The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the United States to dominance marked the start of a new era in international relations. The need to study accommodation as a security strategy in the developing world stemmed from this major development. In this context, this thesis attempts to add to the growing literature on accommodative strategies by analysing the dynamics of accommodation in protracted conflicts in the developing world. The specific case selected in the search for insights is the evolution of Syrian policy towards Israel in the post-Cold War era. Three instances of attempted accommodation are studied: the Madrid Peace Conference (1991), the Wye Talks (1995), and the Shepherdstown Talks (1999). This thesis argues that the main explanatory factors for accommodation in this case are to be found in the external politico-military sphere. On the objective level, the role of powerful third parties and the changes in the opponent's policies particularly stand out. On the subjective level, external politico-military concerns, in the desire to avoid potentially permanent losses, appear to be the prime generator of accommodative moves.

No description available.

Why do some regimes enjoy more autonomy than others when taking foreign policy and alignment choices? How does the organization of state-society relations constrain or enable a regime's freedom to take foreign policy and alignment choices? What explains the overlap between the domestic and external security spheres of some states, but not others? Finally, how do the foreign policy and alignment choices of some regimes have domestic political origins, uses, and implications? / This study explores these theoretical questions through a comparative examination of the impact of the organization of state-society relations (the independent variable) on regime autonomy in taking foreign policy and alignment choices (the dependent variable) in King Hussein's Jordan and Hafiz al-Asad's Syria. In contrast to Jordan's overlapping security terrains, and the domestic political origins, uses, and implications of many of the Hashemite regime's foreign policy and alignment choices, in Asad's Syria these choices are responses to shifts in the external geopolitical environment. This study offers an explanation of the discrepancy between the Syrian regime's ability to ignore domestic constraints on foreign policy and alignment choices, due to its preoccupation with external sources of threat, compared to its Jordanian counterpart's inability to do so and, consequently, its preoccupation on many occasions with strictly domestic sources of threat. / This study bridges comparative politics and international relations theorizing, inviting a methodological shift away from the hitherto dominant neorealist tendency in the latter field, which anchors foreign policy and alignment choices in primarily external considerations and objectives. Borrowing from the literature on corporatism, populism, and historical institutionalism, this study also supplies a more rigorous methodology for investigating the relationship between the domestic structures of nondemocratic states and their foreign policy and alignment choices. More than a revision of neorealist theorizing, and in contrast to idiosyncratic, domestic structure, or constructivist approaches to the study of state behavior, this study contends that a contextual and historical analysis of the organization of state-society relations explains why regime autonomy to take foreign policy and alignment choices may be constrained in some states but not in others. Furthermore, and against neorealism's insistence on the external origins of foreign policy and alignment choices, this study also argues that on many occasions these choices have domestic political origins, uses, and implications. The implications of these conclusions on the study of Arab politics, and on the quest for a first-cut theory of state behavior, are also assessed.

This thesis is a study of international relations theory and the case of the Lebanese state's relations with Syria between 1975 and 2002. It aims to answer the following questions: (1) Why has Lebanon generally "bandwagoned" with Syria, a country which has managed to intervene in and subdue it at the expense of Lebanese sovereignty. (2) How have Lebanese state officials, along with other political actors, tried to manipulate Syria for their own interests, whether to defend Lebanese sovereignty, to maintain and increase their status, or to contain and appease their rivals and opponents. (3) Parallel to the discussions generated by these two questions, which kinds of theory are relevant to or best explain Lebanese relations with Syria. Specifically this study demonstrates that the behavior of a penetrated weak state, Lebanon, toward a regional middle power, Syria, cannot usefully be explained by simple realism's state-to-state power balancing model. Rather, it is necessary to differentiate the multitude of state (office-holders) and sub-state actors. In addition, their behavior can only be explained by a combination of factors identified in a variety of theories: reaction to an external threat (simple realism) which explain a very few cases; "omni-alignments" against interrelated threats (complex realism) which result from the weaknesses of the Lebanese state and which explain much more; still powerful transstate ties (constructivism) which themselves needed to be understood in terms of the contradiction between sovereignty and identity and which have some impact; and complex interdependence and shared interests (pluralism) which generally exist between Lebanese and Syrian elites.

No description available.

No description available.

This thesis explores the dynamics involved in shaping the Anglo-Syrian relationship. It argues that to understand UK relations towards Syria over the past century, they have to be viewed in the broader context of British policy on Middle East regional issues, and wider foreign policy priorities. With no direct interests invested in Syria, it is both Britain's continued involvement in Middle East affairs and Syria's standing as a key regional power that assures a continuing relationship. Consequently, the stance of leading UK politicians on the issues of post-World War regional order, international terrorism, military interventionism, arms sales, dictatorship and democratisation have circumscribed UK policy options in relation to Syria. Using the tools of Neoclassical realism this study considers British foreign policy behaviour, in terms of Britain's attempt to mobilize the power to protect its interests. It reviews Britain's international behaviour in part by how it is affected by changes in the international system, as Britain has declined from being a great imperial power, to a European power. Alliances are a key tool Britain has used to manage its decline, and this study identifies the impact that this has had on Anglo-Syrian relations with particular reference to the US and EU. Finally, it demonstrates that understanding how the foreign policy process works in Britain is key to understanding its international behaviour. In this it takes into account elite perceptions both of what these interests are and how best Britain can achieve them. This adds a layer of understanding as to why foreign policy outcomes do not always conform with what would be predicted purely in terms of the pursuit of the national interest.

This study examines the nature and patterns of Soviet cultural activities in Egypt and Syria, the motivations behind those activities, and the contribution of the Soviet cultural effort toward the attainment of overall Soviet Middle East policies. Chapter I provides background information on Soviet-Arab relations, and in Chapter II Soviet objectives in the Middle East are examined. Chapter III identifies the important components of the Soviet cultural instrument in Egypt and Syria. Chapter IV assesses the contribution made by the cultural tool toward the attainment of Soviet objectives in Egypt and Syria. Finally, Chapter V demonstrates that the Soviet cultural enterprise exerted little impact on overall Soviet policy in the Middle East.