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The tremendous growth of business and their impact on competition within the market raises concerns regarding the regulators ability to enforce fair competition and regulate large corporations. While Competition law strives to regulate the market through tangible punishment, its reactive nature might result in difficulties swiftly addressing anti competitive practices. This study explores the comparison of reactive and proactive regulatory enforcement measures on business compliance, by comparing Competition law with the new Digital Markets Act. The research, compiling of secondary sources, focuses on using compliance theories to explain the differences in ex post and ex ante enforcement measures and how firms might respond to the two. In the context of Competition law and the Digital Markets Act, we conclude that while big penalties could be a good deterrence, the reactive nature of Competition law has significant disadvantages compared to the proactive Digital Markets Act.

No other markets have likely ever been as closely part of our everyday lives as digital markets have. Digital markets can be described as a place for innovation where new products, services, and companies pop up on a nearly daily basis. These markets can at the same time be described as highly concentrated, in the hands of a few, who control the market, and make the rules on the market. It is without a question that digital markets are full of possibilities for innovative companies and therefore it is of such importance that these markets are protected and kept as fair, competitive, and transparent as possible. There have been concerns whether the existing competition law is the best tool to be used on digital markets and whether the often-lenghty process of Article 102 TFEU can, or at least effectively can, control these gatekeepers controlling digital markets. The purpose of the thesis is therefore to analyse the existing and new theories of harm when it comes to Article 102 TFEU and whether they could be useful in the Commissions' ongoing investigations against these gatekeepers. As existing theories of harm margin squeeze, unfair contractual terms and conditions as well as tying will be analysed and their applicability in the digital markets. While some conducts might fall under the existing theories of harm others won't and thereof it is worth looking into new theories of harm such as self-preferencing, forced free riding, and privacy policy tying, in order to determine whether they could be used by the Commission.  While the application of Article 102 TFEU is of great importance, the Commission has also drafted a proposal called Digital Markets Act which would be an ex-ante tool to be used alongside EU competition law and which could help address the problems the current competition law isn't at least effectively addressing. The Digital Markets Act is based on certain undertakings when fulfilling the criterium, being defined as gatekeepers, and when defined as such, the obligations of the Digital Markets Act become applicable. This would offer the Commission a tool that is likely more efficient and legally certain than the application of Article 102 TFEU. Since the existing competition law hasn't been able to prevent digital markets becoming even more and more concentrated, the Digital Markets Act might be exactly what is needed in order to secure the internal market remaining competitive, fair, contestable, and transparent.

The sui generis-right in article 7.1 of the database directive provides the maker of a database, who has made a qualitatively and/or quantitative substantial investment in the obtaining, verification and/or presentation of the contents in a database, the right to prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part of the database contents. In order to prevent the circumvention of article 7.1, the right to prohibit tortious dispositions of the contents was sup- plemented by article 7.5, which extends the right for the maker to prevent non-substantial parts to be extracted and/or re-utilized, provided that the extraction and/or re-utilization are repeated and systematic in a way that undermines the substantial investment the maker of the database has made.  The way that the sui generis-right is framed as an investment protection, in combination with the fact that the right’s object of protection is the investment as such, is the reason that the right has come to be regarded as a protection clause against unfair competition rather than an intellectual property right. As a result, the sui generis-right is of great significance to unfair competition and competition and antitrust law in general. This applies not only to article 102 FEUF, but especially to the DMA and in relation to the prescribed data-sharing obligation in article 6.10 in the DMA.  Competition and antitrust law in general and the DMA in particular, through its rootedness in article 3 FEU, aim to maintain competitive, open and fair digital markets. This applies, to say the least, as a part of ensuring the efficiency in the EU internal market, which by enlarge is intended to benefit the consumers. In this way, it’s understood that the consumers perspective plays a fundamental role in competition policy. In relation to the DMA, this is expressed through articles 6.2 and 6.10 of the DMA, which have the function of promoting innovation and increasing the consumers’ diversity of choice, while simultaneously giving the business users better opportunities to compete with the gatekeepers and thus become more efficient.  By imposing on a gatekeeper a far-reaching data-sharing obligation under article 6.10 in the DMA, in combination with the prohibition to use the same data under article 6.2, the gatekeepers’ sui generis-right is limited in all material aspects. Thereby, these provisions impose greatly on the gatekeepers’ ability as a maker of a database to freely dispose of their own database contents and thus obtain future returns and other competitive advantages as a result of the substantial investment. This is due to the fact that the gatekeeper is subject to an obligation to share the results of the investment with the business users.  The database directive states, however, that the sui generis-right must not be afforded in such a way as to facilitate abuses of a dominant position. By this reference it’s understood that this exception was written with article 102 FEUF in mind. In light of the significant differences between article 102 FEUF and the DMA, it can be concluded that the exception does not apply to the DMA. This is particularly the case as the DMA is framed as an ex ante-regulation, whereas article 102 FEUF is an ex post-regulation.  As this paper has highlighted, it requires great forethought when imposing a compulsory data-sharing obligation such as the one in article 6.10 in the DMA. The intended function of the sui generis-right is to promote investments in data processing and storage functions. In order to even receive or make use of the effective and high-quality data the business users have a right to receive from the gatekeepers, they have to have effective and proper databases, because otherwise it's entirely pointless to even force the gatekeepers to share their data.  Thus, a proportional balance is required between the interest in protecting the data as such by maintaining ex ante incentives to invest and the interest to promote open and fair digital markets as a way to ensure the effectiveness of the internal market for the benefit of the consumers and ex post social welfare. This could be a possible explanation to the Commission’s proposal of the Data Act, specifically article 35, which stipulates that the sui generis-right shall not be applied to machine generated data. It remains, however, to see how the question of the sui generis-right’s to be or not to be will play out in the future.

Dagens samhälle förändras snabbt, och digitala marknader med det. Digitaliseringen har lett till revolutionerande utvecklingar av vårt samhälle, och bakom dessa förändringar står primärt ett fåtal dominerande teknikjättar och deras plattformar. Dessa dominerande digitala plattformar, och de marknader på vilka dessa verkar, är ofta flersidiga och karaktäriseras av särskilda möjligheter till kostnadsfördelning, utveckling och ett beroende av starka nätverkseffekter, samt möjligheter att utveckla affärsmodeller som på olika sätt utnyttjar och kapitaliserar på insamlad data. Detta möjliggör inte bara upprättandet och bibehållandet av marknadsmakt på dessa marknader, utan leder även till höga inträdeshinder med resultatet att marknadens aktörer blir få och att inträdeshindren är höga. Trots att digitaliseringen till stora delar måste anses positiv, har utvecklingen även medfört nya typer av konkurrensproblematik som inte alltid kan hanteras på ett effektivt och adekvat sätt av den tidigare EU-rättsliga konkurrenslagstiftningen. Denna framställning undersöker hur EU:s konkurrenslagstiftning kan tillämpas på nyare typer av dominansmissbruk på digitala plattformar genom att analysera den tidigare regleringen av dominansmissbruk och hur denna har tillämpats rent praktiskt. För att uppnå detta mål undersöker detta arbete de särskilda utmaningar och särdrag som finns på dessa marknader, och ger en utförlig sammanfattning av hur artikel 102 FEUF har använts för att hantera dessa. Här konstateras att denna konkurrenslagstiftning lämnar en del att önska, och att inträdeshinder och risken för tippning ger starka incitament för dominanta digitala plattformar att försöka kringgå prestationsbaserad konkurrens. Framställningen utvärderar även de kompletteringar som gjorts av konkurrenslagstiftningen på dessa områden genom DMA, och hur denna reglering kan tänkas påverka hanteringen av vissa av de dominanta digitala plattformarnas beteenden framöver. Här konkluderas att DMA är en välbehövlig komplettering av tidigare konkurrensreglering på området, men att det fortfarande finns osäkerheter och utvecklingspotential, samt att de snabbföränderliga marknaderna förr eller senare kommer att hitta nya, innovativa sätt att kringgå även denna reglering. Därmed är det viktigt att den EU-rättsliga konkurrensregleringen gör vad den kan för att ligga steget före.