This thesis results from a long interest and association with Australian export activities in the East Asian region. It has developed from an investigation into the relevance of tariffs to Australia’s export performance in East Asia into a thesis which explores the performance of Australia’s Statutory Marketing Authorities (SMA’s) in the beef, dairy and wheat sectors in Japan, Taiwan and Thailand, and the influence of Non-Tariff barriers on this performance. It is hoped that the data presented in the thesis will be a useful guide to the activities of SMA’s in East Asia between 1974 and 1994 and illustrate the success, or lack of it, that Australian exporters have had in overcoming the considerable barriers to agricultural trade with the region. More detailed analysis and assessments have been made of the statistical relevance of NTB’s, and the performance of SMA’s over the past ten years. However, this thesis sets out to charter a more diverse route through the intricacies and complexities of Australia’s export performance and admonish the notion that NTB’s are the pivotal factor to export success in East Asia.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1966. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Bibliography: l. 156-163.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Dept. of Economics, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references.

The World Trade Organisation Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) was crafted with the aim of ensuring that technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedure do not constitute unnecessary obstacles to international trade. Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries have since ratified this Agreement and took a step further to incorporate its principles into the Technical Barriers to Trade Annex to the SADC Protocol on Trade. Despite this effort, SADC countries are still grappling with implementing the TBT Agreement in their domestic frameworks. Consequently, technical barriers to trade have become impediments to both regional and international trade. It is in this context that this study aims to examine the implementation of the TBT Agreement within the SADC. The study answers the question what are the challenges facing SADC Member states to fully implement the TBT Agreement? The study demonstrates that SADC Member face challenges which include of lack adequate resources, technical expertise and enforcement mechanisms to effectively implement the TBT Agreement. In the finality, the study recommends SADC Member states to deepen regional integration in order to collaborate on matters relating to technical barriers to trade within the region. Member states should also share information and learn from the experiences of other countries on how to effectively implement the TBT Agreement. Further, government officials should be educated on trade-friendly regulations that do not compromise on the principles of the TBT Agreement. To this end, regulatory impact assessments should be established in order to assess the trade effects of both new and old regulations. Effective enforcement mechanisms should also be introduced in order to coerce Member states to comply with their regional obligations. By effecting these recommendations, SADC states have the opportunity to eradicate technical barriers to trade thereby increasing both regional and international trade.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of Economics / Yang M. Chang / Concerns over the possible loss of government revenue resulting from tariff reductions under trade liberalization have triggered many developing countries to opt for a strategy of raising destination-based consumption taxes on tradable goods. The first essay analyzes the welfare effects of a coordinated tariff reduction and domestic tax reform when the objective of a reforming country is to keep its government revenue unchanged. Assuming imperfect competition in an import-competing industry, we find that revenue-neutral reform involving tariff reduction and an increase in domestic tax rate may reduce domestic welfare under plausible assumptions. It also discusses the scenario in which the reforming country's objective is to keep domestic profit (or production) unchanged. We further identify the conditions under which a profit-neutral tariff and tax reform may be welfare-improving or welfare-deteriorating. The second essay uses a reciprocal-dumping model to examine the welfare effects of the Byrd Amendment (i.e., the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, or CDSOA). It analyzes the differences in optimal tariffs set by the home and foreign governments when the home (i.e., the U.S.) government redistributes anti-dumping duties to its domestic firm under the new trade law, as compared to the traditional antidumping policy under which these duties are government revenues. We derive conditions under which the CDSOA may raise or lower the price of an import-competing good in the U.S. market. The results show that the CDSOA is an instrument of protectionism and strictly improves the home country welfare when markets are less competitive than in Cournot equilibrium. We find that under the same market characteristics, the new trade law strictly reduces foreign country welfare. The CDSOA's welfare effect is shown to be ambiguous, however, when markets are more competitive than Cournot. The third essay modifies the model presented in Essay 2 to allow for the scenario in which the foreign country strategically responds to the home country's CDSOA law by adopting similar trade law. The results show that the foreign country is able to enhance its national welfare when the import-competing markets are less competitive than in the Cournot equilibrium. We also discuss whether it is welfare-improving for the U.S. to voluntarily repeal the Byrd Amendment and restore the traditional antidumping policy, considering that, otherwise, its trading partner may also adopt the CDSOA law. We find that it is still in the best interest to the U.S. not to revoke the Byrd Amendment when markets are less competitive than Cournot. When markets are more competitive than Cournot, however, repealing the Amendment may turn out to be socially welfare-improving.

No description available.

The study focuses on tariff-linked (or commodity-linked) agreements entered into between a power utility and commodity producers. The main purpose of these types of agreements is to link electricity tariff payable by commodity producers to the price of the commodity produced thereby transferring a certain level of commodity price risk to the power utility. The study looks at risk management practices of a power utility company with a particular reference to tariff-linked agreements. Also, the study critically analyses risk hedging mechanisms put in place by the power utility. The report makes practical recommendations, where applicable, in dealing with these risks. Risk management continuously evolve to meet the challenges of complex financial world. Despite the latest sophisticated risk management tools available commodity producers still encounter difficulties to hedge the price risk. The challenge for the power utility is the application of new risk management tools to effectively manage price risk. / Business Management / M.Com. (Business Economics)

The study focuses on tariff-linked (or commodity-linked) agreements entered into between a power utility and commodity producers. The main purpose of these types of agreements is to link electricity tariff payable by commodity producers to the price of the commodity produced thereby transferring a certain level of commodity price risk to the power utility. The study looks at risk management practices of a power utility company with a particular reference to tariff-linked agreements. Also, the study critically analyses risk hedging mechanisms put in place by the power utility. The report makes practical recommendations, where applicable, in dealing with these risks. Risk management continuously evolve to meet the challenges of complex financial world. Despite the latest sophisticated risk management tools available commodity producers still encounter difficulties to hedge the price risk. The challenge for the power utility is the application of new risk management tools to effectively manage price risk. / Business Management / M.Com. (Business Economics)

<p>In the telecommunications market, firms often give consumers the option of purchasing an individual plan or a family plan. An individual plan gives a certain allowance of usage (e.g., minutes, data) for a single consumer, whereas a family plan allows multiple consumers to share a specific level of usage. The theoretical challenge is to understand how the firm stands to benefit from allowing family plans. In this paper, we use a game-theoretic framework to explore the role of family plans. An obvious way that family plans can be profitable is if it draws in very low-valuation consumers whom the firm would choose not to serve in the absence of a family plan. Interestingly, we find that even when a family plan does not draw any new consumers into the market, a firm can still benefit from offering it. This finding occurs primarily because of the strategic impact of the family plan on the firm's entire product line. By allowing high- and low-valuation consumers to share joint allowance in the family plan, the firm is able to raise the price to extract more surplus from the individual high-valuation consumers by reducing the cannibalization problem. Furthermore, a family obtains a higher allowance compared to the purchase of several individual plans and therefore contributes more profits to the firm. We also observe different types of quantity discounts in the firm's product line. Finally, we identify conditions under which the firm offers a pay-as-you-go plan.</p> / Dissertation

A partir de estudo do histórico da indústria de energia elétrica no Brasil, de revisão de conceitos de Direito Administrativo, teoria geral de concessões de serviços públicos e política de preço aplicada a monopólios naturais, o trabalho apresenta o estudo de caso de duas empresas de fornecimento de energia elétrica privatizadas a partir da regulamentação do art. 175 dispositivos da Constituição Federal de 1988, através da publicação da Lei nº 8.985/1995, conhecida como Lei de Concessões. A Lei em referência possibilitou que serviços de utilidade pública cuja atividade era altamente controlada pelo governo, a exemplo do fornecimento de energia, telecomunicações, entre outros, tivessem sua prestação delegada à iniciativa privada, passando o Estado a exercer apenas as tarefas de fiscalizador e regulador dos serviços, na figura de autarquias de regime especial: as agências reguladoras. As condições da prestação dos serviços públicos, como a forma de reajuste e revisão das tarifas, foram estabelecidas em contratos de concessão assinados entre a União e os novos concessionários. No segmento de distribuição de energia elétrica, entretanto, as condições contratualmente pactuadas para preservação das tarifas não têm sido devidamente observadas, provocando distorções nos mercados das concessionárias, conseqüentemente sobre os seus respectivos consumidores. / ABSTRACT Beginning from the study of the history of Brazils electric energy industry, the review of Administrative rights and obligations concepts, general theory of public utility concessions, to the price policy applied to Natural Monopolies, this Dissertation presents the case study of two electric energy distribution companies, which were privatized by means of Law nº 8.987/1995, know as Law of Concessions, that guides Article nº 175 of the Federal Constitution of 1988. The Law made it possible for public utilities whose activities were highly regulated by the Government, such as the distribution of electric energy, telecommunications, among others, to be granted to the entrepreneurial initiative, where the State would only act as a regulating and inspecting agent, through regulatory agencies. The terms of rendering the service of public utilities, such as tariff policies, were established in concession contracts signed between the Union and the new concessionaires. In the electric energy distribution sector, however, these contractual conditions to establish and preserve tariffs have not been dully observed, causing distortions in the markets served by the concessionaires and consequently on their respective consumers.