This thesis focuses on the contemporary literature in Anglo-American analytic jurisprudence that takes answering the question â what is law?â as the primary goal. Agreement about what is lawâ that is, agreement about which theory of law is accurate and adequateâ is necessary to achieve the primary goal. Theorists have come to acknowledge that no such agreement exists due to their disagreements over two subjects: (S1) what is law and (S2) what methodology theorists should follow to produce an accurate and adequate theory of law. I refer to theoristsâ disagreement about S2 as the methodology conflict. Today, theorists advance towards the primary goal in two different directions: directly or indirectly. The direct course labors to accomplish agreement about which theory of law is accurate and adequate. The indirect course toils to accomplish agreement about which methodology a theory of law should satisfy to be accurate and adequate, before advancing to the direct course. If one course is the correct or best way to achieve the primary goal, it is imprudent for theorists to continue to work towards the same goal in separate directions. How, then, should theorists proceed? Answering this question, loosely put, is the main objective of this thesis. I argue that theorists must resolve the methodology conflict first to be able to achieve the primary goal of jurisprudence (i.e., to reach a common answer to the question â what is law?â ). I reveal that the methodology conflict poses a serious problem for theorists working to reach an agreement about S1: namely, theorists cannot agree about which legal theory is accurate and adequate unless they agree about which methodology a legal theory should satisfy to be accurate and adequate. Next, I settle the methodology conflict. I show that a particular synthesis of the current two approaches to resolve theoristsâ disagreement about S2 â imperialism and relativismâ provides a way out of the methodology conflict. I explain that the solution to the methodology conflict is a reasonable four-step examination process that enables theorists to engage in meaningful debate about S1 and S2 and work more successfully towards achieving the primary goal.

Thesis (Honors)--Liberty University Honors Program, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Available also from UMI/Dissertation Abstracts International.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago. / From Legal tender; a study in English and American monetary history (Decennial publications of the University of Chicago, 2d series, vol. VII).

This thesis is an on-the-ground exploration of the radical hypothesis that each individual human being bears responsibility for constructing order out of the overwhelming plurality and dissonance of normative experience. It constitutes an empirically-based, critical legal pluralist analysis of everyday life at L'Arche Montreal---a community serving persons with intellectual disabilities. The aim of this thesis is to highlight the active role persons with intellectual disabilities living at L'Arche Montreal play in constructing legal normativity.

This dissertation presents a concept of diversity as an ideal of international economic regulation. The theme of diversity refers to the differentiation of individual competitive strategies. The first advantage of such differentiation is argued to be as a means of stable and adaptive progress; increasing the number of possible techniques with which to meet as yet unforeseen challenges. As the first principle of diversity entails a method for systemic responsiveness, the second principle gives content to this method and states that social goals should serve as the incentives encouraging competitors toward differentiation. The advantage offered by the second principle is that social non-economic goals may be advanced in the present, as individuals attempt new routes to personal reward via the satisfaction of collective objectives that previously may have had little or no economic value. As an ideal of diversity contemplates a method of systemic incentives, rather than mandated outcomes, the location of innovation remains individual competitors. Accordingly, the ideal of diversity is justified and articulated from a basis in individual rights. Diversity is argued to be the optimal set of principles which individuals would select if given the ability to design a new competitive system. In joining a method of differentiation with the added social content of non-economic priority, diversity offers a unique blend of economic efficiency and equity; or of self-interest and concern for the welfare of others. Diversity allows an individual to think of their own pursuit of gain, but also and simultaneously further collective goals by selecting the priorities that should influence competitors toward differentiation. Other’s welfare becomes a route to individual success. The project progresses through three broad conceptual stages. First, international problems of market failure are considered in light of strategies and the economic impulses toward self and system defeating cycles of competition. Second, a redefinition of legal and economic progress is offered to meet conditions of unpredictability, and to arrive at an evolutionary method that encourages constantly competitive variation with which to meet society’s future challenges. Third, an evolutionary approach to international regulation is translated into a priority system of legal rights.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.