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The core contentions and departures of this study are that: (1) a three way delineation distinguished the basic types of operation that the CIA performed, between defensive, offensive, and preventive covert action; (2) the agency and its forerunner organisations anticipated government policy and initiated small-scale political clandestine operations during 1946 and 1947, ahead of being given official sanction for such activities; (3) the CIA's operations directorate played a more significant role as an instrument of wider strategic objectives, most notably during the Eisenhower years, than has hitherto been suggested; and (4) domestic politics had a strong impact on the development and deployment of CIA covert action, especially during the McCarthy era. Only by taking these factors into account can the early evolution of the CIA's operations directorate be fully understood.

Approved for Public Release, Distribution is Unlimited / This thesis analyzes the impact of nuclear weapon on the doctrine and force structure of the US Army during the Early Cold War (1947-1957). It compares these impacts with those that occurred on the US Air Force and Navy during that time. Nuclear weapons brought a new aspect to warfare. Their unprecedented economy of destructive power changed the way nations viewed warfare. For the Army, nuclear weapons presented a dual challenge. The Army faced a US security policy centered on the massive use of these weapons; the Army also struggled to understand how these weapons would be utilized on the battlefield. The nation's security policy of large scale strategic nuclear bombardment of the Soviet Union favored the Air Force and to a lesser degree the Navy. The Army viewed this policy as single minded and purposely limiting the nations options to all out nuclear war or deference to another national will. In all the Army faced an internal struggle to incorporate these weapons and an external struggle to retain a useful position within the US Defense establishment during this period. / Major, United States Army

Nowhere has the mid-20th century polarization of Northeast Asia been more evident than on the Korean Peninsula. Over the past six decades, efforts toward Korean unification have spanned the range of total warfare, covert attacks, propagandist affronts, and formal diplomacy to no avail. Amidst the talk of unification however, it seens a better understanding about the evolving nature of Korea's division is needed. Using a truly unique International Relations approach, this thesis explores the utility of Alexander Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics to address the evolving structure of Northeast Asia and its implications for Korean unification. The results of this analysis contrast with those of predominant IR theories such as Neorealism and suggest that unification is becoming less likely under structural trends. Additionally, the constructivist methodology employed here shows that while the United States will continue to play an important role in regional security, it must begin to diverge from its anachronistic Cold War defense posture to ensure future stability. By providing a deeper understanding about the macro-level structure of Northeast Asia, this these will contribute to the development of policies which will both enhance regional stability and aid in the eventual unification of the two Koreas.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Robert D. Linder / This dissertation considers American Protestant perceptions of U.S. foreign policy directed toward Soviet Union during the Dwight D. Eisenhower presidency (1953-1961). The question of what a culture dominated by Protestant denominations thought of its global adversary has not yet been sufficiently explored by scholars of either American religious history or diplomatic history. Most scholars who deal with the intersection of religion and foreign policy during the Eisenhower Administration tend to accentuate the close relationship that existed between government policy and general religious attitudes. That is to say, a general, widespread Protestant support of foreign policy objectives stands as the prevailing interpretation. Most historians conclude that America’s Protestant church leaders—preachers, pastors, and bishops—either actively supported government foreign policy objectives or sought to insert their own stances into existing policy. More recently, historians have published monographs that further explore Protestant Christianity with regard to foreign policy in the 1950s. By acknowledging the different strands of Protestant Christianity, scholars have raised significant questions that have heretofore gone unanswered. The primary question is the one that this dissertation seeks to answer—how widespread was American Protestant denunciation of communism and, simultaneously, how broad was American Protestant support for foreign policy objectives? Billy Graham, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Garfield Bromley Oxnam represent the three most prominent representatives of Protestant Christianity’s three major strands. These three acknowledged opinion makers that serve as the focus of this dissertation were not uniform in their perspectives of U.S. foreign policy, yet they all denounced communism and—to a degree—supported America’s efforts to combat the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence throughout the course of the Eisenhower Administration (1953-1961). This conclusion helps explain the tremendous perseverance of containment as a strategy by attributing its success, in part, to the large, Protestant body of supporters that continued to sustain and encourage Washington’s policies directed toward the Soviet Union.