<p>This paper is inspired by the ills borne out of the internet. The internet has become a modern day tool for criminals seeking to conceal the proceeds derived from their crime, hence the&nbsp / problematic notion of cyberlaundering. This paper journeys through the world of cyberlaundering by looking into the structure of the crime in great depth. It explores various possibilities, and tries to hatch out viable solutions to the dilemma.</p>

Magister Legum - LLM

The research was conducted as a result of the researcher‟s concern that the possibility exists that members of the different law enforcement agencies in South Africa might have a misconception about the mandate and functions of the Financial Intelligence Centre. If such a misconception in fact exists, it poses a huge challenge towards fruitful co-operation among the Centre and the different law enforcement agencies. The researcher identified certain practical problems, namely, that investigators are not aware of the types of intelligence that the Centre could provide them with, and that investigators might not be informed about the specific procedures to follow when they need to request intelligence from the Centre. The research has shown that, in the past, the Centre has been a useful source of crime intelligence concerning a range of predicate offences including narcotics, fraud and tax related crimes. The research has further found that, although the majority of participants gained a lot of experience in law enforcement and investigations, they had limited awareness about the Financial Intelligence Centre and its functions. This research project studied the utilisation of the Financial Intelligence Centre as a crime intelligence source. / Police Practice / M. Tech. (Forensic Investigation)

With the implementation of more and more stringent measures to prevent money laundering, criminals are resorting to the expertise of lawyers for assistance in the formulation of increasingly complex money laundering schemes. This expertise is provided both wittingly and unwittingly. The purpose of this research was to consider whether the South African anti-money laundering legislation places suspicious transaction reporting obligations, which are in line with and meet international directives, conventions and best practice frameworks, on attorneys. The study entails a consideration of the suspicious transaction reporting obligations of lawyers introduced by the Financial Action Task Force, the European Union, the United Kingdom and South Africa and provides an understanding of the concept of money laundering, the money laundering process and the areas in which lawyers are vulnerable to money laundering. The research found that the suspicious transaction reporting responsibilities of attorneys in terms of South African anti-money laundering legislation are not in line with international frameworks and best practice. / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2014. / tm2015 / Auditing / MPhil / Unrestricted

Criminals make use of accountants to assist them, knowingly or unknowingly, with complex money laundering schemes. The nature of the accounting profession places accountants in an ideal position to identify possibly money laundering activities. The purpose of this research is to consider whether the reporting obligations of South African accountants in terms of section 29 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, No 38 of 2001, as amended, corresponds sufficiently with the services they provide so as to constitute an effective anti-money laundering measure. In order to evaluate the relevance of section 29, the reporting requirements of accountants practising in South Africa are compared with those of the European Union and the United Kingdom, as well as the requirements of the Financial Action Task Force. The research study will also analyse the money laundering process and the nature of the accounting profession and consider some of the methods used to perpetrate money laundering applicable to accountants. The research found that accountants in South Africa have a duty to report suspicious transactions only when they are party to such transactions or when they are going either to receive the proceeds of crime or be used for money laundering purposes. Accordingly, in view of the fact that accountants are more likely to be in a position to observe money laundering than to be party to such a transaction, the requirements of section 29 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, No 38 of 2001, as amended, are not effective when applied to accountants. Copyright / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Accounting / unrestricted

The research was conducted as a result of the researcher‟s concern that the possibility exists that members of the different law enforcement agencies in South Africa might have a misconception about the mandate and functions of the Financial Intelligence Centre. If such a misconception in fact exists, it poses a huge challenge towards fruitful co-operation among the Centre and the different law enforcement agencies. The researcher identified certain practical problems, namely, that investigators are not aware of the types of intelligence that the Centre could provide them with, and that investigators might not be informed about the specific procedures to follow when they need to request intelligence from the Centre. The research has shown that, in the past, the Centre has been a useful source of crime intelligence concerning a range of predicate offences including narcotics, fraud and tax related crimes. The research has further found that, although the majority of participants gained a lot of experience in law enforcement and investigations, they had limited awareness about the Financial Intelligence Centre and its functions. This research project studied the utilisation of the Financial Intelligence Centre as a crime intelligence source. / Police Practice / M. Tech. (Forensic Investigation)

Politically exposed persons have become a specific risk factor in money laundering. The Financial Action Task Force has formulated clear and specific requirements for dealing with these individuals. Internationally, various jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the European Union have adopted effective legislation encompassing the 2003 Financial Action Task Force Recommendations. In South Africa the requirement to apply appropriate, risk based procedures to politically exposed persons has been limited to banks. The aim of this research study was to identify whether the South African anti-money laundering regulatory framework, adequately addresses managing the risks of politically exposed persons. The regulatory frameworks of the United Kingdom and the European Union, as well as the requirements of the Financial Action Task Force, were used to determine whether best practice is followed in South Africa with regard to politically exposed persons. The process of how money is laundered has been examined as well as the methods that corrupt politically exposed persons use in order to launder money. The study has shown that politically exposed persons are not regulated in South Africa in accordance with the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations issued in 2003, while the South African Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Framework does not adequately address the risk posed by corrupt, politically exposed persons. Both international best practice and the recommendations of the World Bank were considered in terms of the way in which to address the risks posed by these persons effectively. / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Auditing / unrestricted

The work includes a theoretical definition, ways and methods of money laundering, Czech and International anti money laundering (AML) law. The second part is devoted to the fight against money laundering. It describes the main AML organizations. And as an example is given the program of one banking institution.

The opening of a bank account serves as the genesis of a bank customer relationship. It is imperative that the establishment of a bank customer relationship be regulated by law. Both the common law and statutory law regulate the admission of new clients to the realm of banking. It is a minimum requirement, in terms of both statutory and common law, that the identity of a prospective client who wishes to open a bank account must both be established and verified. This, the need to know one’s customer, is not only good law but common sense and an effective measure to prevent criminals from accessing the banking system. Parties who work together must know each other. The need to establish and verify the identity of a potential customer is commonly referred to as the Know Your Customer standards, alternatively the Customer Due Diligence framework. The Know Your Customer standards are neither unique to South Africa nor have their origins in South Africa. The Know Your Customer standards are international standards which the Financial Action Task Force and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have been advocating for quite some time. A confluence of the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision greatly influenced the birth of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act in South Africa. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 prescribes the steps that a bank has to take in order to establish and verify the identity of a potential client. It will be shown in this dissertation that the identification and verification regime established by the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 0f 2001 and the common law are not fool proof. This dissertation makes recommendations on how the current loopholes that exist in the law can be addressed. / Mercantile Law / LLM

The opening of a bank account serves as the genesis of a bank customer relationship. It is imperative that the establishment of a bank customer relationship be regulated by law. Both the common law and statutory law regulate the admission of new clients to the realm of banking. It is a minimum requirement, in terms of both statutory and common law, that the identity of a prospective client who wishes to open a bank account must both be established and verified. This, the need to know one’s customer, is not only good law but common sense and an effective measure to prevent criminals from accessing the banking system. Parties who work together must know each other. The need to establish and verify the identity of a potential customer is commonly referred to as the Know Your Customer standards, alternatively the Customer Due Diligence framework. The Know Your Customer standards are neither unique to South Africa nor have their origins in South Africa. The Know Your Customer standards are international standards which the Financial Action Task Force and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have been advocating for quite some time. A confluence of the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision greatly influenced the birth of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act in South Africa. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 prescribes the steps that a bank has to take in order to establish and verify the identity of a potential client. It will be shown in this dissertation that the identification and verification regime established by the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 0f 2001 and the common law are not fool proof. This dissertation makes recommendations on how the current loopholes that exist in the law can be addressed. / Mercantile Law / LLM