No description available.

This dissertation analyzes the roles of the Harry Truman administration and Congress in directing American policy regarding the Korean conflict. Using evidence from primary sources such as Truman’s presidential papers, communications of White House staffers, and correspondence from State Department operatives and key congressional figures, this study suggests that the legislative branch had an important role in Korean policy. Congress sometimes affected the war by what it did and, at other times, by what it did not do. Several themes are addressed in this project. One is how Truman and the congressional Democrats failed each other during the war. The president did not dedicate adequate attention to congressional relations early in his term, and was slow to react to charges of corruption within his administration, weakening his party politically. For their part, the Democrats gave HST poor advice concerning congressional involvement in the decision to take the nation to war. A number of them allowed their personal dislike for Secretary of State Dean Acheson to poison their support for the administration whenever U.S. fortunes in the war soured. Another issue was Truman’s interpretation and use of the concept of bipartisanship in foreign policy. HST generally manipulated the idea for political advantage. Ironically, had he listened to the counsel of an administration Republican early in the war, Truman could have mitigated the explosion over the firing of General Douglas MacArthur. A topic heretofore overlooked by historians concerns congressional peace initiatives proposed during the first half of the war. Analysis of the effectiveness of these resolutions, particularly during the heyday of McCarthyism, yields surprising conclusions.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Texas, Aug., 2007. / Title from title page display. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2008. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 257-265).

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1965. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [201]-206).

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 92-97). / This study compares the military effectiveness of the United States Army and United States Marine Corps during the first 10 months of the Korean War. Representative battles selected from the Pusan Perimeter, the Liberation of Seoul, and the Retreat from the Yalu are analyzed using a process-tracing methodology to identify variations in performance between the two services and to determine the source of these differences when they exist. Predictions drawn from functional and cultural theories are employed to determine which theory provides the best explanation for variations in battlefield performance. Based on this historical analysis, there is little evidence to support general claims of superior Marine Corps effectiveness. When operating under similar conditions, the military effectiveness of both organizations was roughly the same. Those variations in battlefield performance that did exist were largely the result of idiosyncratic geographic conditions combined with physical advantages gained through superior weaponry and organic close air support. Differences in organizational culture had marginal impact. Popular perceptions of Marine Corps achievements based on combat during this period resulted from an organizational strategy that emphasized battlefield exploits as part of a conscious effort to maintain a positive public image. / by Michael Richard Eastman. / S.M.

"A dissertation submitted to the Law School, University of Michigan Ann Arbor, for a doctorate degree." / Includes bibliographical references (p. [340]-357).