An undertaking enjoying a dominant position on the internal market has many possibilities to flourish and develop. One way of increasing market power is to expand business activities to downstream markets. An undertaking that is dominant on the upstream market can thus take advantage of its dominance when engaging in business conduct on the downstream market. However, taking advantage of such a position can in some circumstances lead to an infringement of Article 102 TFEU. Recent cases from the EU courts and the EU Commission have, however, demonstrated uncertainties concerning the ways in which the article should be applied.   The purpose of the thesis has been to examine different approaches towards the application of Article 102 TFEU in situations where vertically integrated dominant undertakings are favouring their own downstream operations to the prejudice of competitors. The research question concerns whether there exists a general duty for vertically integrated dominant undertakings not to discriminate in favour of their own downstream operations.   The overall theme of the thesis is the difficulties in drawing a line between legitimate business strategies and abusive business conduct. When intervening against businesses, competition authorities have an important task in balancing the potentially conflicting interests of free competition and counteracting market imperfections. While it is important to encourage business development and innovation, it is also vital to ensure the functioning of the internal market. Discussions concerning these ideas are being held with reference to case law from the EU courts as well as from decisions and statements from the European Commission.   The findings of the thesis show that there has been a noteworthy inconsistency in the application of Article 102 TFEU. A discrepancy in the approaches towards the article has been found, both concerning the main goals of the article as well as the circumstances in which it should be applied. The conclusion is that it is not possible to state that there is a general duty not to discriminate in favour of an undertaking’s own downstream operations. Nevertheless, indications in the direction of such a duty do exist. Finally, the outcome of the analysis suggests that the inconsistency and ambiguities in the law enforcement can result in an infringement of legal certainty.

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This thesis seeks to address the question: to what extent is the EU Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions sufficiently framed in its terms to achieve its underlying aims and objectives? It is argued that the Directive has one overriding goal: to make it easier for the victims of infringements of EU competition law - typically end-consumers - to claim compensation from the infringers. It is also argued that the authors of the Directive present a convincing case that one of the main reasons for the lack of victims claiming - let alone being awarded - compensation, prior to the adoption of the Directive, is weaknesses with the existing legal framework governing competition law damages actions at national level. The thesis examines four of the main areas covered by the Directive: disclosure of evidence; the effect of NCA decisions; limitation periods; and indirect purchaser standing and the passing-on defence. In each case, the relevant rules from the Directive are set out and an assessment is carried out. A crucial part of this assessment consists of seeking to ascertain the problems facing potential claimants prior to the adoption of the Directive and asking whether the Directive appears well-framed in terms of addressing those problems. As well as considering case law of the EU courts, the legal rules and jurisprudence of two leading Member States - the United Kingdom and Italy - are used as primary case studies in carrying out this assessment. The assessment of the measures considered in this thesis is a nuanced one. It is argued that the measures set out in Chapter II of the Directive on disclosure of evidence are generally well-framed and beneficial for claimants, crucially showing a keen understanding of the relationship between private and public enforcement. The assessment of Article 9, on the effect of NCA decisions is much less positive. It is argued that the measures are drafted in vague terms and compare unfavourably with existing rules and practices in the two case-study Member States. It is argued that while the measures set out in Article 10 on limitation periods do represent an improvement for claimants in certain respects, there are a number of key issues that they fail to address. Finally, the assessment of Articles 12 to 15 on indirect purchaser standing and the passing-on defence is positive in some respects, but it is argued that many of the measures do not adequately address the issues that they purport to tackle. It is also argued that these measures are unlikely to bear fruit, without certain issues which are not covered by the Directive, being addressed. Ultimately it is concluded that the Directive makes some important strides towards the realisation of its underlying aims and objectives, but that many of the measures examined are found to be too vague, too weak or too incomplete to fully address the key issues and that the Directive also fails to address some important issues at all.

As man moved out on the internet, so did the companies. One of the most successful business models in the digital era is the digital platform. A digital platform acts as an intermediary on multi-sided markets and enjoys, amongst others, lucrative network effects. One of the main factors behind the great success of digital platforms is the usage of big data combined with algorithms that are enhanced by machine learning. However, as big data is becoming more and more indispensable for any modern company, questions have been raised about whether digital platforms should be able to withhold the massive amount of big data exclusively, or whether they could be forced to share it. This paper investigates these questions through the lens of EU-competition law, especially under Article 102 TFEU and the doctrine of essential facilities.  To address the problem of digital platforms and big data, the business models of digital platforms, the economic forces behind them, and their usage of data are assessed to conclude whether an intervention by the Union could be motivated. It is concluded that the markets where digital platforms act are prone to tip and that the characteristics of big data in combination with sophisticated algorithms create a positive feedback loop, creating barriers to entry. Thus, there are severe risks of external market failures, making an intervention feasible. The paper secondly assesses the essential facility doctrine and evaluates the four elements that needs to be fulfilled for big data to be covered by the doctrine. Even though the business model of digital platforms challenges the traditional instruments of EU-competition law, the author argues that three out of four elements of the essential facilities doctrine are fulfilled. However, as data to its character is non-rivalrous and non-exclusive the data held by the incumbent cannot be considered indispensable, making the essential facilities doctrine inapplicable. Finally, alternative instruments under EU-competition law are assessed to find a solution to the problems attributable to a refusal to supply big data. The paper concludes that there are no optimal solutions, but the best of the potential instruments is to find a new form of abuse under article 102 TFEU or to add a modified version of the essential facilities doctrine to the newly proposed legislation DMA.

Since the internet revolution, and with the ever-growing presence of the internet in our everyday lives, being able to control as much data as possible has become an indispensable part of any business looking to succeed on digital markets. This is where Big Data has become crucial. Being able to gather, but more importantly process and understand data, has allowed companies to tailor their services according to the unspoken wants of the consumer as well as optimize ad sales according to consumers’ online patterns. Considering the significant power over digital markets possessed by certain companies, it becomes critical to examine such companies from a competition law perspective. Refusal to supply, which is an abuse of a dominant position according to Article 102 TFEU, can be used to compel abusive undertakings to share a product or service, which they alone possess, and which is indispensable input in another product, with competitors. This is otherwise known as the Essential Facilities Doctrine. If the Big Data used by attention platforms such as Facebook or Google were to be considered such an indispensable product, these undertakings would be required to share Big Data with competitors. While Big Data enables the dominant positions held by powerful attention platforms today, there are certain aspects of it and its particular uses by such platforms that do not allow for the application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine. Considering the significance of Big Data for these undertakings, however, there may be need for a reform of the Essential Facilities Doctrine. From a purely competition standpoint, allowing the application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Big Data would be beneficial, particularly considering the doctrine’s effect on innovation. However, enforcing an obligation to share Big Data with competitors would be in breach of privacy policies within the EU. While competition decisions made by the Commission do not directly concern rules set forth in such policies, the Commission is still obligated to respect the right to privacy set forth in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Thus, while the significance of Big Data demands a change in how it is approached by competition law, the Essential Facilities Doctrine is not the appropriate remedy.

No other markets have likely ever been as closely part of our everyday lives as digital markets have. Digital markets can be described as a place for innovation where new products, services, and companies pop up on a nearly daily basis. These markets can at the same time be described as highly concentrated, in the hands of a few, who control the market, and make the rules on the market. It is without a question that digital markets are full of possibilities for innovative companies and therefore it is of such importance that these markets are protected and kept as fair, competitive, and transparent as possible. There have been concerns whether the existing competition law is the best tool to be used on digital markets and whether the often-lenghty process of Article 102 TFEU can, or at least effectively can, control these gatekeepers controlling digital markets. The purpose of the thesis is therefore to analyse the existing and new theories of harm when it comes to Article 102 TFEU and whether they could be useful in the Commissions' ongoing investigations against these gatekeepers. As existing theories of harm margin squeeze, unfair contractual terms and conditions as well as tying will be analysed and their applicability in the digital markets. While some conducts might fall under the existing theories of harm others won't and thereof it is worth looking into new theories of harm such as self-preferencing, forced free riding, and privacy policy tying, in order to determine whether they could be used by the Commission.  While the application of Article 102 TFEU is of great importance, the Commission has also drafted a proposal called Digital Markets Act which would be an ex-ante tool to be used alongside EU competition law and which could help address the problems the current competition law isn't at least effectively addressing. The Digital Markets Act is based on certain undertakings when fulfilling the criterium, being defined as gatekeepers, and when defined as such, the obligations of the Digital Markets Act become applicable. This would offer the Commission a tool that is likely more efficient and legally certain than the application of Article 102 TFEU. Since the existing competition law hasn't been able to prevent digital markets becoming even more and more concentrated, the Digital Markets Act might be exactly what is needed in order to secure the internal market remaining competitive, fair, contestable, and transparent.

Abstract Copyright is designed to not interfere with society's general and overriding interest of effective competition. An effective market competition benefits consumers by lowering prices, raising the quality and expands the range of goods and services. The purpose of the paper is to investigate if the collecting societies licensing violates competition laws. On the basis of the investigation regarding the bill for a new Swedish copyright law (URL), mainly the new wording that regulates the license agreement, corresponds to the EU competition rules and customs within the area. The collecting societies licensing violates the competition laws in the following cases • Discrimination of members because of nationality •           Authors transferring their sole rights to global exploitation •           The collecting society have the right to manage the rights after the author have left as a member •           Users that are established abroad do not get access to the repertoire of  the collecting societies, the same goes for concerted practice if this is the purpose or result •           Parallel behaviours that cannot be explained objectively •           Dividing the market •           Fixed Prices •           Refusal to sign multi-territorial licenses •           Apply different conditions for equivalent transactions resulting in competition disadvantages for a company that cannot be justified by reasonable causes Currently there are no indications that the new bill to a new URL violates EU law. The author of the paper thinks this may change if the collective management extends, so that other member states get the extended license agreements, then the single market is affected by the competition restriction that the new bill to the URL mean. The author of the paper thinks that the bill for a new URL should be changed so that a collective society will not get monopoly to sign licenses with extended license agreements. / Sammanfattning Upphovsrätten är utformad i syfte att inte inkräkta på samhällets generella och överordnade intresse av en effektiv konkurrens. En effektiv marknadskonkurrens gynnar konsumenterna genom att den pressar priserna, höjer kvaliteten och ökar utbudet av varor och tjänster. Syftet med uppsatsen är att utreda om upphovsrättsorganisationernas licensering strider mot konkurrenslagstiftningen. Utifrån den utredningen granskas om lagförslaget till en ny URL, framförallt den nya lydelsen som reglerar avtalslicenser, stämmer överens med EU:s konkurrensregler och praxis på området.  I följande fall strider upphovsrättsorganisations licensering mot konkurrensrätten •           Diskriminering av medlemmarna på grund av nationalitet •           Upphovsmännen överlåter sina rättigheter med ensamrätt för en global exploatering •           Upphovsrättsorganisationen har rätt att förvalta rättigheterna efter att upphovsmannen utträtt som medlem •           Användare som är etablerade utomlands får inte tillgång till upphovsrättsorganisationens repertoar, gäller även samordnade förfaranden om detta är syftet eller resultatet •           Parallella beteenden som inte kan förklaras objektivt •           Uppdelning av marknaden •           Prissamarbeten •           Vägra teckna multi-territoriella licenser •           Tillämpa olika villkor för likvärdiga transaktioner med följden att ena bolaget får en konkurrensnackdel som inte går att rättfärdiga genom sakliga skäl I nuläget finns inget som tyder på att det nya lagförslaget till en ny URL strider mot EU-rätten. Enligt uppsatsförfattarens åsikt kan detta ändras om den kollektiva förvaltningen utökas så att den får avtalslicensverkan även i andra medlemsländer varpå den inre marknaden påverkas av den konkurrensbegränsning som det nya lagförslaget till en ny URL innebär. Uppsatsförfattaren anser att lagförslaget till en ny URL bör ändras så att inte en upphovsrättsorganisation ges monopol att teckna licens med avtalslicensverkan.

Dagens samhälle förändras snabbt, och digitala marknader med det. Digitaliseringen har lett till revolutionerande utvecklingar av vårt samhälle, och bakom dessa förändringar står primärt ett fåtal dominerande teknikjättar och deras plattformar. Dessa dominerande digitala plattformar, och de marknader på vilka dessa verkar, är ofta flersidiga och karaktäriseras av särskilda möjligheter till kostnadsfördelning, utveckling och ett beroende av starka nätverkseffekter, samt möjligheter att utveckla affärsmodeller som på olika sätt utnyttjar och kapitaliserar på insamlad data. Detta möjliggör inte bara upprättandet och bibehållandet av marknadsmakt på dessa marknader, utan leder även till höga inträdeshinder med resultatet att marknadens aktörer blir få och att inträdeshindren är höga. Trots att digitaliseringen till stora delar måste anses positiv, har utvecklingen även medfört nya typer av konkurrensproblematik som inte alltid kan hanteras på ett effektivt och adekvat sätt av den tidigare EU-rättsliga konkurrenslagstiftningen. Denna framställning undersöker hur EU:s konkurrenslagstiftning kan tillämpas på nyare typer av dominansmissbruk på digitala plattformar genom att analysera den tidigare regleringen av dominansmissbruk och hur denna har tillämpats rent praktiskt. För att uppnå detta mål undersöker detta arbete de särskilda utmaningar och särdrag som finns på dessa marknader, och ger en utförlig sammanfattning av hur artikel 102 FEUF har använts för att hantera dessa. Här konstateras att denna konkurrenslagstiftning lämnar en del att önska, och att inträdeshinder och risken för tippning ger starka incitament för dominanta digitala plattformar att försöka kringgå prestationsbaserad konkurrens. Framställningen utvärderar även de kompletteringar som gjorts av konkurrenslagstiftningen på dessa områden genom DMA, och hur denna reglering kan tänkas påverka hanteringen av vissa av de dominanta digitala plattformarnas beteenden framöver. Här konkluderas att DMA är en välbehövlig komplettering av tidigare konkurrensreglering på området, men att det fortfarande finns osäkerheter och utvecklingspotential, samt att de snabbföränderliga marknaderna förr eller senare kommer att hitta nya, innovativa sätt att kringgå även denna reglering. Därmed är det viktigt att den EU-rättsliga konkurrensregleringen gör vad den kan för att ligga steget före.

Europe is facing a climate and environmental crisis. To respond to this, the European Commission has launched several programmes, which aim to increase sustainability and environmental protection. This aim has been condensed into the policy document that is the European Green Deal. The European Green Deal sets out the aim of making the Union’s economy climate neutral, while improving environmental protection and protecting biodiversity. To this end, several different sectors of the economy need to be overhauled.  In EU Law, a key policy area is to protect free competition. Article 101 TFEU sets out that agreements between undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition are prohibited. Similarly, Article 102 TFEU prohibits abuse by an undertaking of a dominant position.  This thesis explores what happens when competition law thus intersects with the environmental policy of the Union. The thesis identifies two main situations  of interaction. Undertakings can invoke environmental protection to justify a restriction of competition. The Union may also rely on its antitrust provisions to enforce sustainability by holding unsustainable practices as restrictive agreements or abuses of dominant behaviour, respectively, and thus prohibited by the antitrust provisions.  Generally, the thesis concludes that there is not enough information on how the Commission and the CJEU will approach arguments relating to sustainability in its antitrust assessment. The Commission’s consumer welfare standard appears to limit environmental integration to points where a certain factor results affects the environment or sustainability on the one hand, and consumer welfare on the other. The lack of information, moreover, is in itself an issue as undertakings may abstain from environmental action if they believe they will come under scrutiny due to violations of the antitrust provisions. Therefore, a key conclusion in the thesis is that the Commission and the CJEU should set out clear guidelines for environmental action by undertakings, in relation to the antitrust provisions. Similarly, the Commission appears to be cautious to use antitrust as a tool against unsustainable practices. The Commission has, however, recently decided to open an investigation into agreements which limit sustainability, which shows that the picture may be changing.

Competition and data protection law are two powerful regimes simultaneously shaping the use of digital information, which has given rise to new interactions between these areas of law. While most views on this intersection emphasize that competition and data protection law must work together, nascent developments indicate that these legal regimes may sometimes conflict.  In the first place, firms faced with antitrust allegations are to an increasing extent invoking the need to protect the privacy of their users to justify their impugned conduct. Here, the conduct could either be prohibited by competition law despite of data protection or justified under competition law because of data protection. In the EU, no such justification attempt has reached court-stage, and it remains unclear how an enforcer ought to deal with such a claim. In the second place, competition law can mandate a firm to provide access to commercially valuable personal data to its rivals under a competition law remedy. Where that is the case, the question arising in this connection is whether an enforcer can and should design the remedy in a way that aligns with data protection law. If so, the issue remains of how that ought to be done. The task of the thesis has been to explore these issues, legally, economically, and coherently.  The thesis has rendered four main conclusions. First, data protection has a justified role in EU competition law in two ways. On the one hand, enhanced data protection can increase the quality of a service and may thus be factored in the competitive analysis as a dimension of quality. On the other, data protection as a human right must be guaranteed in the application of competition law. Second, these perspectives can be squared with the criteria for justifying competition breaches, in that data protection can be invoked to exculpate a firm from antitrust allegations. Third, in that context, the human rights dimension of data protection may entail that the enforcer must consider data protection even if it is not invoked. However, allowing data protection interests to override competition law in this manner is relatively inefficient as it may lead to less innovation, higher costs, and lower revenues. Fourth, the profound importance of data protection in the EU necessarily means that enforcers should accommodate data protection interests in designing competition law remedies which mandate access to personal data. This may be done in several ways, including requirements to anonymize data before providing access, or to oblige the firm to be compliant with data protection law in the process of providing access. The analysis largely confirms that anonymization is the preferable option.