"A dissertation submitted to the Law School, University of Michigan Ann Arbor, for a doctorate degree." / Includes bibliographical references (p. [340]-357).

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1963. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.) -- Ohio State University, 2005. / Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 262-276). Also available via internet from University of Ohio OhioLink ETD Center. Adobe Acrobat reader required. Address as of 01/25/2007: http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/send-pdf.cgi?acc%5Fnum=osu1108407385

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1998. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 309-329).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Texas, May, 2008. / Title from title page display. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Victoria University of Wellington, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.

Airpower played an important supporting role in the Korean War, and as General of the Army Douglas MacArthur pursued victory in the war and President Harry S Truman's objectives altered throughout the first year of the conflict, tension arose between the two men. One issue in these frictions was the restriction of airpower. Not only MacArthur, but also his admiring subordinate Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer commanding the Far East Air Forces, and Fifth Air Force commander Major General Earle E. Partridge opposed the restrictions which had been imposed on airmen from the outset of the conflict. Stratemeyer did so partly because of his loyalty to MacArthur, who wanted latitude in coping with the situation in the field and defeating the Communist enemy. Partridge did so because he thought they endangered his personnel and limited the effectiveness of airpower in the war. These commanders had a fundamentally different opinion from Washington regarding the likelihood of overt Soviet intervention in the war, and because they did not think the Korean War would become a world war, they were more willing than Washington to prosecute the war more aggressively. MacArthur's conflict ended with his removal in April 1951, and Stratemeyer (who suffered a heart attack weeks afterward) continued to advocate for forceful American foreign policy in Asia during his retirement. Partridge eventually earned four stars and long after the war likewise continued to disfavor the restrictions which had been put in place. Between oral history interviews in 1974 and 1978, however, Partridge reconsidered the issue of restrictions. He expressed that the Korean War had been a considerable challenge without a wider war, implying that restrictions had perhaps been important.

This study is an operational and tactical study of a battle fought by the U. S. 1st Marine Division near "the Punchbowl," an extinct volcano of military value in the Taebaek Mountains of Korea, from late August through mid September 1951. That engagement was to be the last 1st Marine Division offensive of the Korean War. This battle, for Yoke and Kanmubong Ridges, has received little coverage from historians. That it is all but forgotten is surprising, since it was one of the hardest fought for United States Marines in the war. The casualties were high, and Americans did not understand why so many had to die for a war that seemed to already be set to conclude by negotiations. This study tells the story of that battle more completely than ever before, and assesses its significance to the course of the Korean War.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Department of East Asian Languages & Civilizations, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.