Bakgrund: Revisorer omfattas av penningtvättslagstiftningens krav och ska rapportera misstänkta transaktioner som de upptäcker till Finanspolisen. Men revisorernas rapporteringar är väldigt få. Tidigare studier visar på att bristande utbildning och kunskaper hos revisorerna kan vara en orsak till det låga rapporteringstalet. Andra aspekter som framförts är att det är svårt att hitta oegentligheter under en revision eftersom det endast är ett urval av transaktioner som granskas, samt att penningtvätt lämnar få spår i en årsredovisning.  Syfte: Syftet med studien är att ge en ökad förståelse för revisorers förutsättningar för rapportering av misstänkta transaktioner genom att undersöka hur revisorer utbildas inom penningtvättsområdet och hur revisorernas möjligheter att upptäcka penningtvätt kan se ut i verkligheten.  Metod: Jag har utfört min studie med abduktiv forskningsansats, där jag växlat mellan insamling och tolkning av både teori och empiri för att uppfylla studiens syfte. Jag har samlat min empiri genom semistrukturerade kvalitativa intervjuer med personer från revisionsfirmor och utredande myndigheter, samt att jag använt mig av ett penningtvättsfall med domar från tingsrätt och hovrätt samt årsredovisningar för de bolag som ingick i fallet. Slutsats: Den generella uppfattningen hos respondenterna från revisionsfirmor är att revisorernas utbildning inom penningtvätt är tillräcklig för att uppfylla penningtvättslagens krav. Samtidigt framkommer att det finns ett behov av mer praktisk utbildning för att ge revisorerna bättre förståelse för vad de ska leta efter för att hitta penningtvätt. Vidare framkommer att lagkravet om transaktionsgranskning bör ges mer emfas i revisorernas utbildning. Studiens rättsfallsanalys visar på att revisorernas möjligheter att upptäcka penningtvätt i det aktuella fallet var bättre avseende små bolag. Revisorns val av granskningsmetoder samt att vara observant på avvikande betalningsströmmar är viktiga faktorer som påverkar möjligheterna att upptäcka penningtvätt. / Background: Accountants are subject to money laundering legislation and has to report suspicious transactions they detect to the Financial Police. But accountants submit very few suspicious transactions reports. Previous studies indicate that this could be due to the accountants’ lacking training and knowledge. Other aspects that have been expressed are that it is difficult to find irregularities during an audit as only a selection of transactions are examined, and that money laundering leaves few traces in a financial statement.  Purpose: The purpose of this study is to increase the understanding of the accountants’ conditions for reporting suspicious transactions by examining how the accountants are trained in the money laundering field and which possibilities the accountants might have to detect money laundering in reality.  Method: I have performed this study with an abductive research approach, where I have alternated between collecting and interpreting both theory and empirical data to fulfil the purpose of the study. I have gathered my empirical data through semi-structured qualitative interviews with persons from accounting firms and investigative authorities. I have also used a money laundering case with court decisions from Crown court and Court of Appeal together with the financial statements from the limited companies that were involved in the case. Conclusions: The general perception among the respondents from the accounting firms is that the accountants’ training in the money laundering field is sufficient to fulfil the legislative requirements. At the same time it appears that more practical training is required to give the accountants a better understanding of what they should be looking for to detect money laundering. Furthermore, it appears that the legislative requirement for examining transactions should be give more emphasis in the training. The study’s analysis of a court case indicates that the accountants’ possibilities to detect money laundering in the specific case were better regarding smaller sized companies. The accountant’s choice of audit procedures and to be observant of abnormal money flows are important factors that impacts the possibilities to detect money laundering.

Submitted by Aldo Romani Netto (aldoromani82@hotmail.com) on 2018-03-28T17:08:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 TCC - VERSÃO FINAL REVISADA - ENCADERNAÇÃO.pdf: 1173150 bytes, checksum: 0420537bae521c26ec90356de732708c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Thais Oliveira (thais.oliveira@fgv.br) on 2018-03-28T17:11:02Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 TCC - VERSÃO FINAL REVISADA - ENCADERNAÇÃO.pdf: 1173150 bytes, checksum: 0420537bae521c26ec90356de732708c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Isabele Garcia (isabele.garcia@fgv.br) on 2018-03-28T18:19:55Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 TCC - VERSÃO FINAL REVISADA - ENCADERNAÇÃO.pdf: 1173150 bytes, checksum: 0420537bae521c26ec90356de732708c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-03-28T18:19:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TCC - VERSÃO FINAL REVISADA - ENCADERNAÇÃO.pdf: 1173150 bytes, checksum: 0420537bae521c26ec90356de732708c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-16 / Com a promulgação da Lei Federal 12.683/2012, ganhou relevância a discussão sobre a submissão de advogados aos mecanismos de controle em operações suspeitas de lavagem de capitais, sobretudo quando atuam no assessoramento de clientes em operações financeiras, imobiliárias e societárias. O presente trabalho se propõe a discutir a compatibilidade entre o dever de comunicar operações suspeitas de lavagem de capitais por advogados e os princípios inerentes ao exercício da advocacia. Nesse sentido, a entrada em vigor da parte administrativa da Lei de Lavagem de Capitais motivou os diversos órgãos representativos de classes profissionais a regulamentarem as atividades de seus representados, inclusive definindo quais operações apresentariam indícios de suspeição. A Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, por seu turno, já externou seu entendimento no sentido de que o artigo 9o, parágrafo único, inciso XIV, é inaplicável aos advogados, sob o argumento de uma suposta incompatibilidade entre o sigilo profissional e o teor da norma. Trabalha-se com a hipótese de que a postura da OAB fragiliza a segurança profissional dos advogados, expondo a classe de profissionais a risco permanente na prática da advocacia, especificamente a consultiva. Não por outro motivo, muitos advogados se tornaram alvo de investigações criminais por práticas profissionais que acabaram se revelando como possíveis contribuições a processos de lavagem de capitais de clientes. No âmbito internacional, entidades representativas no combate à lavagem de capitais entendem estarem os serviços jurídicos prestados por advogados sujeitos aos mecanismos controle. A submissão dos advogados ao dever de informar operações suspeitas de clientes, portanto, parece ser um caminho sem volta, ao menos sob certos pressupostos e condições. / After the enactment of Federal Law No. 12,683/2012, the discussion regarding the submission of lawyers to control mechanisms of operations that are suspected to be a money laundering scheme has become relevant, especially when they act advising clients in financial, real estate and corporate transactions. Among them, the spotlight is in the obligation to communicate suspicious transactions that is related with the central issue of this discussion: its compatibility with principles inherent to the practice of advocacy. The entry into force of the administrative part of the Money Laundering Law motivated the various representative bodies of professional classes to regulate the activities of their represented personnel, including defining which operations would show signs of suspicion. The Brazilian Bar (OAB), for its part, has already expressed its view that Article 9, sole paragraph, clause XIV, is inapplicable to lawyers, on the grounds of a supposed incompatibility between professional confidentiality and the provisions of the law. The hypothesis that the position of OAB weakens the professional security of lawyers is worked upon, exposing the entire class of professionals to permanent risk in the practice of advocacy, especially the advisory. For the very same reason, many lawyers became the target of criminal investigations for professional practices that turned out to be potential contributions to clients' money laundering procedures. At the international level, entities representing the struggle against money laundering understand that the legal services provided by lawyers are subject to control mechanisms. The submission of lawyers to the duty to report suspicious client transactions seems to be a non-return path, at least under certain assumptions and conditions.