Dagens samhälle förändras snabbt, och digitala marknader med det. Digitaliseringen har lett till revolutionerande utvecklingar av vårt samhälle, och bakom dessa förändringar står primärt ett fåtal dominerande teknikjättar och deras plattformar. Dessa dominerande digitala plattformar, och de marknader på vilka dessa verkar, är ofta flersidiga och karaktäriseras av särskilda möjligheter till kostnadsfördelning, utveckling och ett beroende av starka nätverkseffekter, samt möjligheter att utveckla affärsmodeller som på olika sätt utnyttjar och kapitaliserar på insamlad data. Detta möjliggör inte bara upprättandet och bibehållandet av marknadsmakt på dessa marknader, utan leder även till höga inträdeshinder med resultatet att marknadens aktörer blir få och att inträdeshindren är höga. Trots att digitaliseringen till stora delar måste anses positiv, har utvecklingen även medfört nya typer av konkurrensproblematik som inte alltid kan hanteras på ett effektivt och adekvat sätt av den tidigare EU-rättsliga konkurrenslagstiftningen. Denna framställning undersöker hur EU:s konkurrenslagstiftning kan tillämpas på nyare typer av dominansmissbruk på digitala plattformar genom att analysera den tidigare regleringen av dominansmissbruk och hur denna har tillämpats rent praktiskt. För att uppnå detta mål undersöker detta arbete de särskilda utmaningar och särdrag som finns på dessa marknader, och ger en utförlig sammanfattning av hur artikel 102 FEUF har använts för att hantera dessa. Här konstateras att denna konkurrenslagstiftning lämnar en del att önska, och att inträdeshinder och risken för tippning ger starka incitament för dominanta digitala plattformar att försöka kringgå prestationsbaserad konkurrens. Framställningen utvärderar även de kompletteringar som gjorts av konkurrenslagstiftningen på dessa områden genom DMA, och hur denna reglering kan tänkas påverka hanteringen av vissa av de dominanta digitala plattformarnas beteenden framöver. Här konkluderas att DMA är en välbehövlig komplettering av tidigare konkurrensreglering på området, men att det fortfarande finns osäkerheter och utvecklingspotential, samt att de snabbföränderliga marknaderna förr eller senare kommer att hitta nya, innovativa sätt att kringgå även denna reglering. Därmed är det viktigt att den EU-rättsliga konkurrensregleringen gör vad den kan för att ligga steget före.

Preliminary References in Civil and European procedural law JUDr. Štangová Eva 1 Abstract (EN) The main purpose of this doctoral thesis was to provide an comprehensive analysis of the Preliminary questions under Slovak and Czech national legislations and to provide the same analysis of Preliminary questions under Treaties and Legislation of European Union Law (hereinafter referred to as "Union law"). This analysis shall cover both, Slovak and Czech code of judicial procedure which have the same numerical designation as Act No. 99/1963 Coll. and are known as Code of civil procedure (hereinafter referred to as OSP) in Slovakia and Code of civil procedure (hereinafter referred to as OSŘ) in the Czech Republic as well. The research in this thesis is structurally divided into 5 independent chapters. Using bellow stated research methods and science procedures; each part focuses on different context of preliminary questions. The first two chapters focus the historical context, concept, importance and scope of the preliminary questions under legislation of Czech and Slovak Republic. This chapter also outlines the normative legal regulations of these issues in the "de lege lata" status. At the same time, the author pays more attention to the eligibility of preliminary questions to be considered as preliminary ones,...

The present master thesis provides the reader with overall and detailed review of jurisdiction of the CJEU in correlation with primary and secondary law of the European Union regarding justification of restrictions on imports or exports of goods on the grounds of the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants pursuant to the art.36 of TFEU. The very first part deals with the essence of the free movement goods. It explains the concept of the prohibition on custom duties on imports and exports and charges having equivalent effect and quantitative restrictions on imports and exports and all measures having equivalent effect. Simultaneously this part demonstrates the application of the art.36 of TFEU and presents mandatory requirements and their purpose. The second part clarifies the concept of goods according to the European Union law, examples and provides proper definition. The third part presents the core of the thesis. It is subdivided into more than 10 parts. It contains explanations regarding principle of proportionality, protection of health and life of humans, total bans, precautionary principle, sufficiently rigorous risk assessment doctrine, protection of health and life of animals, prohibition on use, labeling requirements, or protection of the environment. The most relevant and most widely-known cases were chosen and analyzed in order to present the approach of the CJEU to the disputable measures and their justifications. / Šis baigiamasis magistro darbas suteikia skaitytojui bendrą, visaapimančią ir išsamią ESTT jurisdikcijos apžvalgą dėl importo ir eksporto prekių ribojimo pagrįstumo sąlygų žmonių, gyvūnų ar augalų sveikatos bei gyvybės apsaugos tikslais pagal SESV 36 straipsnį, remiantis pirminiais bei antriniais Europos Sąjungos teisės aktais. Pirmojoje dalyje kalbama apie laisvo prekių judėjimo esmę. Čia paaiškinama importo ir eksporto muitų bei lygiaverčio poveikio mokėjimų bei kiekybinių importo ir eksporto apribojimų bei lygiaverčio poveikio priemonių draudimo koncepcija. Taip pat, ši dalis pademonstruoja SESV 36 str. veikimą, pabrėžiant privalomuosius reikalavimus bei jų tikslus. Antrojoje dalis paaiškina prekių sampratą remiantis Europos Sąjungos teise,pateikia pavyzdžių bei deramą apibrėžimą. Trečiojoje dalyje pateiktas baigiamojo magistro darbo pagrindas. Ši dalis yra suskirstyta į daugiau kaip 10 dalių. Čia yra sutelkti paaiškinimai dėl proporcingumo principo, žmonių sveikatos ir gyvybės apsaugos, visiško draudimo, atsargumo principo, pakankamai griežtos rizikos vertinimo doktrinos, gyvūnų sveikatos ir gyvybės apsaugos, naudojimo draudimo, ženklinimo reikalavimų bei aplinkos apsaugos. Siekiant pristatyti ESTT požiūrį į abejotinas priemones bei ribojimo pagrįstumo sąlygas yra analizuojamios aktualiausios ir plačiausiai žinomos bylos.

The aim of the thesis is to analyse how the EU perceives the specific contribution of Churches to the European integration as stated in the Article 17.3 of the TFEU. The specific contribution is analysed on the case of Roman Catholic Church (RCC) which predominates in the dialogue under the Article 17.3. There are two time periods addressed in the thesis. Firstly, the specific contribution is addressed in the context of the debate on the EU constitution. It is examined, based on the analysis of politicians' speeches and MEPs amendments, whether the specificity is rooted in the area of values. Second period is marked by the year 2009 when the TFEU entered into force, and 2014 when the dialogue with Churches was somewhat degraded. In fact, the new body responsible for the interaction became DG JUST, thereby replacing BEPA, i.e. organization directly reporting to the President of the Commission. Based on the analysis of the speeches and other relevant documents regard all the official meetings, I examine what the EU politicians expected from the Church and what was Her specificity according to them. Against this background is also analysed the fact that the dialogue with Churches was separated from the civil society organizations. It results from the research that the EU perceived the specific...

Competition and data protection law are two powerful regimes simultaneously shaping the use of digital information, which has given rise to new interactions between these areas of law. While most views on this intersection emphasize that competition and data protection law must work together, nascent developments indicate that these legal regimes may sometimes conflict.  In the first place, firms faced with antitrust allegations are to an increasing extent invoking the need to protect the privacy of their users to justify their impugned conduct. Here, the conduct could either be prohibited by competition law despite of data protection or justified under competition law because of data protection. In the EU, no such justification attempt has reached court-stage, and it remains unclear how an enforcer ought to deal with such a claim. In the second place, competition law can mandate a firm to provide access to commercially valuable personal data to its rivals under a competition law remedy. Where that is the case, the question arising in this connection is whether an enforcer can and should design the remedy in a way that aligns with data protection law. If so, the issue remains of how that ought to be done. The task of the thesis has been to explore these issues, legally, economically, and coherently.  The thesis has rendered four main conclusions. First, data protection has a justified role in EU competition law in two ways. On the one hand, enhanced data protection can increase the quality of a service and may thus be factored in the competitive analysis as a dimension of quality. On the other, data protection as a human right must be guaranteed in the application of competition law. Second, these perspectives can be squared with the criteria for justifying competition breaches, in that data protection can be invoked to exculpate a firm from antitrust allegations. Third, in that context, the human rights dimension of data protection may entail that the enforcer must consider data protection even if it is not invoked. However, allowing data protection interests to override competition law in this manner is relatively inefficient as it may lead to less innovation, higher costs, and lower revenues. Fourth, the profound importance of data protection in the EU necessarily means that enforcers should accommodate data protection interests in designing competition law remedies which mandate access to personal data. This may be done in several ways, including requirements to anonymize data before providing access, or to oblige the firm to be compliant with data protection law in the process of providing access. The analysis largely confirms that anonymization is the preferable option.

The European court of Justice (ECJ) has the stance that EU-law, within the confines of EU competence, has primacy over national law, regardless of its source, even if it’s the national constitutions.  Although generally the ECJ:s  stance is accepted, sometimes it is instead the EU that has had to indirectly (through inaction) accept the conclusions of the national constitutional courts. When this happens, it can however only be noticed as the EU commission’s decision to not start infringement proceedings against the member state, and as such it appears as a legal vacuum or absence of enforced law. Inside this vacuum there is lacking enforcement of EU-law, which the member states can use as a de facto exemption from EU-law to regain or uphold national sovereignty. Thus the member states can fill the vacuum by deciding cases on the basis of their own constitutional law rather than (the unenforced) EU-law. It appears to be an in EU-law unregulated transfer of sovereignty.  This paper intends to shed light on possible problems that arise in this situation due to the lack of legality and certainty that ensues from these exemptions from EU-law being upheld through the inaction of the commission rather than positive legal regulation. I will also attempt to find a coherent model for the explanation of this seemingly contradictory situation, describing it as a “sovereignty-vacuum”, an opposing but related concept to the “exemption” of Carl Schmitt.  Through use of Schmitt’s political theology, I attempt to find a solution to the problem of legality with an analogy to the concept of “mercy” and “forgiveness” in the context of constitutional law. Ultimately, I propose a solution de lege ferenda that these implicit exemptions from EU-law be written down as explicit exemptions.

Snus förbjöds inom EU år 1992, men Sverige erhöll ett undantag från förbudet vid anslutning till EU år 1995. Anledningen till snusförbudet var att vissa medlemsstater redan infört förbud mot snus i nationell lagstiftning, vilket skapade en obalans på den inre marknaden. År 2016 lanserades vitt snus, en produkt som liknar snus men saknar tobak. Tobakssnus och vitt snus har sitt ursprung i Sverige. Vitt snus har nyligen förbjudits i flera medlemsstater, som Belgien, Nederländerna och delar av Tyskland. EU har ännu inte tagit ställning till frågan om vitt snus, vilket gör framtiden för vitt snus oviss. Syftet med EU:s tobakspolitik och regleringar är att tobaksvaror inte ska vara tilltalande och attraktiva för unga. EU har som mål att vara en tobaksfri generation år 2040 enligt Europas plan mot cancer. Denna uppsats undersöker om ett nationellt förbud mot vitt snus strider mot den fria rörligheten för varor och hur en framtida reglering kan se ut.  Genom analys av tobaksvaror, tobaksdirektiv, svensk lagstiftning, ställningstagande från medlemsstater, EU:s inre marknad, fri rörlighet av varor och handelshinder har följande slutsatser framkommit. Eftersom Tobaksdirektivet är från 2014 är det möjligt att ett nytt tobaksdirektiv kommer införas inom en snar framtid. I ett nytt tobaksdirektiv borde vitt snus regleras, såvida inte ett separat direktiv skapas för tobaksfria nikotinprodukter. Tobakspolitiken tar alltmer sikte på nikotin, eftersom nikotin är den beroendeframkallande komponenten. Det är möjligt att vitt snus kategoriseras som snus och därmed omfattas av Sveriges undantag från snusförbudet. En sådan kategorisering kan utlösa diskussioner i andra medlemsstater och äventyra det svenska undantaget. Det är viktigt att identifiera varan vitt snus för att avgöra huruvida det kan regleras enligt befintliga regleringar för tobaksvaror eller om vitt snus är en egen vara som saknar regleringar. Vitt snus saknar harmoniseringsåtgärder, vilket ger medlemsstaterna utrymme att fastställa sina egna skyddsnivåer för vitt snus förutsatt att det inte strider mot den fria rörligheten av varor. Ett nationellt förbud mot vitt snus är ett handelshinder, då det begränsar vitt snus och skapar obalans på den inre marknaden. Dock kan ett sådant handelshinder motiveras av folkhälsoskäl enligt artikel 36 FEUF. Slutsatsen är att ett förbud mot vitt snus i nationell lagstiftning inte strider mot den fria rörligheten av varor, förutsatt att det är ett motiverat handelshinder som godkänns av EU. Framöver kan en reglering av vitt snus förväntas. / Snus was banned in the EU in 1992, However, Sweden was granted an exception from the ban in 1995 when Sweden joined the EU. The reason for the ban on snus was that some Member States had already banned snus in their national legislation, creating an imbalance in the internal market. Nicotine pouches, which are similar to snus, were introduced in 2016. The distinction between snus and nicotine pouches is that nicotine pouches do not contain tobacco. Both snus and nicotine pouches are Swedish products. However, nicotine pouches have recently been banned in Member States such as Belgium, the Netherlands and parts of Germany. The EU has not yet taken a position on the issue of nicotine pouches, making their future unpredictable. The aim of the EU's tobacco policy is to prevent tobacco products from being appealing and attractive to young people, with a target of achieving a tobacco-free generation by 2040. The thesis examines whether a national ban on nicotine pouches conflicts with the free movement of goods and what a future regulation might entail.  This thesis analyses the EU regulation of tobacco products and the Swedish legislation, as well as the position taken by Member States on the free movement of goods and trade barriers within the EU's internal market. It is expected that a new tobacco directive will be introduced in the near future, which will likely include regulations for nicotine pouches, unless a separate directive is created for tobacco-free nicotine products. Tobacco policy increasingly focuses on nicotine, as it is the addictive component. Nicotine pouches may be classified as snus due to their similar features, which means that nicotine pouches will be included in Sweden's exemption from the snus ban. It is possible that snus could then trigger discussions in other Member States and thus jeopardise the Swedish exemption. Classifying nicotine pouches as goods may determine whether banning them in national legislation would conflict with the free movement of goods. Nicotine pouches are not subject to harmonization measures. Therefore, Member States have the opportunity to determine their own levels of protection, as long as it does not conflict with the free movement of goods. A ban on nicotine pouches in national law is a barrier to trade under Article 34 TFEU because it restricts the product and creates an imbalance in the internal market. However, a trade barrier can be justified if it is justified on grounds of public health under Article 36 TFEU. Therefore, a national ban on nicotine pouches may be a justified trade barrier. The burden of proof for a justified trade barrier lies with the Member State, after which the EU approves it. The conclusion is that banning nicotine pouches in national legislation does not conflict with the free movement of goods, because a justified trade barrier should be approved by the EU. In the future, we may have to expect a harmonisation measure for the product nicotine pouches. / Le snus a été interdit dans l'UE en 1992. Cependant, la Suède a obtenu une exception à l'interdiction en 1995, lorsque la Suède a rejoint l'UE. La raison de l'interdiction du snus était que certains États membres l'avaient déjà interdit dans leur législation nationale, créant ainsi un déséquilibre au sein du marché intérieur. Les sachets de nicotine, similaires au snus, ont été introduits en 2016. La distinction entre le snus et les sachets de nicotine est que les sachets de nicotine ne contiennent pas de tabac. Les sachets de nicotine ont récemment été interdits dans des États membres comme la Belgique, les Pays-Bas et certaines parties de l'Allemagne. L'UE n'a pas encore pris position sur la question des sachets de nicotine, ce qui rend leur avenir imprévisible. L'objectif de la politique antitabac de l'UE est d'empêcher les produits du tabac d'être attrayants pour les jeunes, avec pour objectif d'atteindre une génération sans tabac d'ici 2040. La thèse examine si une interdiction nationale des sachets de nicotine est en conflit avec la libre circulation des marchandises et ce que pourrait impliquer une future réglementation.  Cette thèse analyse la réglementation de l'UE, la législation suédoise, la position prise par les États membres sur la libre circulation des marchandises et les barrières commerciales au sein du marché intérieur de l'UE. On s'attend à ce qu'une nouvelle directive sur le tabac soit introduite dans un avenir proche, qui comprendra probablement des réglementations sur les sachets de nicotine, à moins qu'une directive distincte ne soit créée pour les produits à base de nicotine sans tabac. La politique antitabac se concentre de plus en plus sur la nicotine, car c'est elle qui crée la dépendance. Les sachets de nicotine peuvent être classés comme snus en raison de leurs caractéristiques similaires et inclus dans l'exemption suédoise de l'interdiction du snus. Il est possible que le snus déclenche alors des discussions dans d'autres États membres et mette ainsi en péril l'exemption suédoise. Classer les sachets de nicotine comme marchandises peut déterminer si leur interdiction dans la législation nationale serait contraire à la libre circulation des marchandises. Les sachets de nicotine ne sont pas soumis aux mesures d'harmonisation au titre de l'article 114 du TFUE. Les États membres ont donc la possibilité de déterminer leurs propres niveaux de protection, pour autant que cela n'entre pas en conflit avec la libre circulation des marchandises. L'interdiction des sachets de nicotine dans la législation nationale constitue une barrière commerciale au sens de l'article 34 du TFUE, car elle restreint le produit et crée un déséquilibre sur le marché intérieur. Toutefois, une barrière commerciale peut être justifiée s’il est justifié par des raisons de santé publique au titre de l’article 36 du TFUE. Par conséquent, une interdiction nationale sur les sachets de nicotine pourrait constituer une barrière commerciale justifiée. La charge de la preuve d’une barrière commerciale justifiée incombe à l’État membre, après quoi l’UE l’approuve. La conclusion est que l'interdiction des sachets de nicotine dans la législation nationale n'est pas contraire à la libre circulation des marchandises, car une barrière commerciale justifiée devrait être approuvée par l'UE.

1 Abstract This dissertation deals with investment protection in the European Union from several points of view. The first part deals with the history of investment protection and its main basis and grounds for current legislation and proposals for future regulation, particularly within the EU. In subsequent parts, current legislation and intra-European Union investment protection is analysed in detail, including the question of validity and applicability of Intra-EU BITs, i.e. bilateral treaties concluded between two EU Member States. The analysis is made from the perspective of EU law, as well as from the point of view of public international law. The dissertation further deals with their relationship and demonstrates contradictions between them in two crucial cases, Eureko/Achmea and Micula. Additional themes of this dissertation are the powers of the European Union regarding investment protection and the conclusion of international treaties such as CETA and TTIP. This dissertation further deals with the status, jurisdiction and functioning of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), demonstrating the relatively smooth and widely accepted investment dispute settlement mechanism. In this regard, the proposed EU Multilateral Investment Court project in analysed, including a...

Since the US National Security Agency’s former contractor Edward Snowden exposed the Agency’s mass surveillance, the EU has been making a series of attempts toward a more safeguarded and stricter path concerning its data privacy protection. On 8 April 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the CJEU) invalidated the EU Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC on the basis of incompatibility with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter). After this judgment, the CJEU examined the legality of the Safe Harbour Agreement, which had been the main legal basis for transfers of personal data from the EU to the US under Decision 2000/520/EC. Subsequently, on 6 October 2015, in the case of Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, the CJEU declared the Safe Harbour Decision invalid. The ground for the Court’s judgment was the fact that the Decision enabled interference, by US public authorities, with the fundamental rights to privacy and personal data protection under Article 7 and 8 of the Charter, when processing the personal data of EU citizens. According to the judgment, this interference has been beyond what is strictly necessary and proportionate to the protection of national security and the persons concerned were not offered any administrative or judicial means of redress enabling the data relating to them to be accessed, rectified or erased. The Court’s analysis of the Safe Harbour was borne out of the EU Commission’s own previous assessments. Consequently, since the transfers of personal data between the EU and the US can no longer be carried out through the Safe Harbour, the EU legislature is left with the task to create a safer option, which will guarantee that the fundamental rights to privacy and protection of personal data of the EU citizens will be respected. However, although the EU is the party dictating the terms for these transatlantic transfers of personal data, the current provisions of the US law are able to provide for derogations from every possible renewed agreement unless they become compatible with the EU data privacy law. Moreover, as much business is at stake and prominent US companies are involved in this battle, the pressure toward the US is not only coming from the EU, but some American companies are also taking the fight for EU citizens’ right to privacy and protection of their personal data.

v anglickém jazyce - English abstract Protection of Right to Fair Trial in Relation to Preliminary Ruling Proceedings Right to fair trial is one of fundamental human rights, which enables individuals to effectively invoke their rights and freedoms before a lawful, impartial and independent court. In Europe, the protection of this right is guaranteed at a multi-layer level, whose layers interact: first layer is formed by constitutional orders of individual States, second layer by institutions of European Union, in particular the Court of Justice of the European Union, and a third one, that of the European Court for Human Rights. In the European Union, the Treaties have introduced the mechanism of preliminary ruling with the aim of preserving unity within the Union and of ensuring coherent interpretation and application of European law by the courts of the Member States. Preliminary ruling proceedings ensure effective cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union. Art. 267 TFEU provides for an obligation to request a preliminary ruling for national courts of last instance (if none of the CILFIT case law conditions is met). Breach of this obligation may entail violation of right to fair trial at all three layers of human rights protection in Europe. Each European...