, environmental law, and free speech/expression - I find that amicus briefs submitted by interest groups have the most influence over judicial outcomes in areas of law where interest groups routinely make large-scale donations to judicial campaigns. These results raise serious concerns about the influence of big money in judicial elections. The second part of this dissertation tests two competing theories of amicus influence to determine how state high court judges utilize amicus brief information in judicial decision making. The informational theory assumes the influence of amicus brief information to be evenly distributed across judges. However, theories of confirmation bias and motivated reasoning suggest that the information in amicus briefs may be received and evaluated differently depending upon the ideological predispositions of individual judges. Using multi-level modeling, I analyze the votes of more than 12,000 individual state high court judges to determine whether judge ideology conditions the influence of amicus briefs such that judges are more receptive to pro-attitudinal information contained in briefs from interest groups that share their predispositions. Results suggest that method of judicial retention and area of case law structures the mechanism of amicus brief influence. Amicus briefs appear to play an informational role in complex areas of case law but the presence of competitive judicial elections appear to alter the mechanism of amicus brief influence such that judicial responsiveness to amicus briefs is more closely tied to the reelection and campaign fundraising considerations of individual judges. The final portion of this dissertation investigates the case-level and court-level factors that attract interest group participation as amicus curiae in state high courts in order to better our understanding of interest group strategies when engaging state judiciaries. This paper tests the hypothesis that groups strategically target cases that will best serve the policy and institutional interests of the group, while focusing group resources on cases and courts where they are most likely to be successful. Results indicate that both liberal and conservative groups target state high courts that are elected through competitive and retention election processes rather than those that are appointed, suggesting that interest groups believe their influence will be greater with judges who are accountable to the public. Results also show that both liberal and conservative groups target courts from states that are ideologically sympathetic, but not necessarily from courts that are ideologically similar. / Political Science

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The author has tried to show in this study the broad applications laid down by the Supreme Court in its decisions dealing with Jehovah's Witnesses. The tolerance used by the Supreme Court in working out the immense problems created by this sect at such a critical period, shows how tolerance builds strength rather than lessens it.

Many people assume that when the U.S. Supreme Court invalidates a federal statute as unconstitutional, the Court's decision establishes binding precedent that narrows the U.S. Congress's available options. This thesis examines whether Congress has in practice been able to effectively circumvent Supreme Court precedents while still acting consistently with such precedents in a narrow sense by not repassing an identical statute. More specifically, this work explores whether the U.S. Congress was able to repass new statutes similar to those previously invalidated by the Rehnquist Court (1986-2005). To more fully probe this issue, this study examines how often Congress has responded in such a manner, how successful Congress was in replicating the initial invalidated statute's breadth and potency, the success of the amended statute's subsequent implementation or whether the new statutes survived judicial scrutiny, and lastly, whether legislative policy goals or Court precedents prevailed. The research focused on the Rehnquist Court because it invalidated an unprecedented 34 federal statutes. This analysis found that Congress offered 11 proposals, but only repassed four statutes attempting to replicate the initial invalidated statutes. Nevertheless, in the four instances of successful reenactment, Congress was able to achieve, in practice, indistinguishable potency and breadth in two statutes and identical potency with significantly narrower breadth in one statute. This work is significant because it demonstrates that occasionally Congress has utilized available tools—in this case repassing analogous statutes—to effectively counter Supreme Court precedents. The Supreme Court is not always the exclusive or irrevocable arbitrator of constitutional controversies. / Master of Arts

Since the acknowledgement of the entrapment defense by the Supreme Court in the case of Sorrells v. United States 287 U.S. 435 (1932) there have been discussions on how it should be applied. There are two schools of thought for the application of the entrapment defense. One is the objective test and the other is the subjective test for entrapment. The subjective test focuses on the defendant's predisposition while the objective test focuses on the activity of the government. The federal courts and thirty eight states use the subjective test for entrapment. Florida is one of the states that use the subjective test for entrapment. The majority of this study is focused on the history and application of the entrapment defense, with a focus on the state of Florida. The study will aim to examine the ramifications of applying a subjective test for entrapment. Furthermore, this study will shed some light on problems with the way the entrapment defense is applied in Florida. This study has led to new ideas about how and why a new test for entrapment should be embraced by the courts in Florida.

The purpose of this study identifies state court cases involving public school finance specifically related to adequacy and equity in funding. Results address how state court cases have challenged the constitutionality of school finance in the United States, including Texas, over the last 50 years. The study further shows how the decisions from previous cases have influenced the Supreme Court of Texas decision in the Texas Taxpayer & Student Fairness litigation.

Submitted by Deidre Raquel Whitfield (deidre.whitfield2015@fgvmail.br) on 2015-01-26T14:28:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 CIM Thesis Modification - TNR Discrimination in the Workplace - 29 November 2014.pdf: 6213678 bytes, checksum: c71a107036fdb9510410fef984976165 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Janete de Oliveira Feitosa (janete.feitosa@fgv.br) on 2015-01-28T14:08:09Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 CIM Thesis Modification - TNR Discrimination in the Workplace - 29 November 2014.pdf: 6213678 bytes, checksum: c71a107036fdb9510410fef984976165 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2015-02-05T16:21:04Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 CIM Thesis Modification - TNR Discrimination in the Workplace - 29 November 2014.pdf: 6213678 bytes, checksum: c71a107036fdb9510410fef984976165 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-02-05T16:26:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 CIM Thesis Modification - TNR Discrimination in the Workplace - 29 November 2014.pdf: 6213678 bytes, checksum: c71a107036fdb9510410fef984976165 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-10-29 / Discrimination, in its best form, is a hard concept to fathom as an employee or ordinary citizen. In the workplace, there are times when discrimination is necessary due to extenuating circumstances that revolve around the form or act of discrimination. It could be conveyed to save a life or avoid future conflict. However, it must be clearly stated as a written law that the act is lawful. When unlawful discrimination occurs, it stages an entirely different tone, as it is mainly conducted out of malice, hatred, greed, control, or ignorance. Over the last few decades, discrimination has existed in the workplace, although Federal laws mandate that it does not occur. It does not exist in just one geographical area or is country specific, but covers a wide spectrum, linking countries together from their points of view to creating rifts amongst those who are affected and those who are not, not only from a business perspective, but social humanistic relationships as well. This thesis will use quantitative and qualitative data to support discrimination of sexual harassment, race or color, and gender issues, as well as personal experiences, and how it has and will continue to impact businesses if the acts do not cease, permanently. Leadership, from the Presidents and Heads of Countries, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), managers, lowest-ranking supervisor, and employees should make it their personal goal to ensure these issues do not continue or arise in their perspective areas of responsibilities. When employees understand that they are valued, will be taken seriously when reporting acts of discrimination, and that some form of action will be taken, performance and productivity will escalate, and morale will increase in the workplace, resulting in higher productivity and subsequently higher profit margins for the company.

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This thesis examines the views of freedoms of press and speech held by the twelve earliest justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, as the Sedition Act of 1798 raised their earliest First Amendment questions including the breadth of those freedoms and of seditious libel. The thesis discusses three aspects of the early justices' views, which add to existing studies. First, the context of those justices' views was growing challenges to the restrictive Blackstone and Mansfield definition of freedom of press as only freedom from prior restraint (licensing) and as not also freedom from subsequent restraint such as seditious libel prosecution. Those challenges were reflected in broad language protecting freedoms of press and speech, and in the absence of language stating that the English common law of rights or of seditious libel was left unaltered. That crucial context of growing challenges has not been detailed in existing literature. (Chapter 3.) Second, the views of each early justice on press and speech are chronicled for the period 1789-1798. That discloses express commitments to those freedoms, which are absent from existing literature, and no adoption of the Blackstone definition before the 1798 crisis. (Chapters 4-5.) Third, the cases and reasoning of the six sitting justices upholding the Sedition Act of 1798 are chronicled and assessed, along with the views of the six remaining justices. That reveals that most remaining justices and also a significant minority within the Federalist party rejected the Sedition Act. Yet positions on the Sedition Act have been only cursorily discussed for four sitting justices and have been overlooked for the other eight justices, as well as for the Federalist party's minority, for the critical period 1798-1800. (Chapters 6-7.) The thesis proposes reasons for that divergence between the pre-1798 commitment of all justices to freedoms of press and speech, and the support given by most sitting justices to the Sedition Act, in contrast to apparent opposition by most remaining justices. The primary reasons are their opposing positions on several connected issues: the extent of rights to dissent, the challenges to the Blackstone definition and to seditious libel, the effect of new state and federal constitutions on seditious libel and on common law rights, strength of attachment to freedoms of press and speech and to seditious libel, and most sitting justices' changes of position to embrace the Blackstone definition. The thesis calls into question conventional views in existing literature on each of those three aspects. First, Levy and others express the dominant view that freedom of press in state declarations of rights and the First Amendment 'was used in its prevailing common law or Blackstonian sense to mean a guarantee against previous restraints and a subjection to subsequent restraints for licentious or seditious abuse,' so that contrary evidence 'does not exist,' and that 'no other definition of freedom of the press by anyone anywhere in America before 1798' existed. Instead, opposition to the essence of seditious libel had been mounting over the decades. Second, the early justices are usually portrayed as having nothing to say about freedoms of press and speech before 1798. Instead, nearly all exhibited commitment to those freedoms before that crucial year, though half the early justices upheld the Sedition Act during 1798-1800. Third, the Federalist party, the early justices, and the states except Virginia and Kentucky are all usually described as unanimously supporting the Sedition Act. Instead, the Federalists divided over the Act, and the early justices did as well, with an unrecognized but significant minority of the party, and nearly half of the early justices, opposing the Sedition Act, as did several additional states.