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A reasoner’s beliefs can compromise or inflate the accuracy of their syllogistic judgments when syllogistic content and structure are incongruent or congruent, respectively. An integrated approach to the study of syllogistic reasoning led to the investigation of premise-based belief-content conflict and its impact on belief bias. The belief-content conflict cue attenuated belief bias in incongruent valid and invalid trials, as well as congruent invalid trials. Its efficacy was found to depend on the difficulty level of the syllogism in which it was embedded and the location of its placement. Reaction time analyses were used to guide interpretations about the relative engagement of Systems 1 and 2. The key findings suggested that belief-content conflict activated System 2 for invalid incongruent trials which would otherwise have been processed using low-cost heuristic means due to their inherent difficulty. In contrast, it appeared that in valid trials the cue led to a redirection of System 2 resources such that specialized analytic strategies were applied in incongruent trials preceded by belief-content conflict compared to those lacking this cue. Finally, belief bias was successfully offset by belief-content conflict even in cases of congruency. In congruent invalid trials without this cue participants’ intuitive awareness of the content-structure match appeared to lead to low-cost, belief-based guesses; yet when presented as the major premise this conflict cue appeared to shift System 1 processing away from content and towards structure. Albeit less diligent than System 2 analysis, the shallow consideration of structural features may have been viewed as a safer bet than any shortcut aiming to capitalize on syllogistic content. This set of findings cannot be fully accounted for by the selective scrutiny, misinterpreted necessity, mental models, verbal reasoning, selective processing, or Receiver Operating Characteristics accounts thereby highlighting the need for considering belief-content conflict in future models of belief bias.

The central topic of the thesis is the relationship between logic and the cognitive psychology of reasoning. This topic is treated in large part through a detailed examination of the recent work of P. N. Johnson-Laird, who has elaborated a widely-read and influential theory in the field. The thesis is divided into two parts, of which the first is a more general and philosophical coverage of some of the most central issues to be faced in relating psychology to logic, while the second draws upon this as introductory material for a critique of Johnson-Laird's `Mental Model' theory, particularly as it applies to syllogistic reasoning. An approach similar to Johnson-Laird's is taken to cognitive psychology, which centrally involves the notion of computation. On this view, a cognitive model presupposes an algorithm which can be seen as specifying the behaviour of a system in ideal conditions. Such behaviour is closely related to the notion of `competence' in reasoning, and this in turn is often described in terms of logic. Insofar as a logic is taken to specify the competence of reasoners in some domain, it forms a set of conditions on the 'input-output' behaviour of the system, to be accounted for by the algorithm. Cognitive models, however, must also be subjected to empirical test, and indeed are commonly built in a highly empirical manner. A strain can therefore develop between the empirical and the logical pressures on a theory of reasoning. Cognitive theories thus become entangled in a web of recently much-discussed issues concerning the rationality of human reasoners and the justification of a logic as a normative system. There has been an increased interest in the view that logic is subject to revision and development, in which there is a recognised place for the influence of psychological investigation. It is held, in this thesis, that logic and psychology are revealed by these considerations to be interdetermining in interesting ways, under the general a priori requirement that people are in an important and particular sense rational. Johnson-Laird's theory is a paradigm case of the sort of cognitive theory dealt with here. It is especially significant in view of the strong claims he makes about its relation to logic, and the role the latter plays in its justification and in its interpretation. The theory is claimed to be revealing about fundamental issues in semantics, and the nature of rationality. These claims are examined in detail, and several crucial ones refuted. Johnson- Laird's models are found to be wanting in the level of empirical support provided, and in their ability to found the considerable structure of explanation they are required to bear. They fail, most importantly, to be distinguishable from certain other kinds of models, at a level of theory where the putative differences are critical. The conclusion to be drawn is that the difficulties in this field are not yet properly appreciated. Psychological explantion requires a complexity which is hard to reconcile with the clarity and simplicity required for logical insights.

Kurį laiką buvo manoma, kad vaikai, kurie dar neperėjo priešoperacinės stadijos nemoka daryti tranzityvumo santykio išvadų apie kiekybę (Pears, Bryant, 1992). Pasak Schnall ir Gattis (1998), daugelis tyrinėtojų bando atsakyti į klausimą, iki kokio laipsnio ir nuo kokio amžiaus vaikai gali išspręsti tranzityvumo santykio vertinimo užduotis. Nors Piaget ir kiti (Inhelder ir Piaget, 1958; cit. pagal Schnall, Gattis, 1998) manė, kad vaikai tik apie 7-8 metus ir vyresni geba teisingai išspręsti tranzityvumo vertinimo užduotis, jaunesni vaikai (Bryant ir Trabasso, 1971; Riley ir Trabasso, 1974) (cit. pagal Schnall, Gattis, 1998) taip pat geba tranzityviai vertinti pasitreniravus. Bryant ir Trabasso (1971; cit. pagal Schnall, Gattis, 1998) padarė išvadą, kad tranzityvumo vertinimo u���duočių neišsprendimas gali būti greičiau dėl darbinės atminties ribotumo nei dėl kognityvinių trūkumų. Tyrimo objektas – 4-6 metų vaikų tranzityvumo supratimas. Tyrimo tikslas – charakterizuoti 4-6 metų vaikų tranzityvumo santykio supratimo ypatumus. Siekiant šio tikslo, išsikelti šie uždaviniai: 1. Sudaryti ir pateikti 4-6 metų am����iaus vaikams tris užduotis, kurios tiria tranzityvumo santykio supratimą. 2. Nustatyti, ar 4-6 metų vaikai geba tranzityviai samprotauti. 3. Palyginti užduotis pagal tiesioginius atsakymus. 4. Palyginti užduotis pagal kokybinius atsakymus. 5. Palyginti berniukų ir mergaičių gebėjimą tranzityviai samprotauti. Prieš atliekant tyrimą buvo išsikeltos tokios hipotezės: 1. 4-6... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / It was believe that children which didn‘t pass preoperational stage, can‘t to do transitivity conclusions about quantity (Pears, Bryant, 1992). According Schnall and Gattis (1998), many researchers trying ask to question by what degree and from what age children are able to solve transitivity interference tasks. Though Piaget and others (Inhelder ir Piaget, 1958; cit. pagal Schnall, Gattis, 1998) thought that children only about 7-8 years and older can to solve transitivity interference tasks right, younger children (Bryant ir Trabasso, 1971; Riley ir Trabasso, 1974; by Schnall, Gattis, 1998) also are able to solve transitivity interference tasks if they are trained. Bryant and Trabasso (1971; by Schnall, Gattis, 1998) made conclusion that wrong solving of transitivity interference tasks can be rather for working memory limitation nor cognitive deficits. Object of the Study – understanding transitivity in 4-6 years old children. The aim of the study was to characterize understanding transitivity in 4-6 years old children. Goals of the study: 1. Organize and represent for 4-6 years old children three tasks which research inderstanding transitivity. 2. Find, are 4-6 years old children able to reason transitively. 3. Compare tasks by direct answers. 4. Compare tasks by qualitative ansvers. 5. Compare ability to reason transitively in boys and girls. Hyphotesis: 1. 4-6 years old children are able to reason transitively. 2. Children did more mistakes in tasks which were hard to... [to full text]

В настоящее время силлогистика, благодаря ее связи с естественным языком, занимает значимую позицию в широком спектре дисциплин: от когнитивных наук до исследований в области искусственного интеллекта. Ряд особенностей восприятия и обработки человеком силлогистических рассуждений часто приводит к ошибкам при решении данного рода задач. Применение интерактивной визуализации символьных контекстов с применением компьютерных моделей снижает вероятность возникновения подобных проблем. Кроме того, повышению эффективности на этапе обучения способствует введение игровых элементов. В силлогистике самыми распространенными вариантами графических представлений являются круговые диаграммы Эйлера и Венна. Первый подход, согласно ряду эмпирических результатов, оказывает более положительный эффект на результаты решения силлогистических задач. В качестве иллюстрации идеи визуальной поддержки освоения базовых принципов силлогистического вывода предложен проект программного решения, предоставляющего возможности интерактивного построения силлогизмов с использованием диаграмм Эйлера в качестве графической репрезентации. / Today syllogistic, due to its connection with natural language, finds broad application in a wide range of research fields: from cognitive sciences to AI. Some specific features of human perception and processing of syllogistic reasoning makes such kind of tasks prone to error. To diminish the impact of these cognitive biases visual interactive computer models are used as a representation of symbolic contexts. Moreover, to increase the effectiveness of learning various game elements could be applied. Euler and Venn diagrams are the most common methods of the syllogistic reasoning visual representation. There are some empirical proofs that Euler diagrams have better effect on the results of the syllogistic tasks solving. To illustrate the idea of a visual support system for syllogistic learning, we have proposed a project of software application that represents the environment for interactive syllogism construction, which relies on Euler diagrams as a visual representation.