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An undertaking enjoying a dominant position on the internal market has many possibilities to flourish and develop. One way of increasing market power is to expand business activities to downstream markets. An undertaking that is dominant on the upstream market can thus take advantage of its dominance when engaging in business conduct on the downstream market. However, taking advantage of such a position can in some circumstances lead to an infringement of Article 102 TFEU. Recent cases from the EU courts and the EU Commission have, however, demonstrated uncertainties concerning the ways in which the article should be applied.   The purpose of the thesis has been to examine different approaches towards the application of Article 102 TFEU in situations where vertically integrated dominant undertakings are favouring their own downstream operations to the prejudice of competitors. The research question concerns whether there exists a general duty for vertically integrated dominant undertakings not to discriminate in favour of their own downstream operations.   The overall theme of the thesis is the difficulties in drawing a line between legitimate business strategies and abusive business conduct. When intervening against businesses, competition authorities have an important task in balancing the potentially conflicting interests of free competition and counteracting market imperfections. While it is important to encourage business development and innovation, it is also vital to ensure the functioning of the internal market. Discussions concerning these ideas are being held with reference to case law from the EU courts as well as from decisions and statements from the European Commission.   The findings of the thesis show that there has been a noteworthy inconsistency in the application of Article 102 TFEU. A discrepancy in the approaches towards the article has been found, both concerning the main goals of the article as well as the circumstances in which it should be applied. The conclusion is that it is not possible to state that there is a general duty not to discriminate in favour of an undertaking’s own downstream operations. Nevertheless, indications in the direction of such a duty do exist. Finally, the outcome of the analysis suggests that the inconsistency and ambiguities in the law enforcement can result in an infringement of legal certainty.

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This thesis seeks to address the question: to what extent is the EU Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions sufficiently framed in its terms to achieve its underlying aims and objectives? It is argued that the Directive has one overriding goal: to make it easier for the victims of infringements of EU competition law - typically end-consumers - to claim compensation from the infringers. It is also argued that the authors of the Directive present a convincing case that one of the main reasons for the lack of victims claiming - let alone being awarded - compensation, prior to the adoption of the Directive, is weaknesses with the existing legal framework governing competition law damages actions at national level. The thesis examines four of the main areas covered by the Directive: disclosure of evidence; the effect of NCA decisions; limitation periods; and indirect purchaser standing and the passing-on defence. In each case, the relevant rules from the Directive are set out and an assessment is carried out. A crucial part of this assessment consists of seeking to ascertain the problems facing potential claimants prior to the adoption of the Directive and asking whether the Directive appears well-framed in terms of addressing those problems. As well as considering case law of the EU courts, the legal rules and jurisprudence of two leading Member States - the United Kingdom and Italy - are used as primary case studies in carrying out this assessment. The assessment of the measures considered in this thesis is a nuanced one. It is argued that the measures set out in Chapter II of the Directive on disclosure of evidence are generally well-framed and beneficial for claimants, crucially showing a keen understanding of the relationship between private and public enforcement. The assessment of Article 9, on the effect of NCA decisions is much less positive. It is argued that the measures are drafted in vague terms and compare unfavourably with existing rules and practices in the two case-study Member States. It is argued that while the measures set out in Article 10 on limitation periods do represent an improvement for claimants in certain respects, there are a number of key issues that they fail to address. Finally, the assessment of Articles 12 to 15 on indirect purchaser standing and the passing-on defence is positive in some respects, but it is argued that many of the measures do not adequately address the issues that they purport to tackle. It is also argued that these measures are unlikely to bear fruit, without certain issues which are not covered by the Directive, being addressed. Ultimately it is concluded that the Directive makes some important strides towards the realisation of its underlying aims and objectives, but that many of the measures examined are found to be too vague, too weak or too incomplete to fully address the key issues and that the Directive also fails to address some important issues at all.

Submitted thesis deals with the Kadi case law of both the General Court and the Court of Justice. It focuses mainly on its structural aspects and the specific procedural standards which are to be applied according to the ECJ's Kadi case law in the context of counter terrorist measures aimed at individuals are only briefly mentioned. While the General Court dismissed an action lodged by Mr. Kadi on the ground that EU's measures strictly implementing UN Security Council resolutions cannot be reviewed in light of their compliance with EU's human rights principles, the Court of Justice held in favor of the applicant. Although both instances departed from the same point that is, that it is the EU law which determines the status and effects of international law within the EU law, they differ in terms of what the EU law says about the status of the Charter of the UN within the EU law system. The General Court based its decision on the combination of succession of the EU into international obligations of its member states established in the 1970s and articles 347 and 351 TFEU. The succession is required because for a legal norm to serve as a standard of review it needs to be intenally binding on the Union and the article 351 TFEU or its sibling is required to elevate the Charter of the UN (and the UN...

The United States and the European Union operate in the world’s two most powerful systems of competition law and policy, whose enforcement and judicial institutions employ similar concepts and legal language. Nevertheless, the two systems have reached different results across a number of significant antitrust issues. One such issue is the approach taken towards vertical price fixing and, in particular, the practice referred to as resale price maintenance. Resale price maintenance generally includes the predetermination of a fixed or minimum retail price in a vertical distribution agreement.   In European competition law, resale price maintenance is considered a hardcore restriction of competition and is thereby presumed to infringe Article 101(1) TFEU by its object. The presumption is strong and has proved difficult to rebut in practice. In the United States, the US Supreme Court changed its approach towards resale price maintenance in its 2007 landmark decision Leegin. The majority overturned its nearly century old precedent regarding resale price maintenance, concluding that the practice is no longer to be treated as a per se violation of antitrust law but should instead be subject to a rule of reason analysis. The judgment was the last in a series of different cases, all demonstrating a complete reversal in the approach towards both price and non-price vertical restraints. The change of approach in the United States was largely influenced by developments in economic thinking addressing the potential pro-competitive effects of resale price maintenance. Even though the European Union has modernised and renewed its competition rules to be more in line with economic theory, some uncertainties and difficulties seem to remain regarding the scope of the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements and the possible efficiencies resulting from vertical price fixing. These issues have constituted the main focus for this thesis, which aims to examine vertical price fixing and the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements in Article 101(1) TFEU.   The policy view towards resale price maintenance in the European Union has been subject to great discussion and debate, and it has been argued that the approach towards the restriction is too strict. The legal framework for vertical agreements is now up for review and it is of interest to examine the appropriateness of the prohibition on resale price maintenance, especially in the light of two recent judgments. The thesis shows that there might be sufficient arguments for a change of approach towards resale price maintenance also in the European Union.

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Desрite discretionаry exclusion ground рrovided by Аrticle 57(4)(d) of the Directive 2014/24 thаt аllows contrаcting аuthorities to exclude unreliаble tenderers from рrocurement рrocedures, there is still uncertаinty regаrding both the scoрe of this рrovision аnd the рrinciрle of рroрortionаlity used by contrаcting аuthorities under the Аrticle. Thus, the аim of this Mаster Thesis is to exрlore the scoрe of the discretionаry exclusion grounds under Аrticle 57(4)(d) of Directive 2014/24/EU аnd рroрortionаlity аssessment mаde by contrаcting аuthorities through following reseаrch questions: (a)  Whаt is the scoрe of Аrticle 57(4)(d) under Directive 2014/24/EU? (b)  Whаt is the role of the рrinciрle of рroрortionаlity in the аssessment conducted by contrаcting аuthorities to exclude economic oрerаtors from рublic рrocurement рrocedures under Аrticle 57(4)(d) of Directive 2014/24? Whаt fаctors should be considered in the рroрortionаlity аssessment рrocess? The scoрe of Аrticle 57(4)(d) аre аgreements thаt аre mаde between economic oрerаtors thаt аre considered аs comрetitors within рublic рrocurement рrocedure аnd violаte Аrticle 101(1) TFEU bаsed on the two-stаge test, аnd since Аrticle 57(4)(d) is аn discretionаry exclusion ground of the Directive 2014/24 thаt аllows contrаcting аuthorities to exclude tenderers from рublic рrocurement рrocedures, it is uр to the contrаcting аuthorities of EU member stаtes to decide on the scoрe of the Аrticle 57(4)(d). However, it is still uncleаr how the рrinciрle of рroрortionаlity under Аrticle 57(6) of Directive 2014/24 shаll be used by contrаcting аuthorities uрon mаking such а decision. Therefore, the аuthor concludes thаt contrаcting аuthorities could use the рrinciрle of рroрortionаlity under Аrticle 101(1) TFEU рrior mаking а decision whether to exclude economic oрerаtors from the рublic рrocurement рrocedures under Аrticle 57(4)(d) or not. On the contrаry, Аrticle 101(3) TFEU could be used by contrаcting аuthorities when exercising “wide mаrgin of аррreciаtion” to evаluаte economic oрerаtors’ submitted evidence in order to mаke а conclusion whether the economic oрerаtor concerned mаnаged to restore its reliаbility аnd, thus, is аllowed to continue раrticiраting in рublic рrocurement рrocedures аfter “self-cleаning” meаsures tаken under Аrticle 57(6).

Abstract Copyright is designed to not interfere with society's general and overriding interest of effective competition. An effective market competition benefits consumers by lowering prices, raising the quality and expands the range of goods and services. The purpose of the paper is to investigate if the collecting societies licensing violates competition laws. On the basis of the investigation regarding the bill for a new Swedish copyright law (URL), mainly the new wording that regulates the license agreement, corresponds to the EU competition rules and customs within the area. The collecting societies licensing violates the competition laws in the following cases • Discrimination of members because of nationality •           Authors transferring their sole rights to global exploitation •           The collecting society have the right to manage the rights after the author have left as a member •           Users that are established abroad do not get access to the repertoire of  the collecting societies, the same goes for concerted practice if this is the purpose or result •           Parallel behaviours that cannot be explained objectively •           Dividing the market •           Fixed Prices •           Refusal to sign multi-territorial licenses •           Apply different conditions for equivalent transactions resulting in competition disadvantages for a company that cannot be justified by reasonable causes Currently there are no indications that the new bill to a new URL violates EU law. The author of the paper thinks this may change if the collective management extends, so that other member states get the extended license agreements, then the single market is affected by the competition restriction that the new bill to the URL mean. The author of the paper thinks that the bill for a new URL should be changed so that a collective society will not get monopoly to sign licenses with extended license agreements. / Sammanfattning Upphovsrätten är utformad i syfte att inte inkräkta på samhällets generella och överordnade intresse av en effektiv konkurrens. En effektiv marknadskonkurrens gynnar konsumenterna genom att den pressar priserna, höjer kvaliteten och ökar utbudet av varor och tjänster. Syftet med uppsatsen är att utreda om upphovsrättsorganisationernas licensering strider mot konkurrenslagstiftningen. Utifrån den utredningen granskas om lagförslaget till en ny URL, framförallt den nya lydelsen som reglerar avtalslicenser, stämmer överens med EU:s konkurrensregler och praxis på området.  I följande fall strider upphovsrättsorganisations licensering mot konkurrensrätten •           Diskriminering av medlemmarna på grund av nationalitet •           Upphovsmännen överlåter sina rättigheter med ensamrätt för en global exploatering •           Upphovsrättsorganisationen har rätt att förvalta rättigheterna efter att upphovsmannen utträtt som medlem •           Användare som är etablerade utomlands får inte tillgång till upphovsrättsorganisationens repertoar, gäller även samordnade förfaranden om detta är syftet eller resultatet •           Parallella beteenden som inte kan förklaras objektivt •           Uppdelning av marknaden •           Prissamarbeten •           Vägra teckna multi-territoriella licenser •           Tillämpa olika villkor för likvärdiga transaktioner med följden att ena bolaget får en konkurrensnackdel som inte går att rättfärdiga genom sakliga skäl I nuläget finns inget som tyder på att det nya lagförslaget till en ny URL strider mot EU-rätten. Enligt uppsatsförfattarens åsikt kan detta ändras om den kollektiva förvaltningen utökas så att den får avtalslicensverkan även i andra medlemsländer varpå den inre marknaden påverkas av den konkurrensbegränsning som det nya lagförslaget till en ny URL innebär. Uppsatsförfattaren anser att lagförslaget till en ny URL bör ändras så att inte en upphovsrättsorganisation ges monopol att teckna licens med avtalslicensverkan.

As man moved out on the internet, so did the companies. One of the most successful business models in the digital era is the digital platform. A digital platform acts as an intermediary on multi-sided markets and enjoys, amongst others, lucrative network effects. One of the main factors behind the great success of digital platforms is the usage of big data combined with algorithms that are enhanced by machine learning. However, as big data is becoming more and more indispensable for any modern company, questions have been raised about whether digital platforms should be able to withhold the massive amount of big data exclusively, or whether they could be forced to share it. This paper investigates these questions through the lens of EU-competition law, especially under Article 102 TFEU and the doctrine of essential facilities.  To address the problem of digital platforms and big data, the business models of digital platforms, the economic forces behind them, and their usage of data are assessed to conclude whether an intervention by the Union could be motivated. It is concluded that the markets where digital platforms act are prone to tip and that the characteristics of big data in combination with sophisticated algorithms create a positive feedback loop, creating barriers to entry. Thus, there are severe risks of external market failures, making an intervention feasible. The paper secondly assesses the essential facility doctrine and evaluates the four elements that needs to be fulfilled for big data to be covered by the doctrine. Even though the business model of digital platforms challenges the traditional instruments of EU-competition law, the author argues that three out of four elements of the essential facilities doctrine are fulfilled. However, as data to its character is non-rivalrous and non-exclusive the data held by the incumbent cannot be considered indispensable, making the essential facilities doctrine inapplicable. Finally, alternative instruments under EU-competition law are assessed to find a solution to the problems attributable to a refusal to supply big data. The paper concludes that there are no optimal solutions, but the best of the potential instruments is to find a new form of abuse under article 102 TFEU or to add a modified version of the essential facilities doctrine to the newly proposed legislation DMA.