Sectarianism has become the magic word with which many scholars and politicians describe the current Middle East politics. Much of the existing literature presumes that most of the state and non-state actors of the region are divided over Shia and Sunni blocs led by Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabi (KSA) respectively. However, so far scholars have left out the Kurds within their studies on sectarianism. Scholars have not explicitly pointed out why they are disinterested in sectarianism among the Kurds; it might be due to the perception that the Kurds are mostly Sunnis who have an ethnic and not a religious cause. The main aim of this research is to look at sectarianism in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and find out whether or not of this perception is true. To do so, this research rejects the general application of the English term "sectarianism" in the first place as a theme to explain the politics of the Middle East. Instead, in the first chapter it is argued that there are three tiers of relations among regional actors: 1) state-state realpolitik, which is based on geopolitical realities among Turkey, Iran and the KSA, 2) political sectarianism (taifiyya) among sectarian groups such as the MB, Wahabis and Shia, often conducted through political agents like state and non-state actors, and 3) the civil and non-violent sect-sect theological sectarianism (madhabiyya) among those three sects. In the second chapter this new understanding of sectarianism is then applied on the domestic politics of the KRI. It is argued that while there is theological sectarianism in the KRI, there is no political sectarianism. The third chapter explores the foreign relations of the KRI. It argues that the KRI as an unrecognized state, acts rationally to survive. It evades sectarianism and deemphasizes its demands of international recognition. Alternatively, the KRI pursues 'Regional Acceptance Policy' within which the Kurdish leadership persuades the regional powers, especially Turkey and Iran, that the de facto state will not declare independence, in return, they ask regional powers' acceptance of the KRI as a legitimate actor with its unique status. / Doctor of Philosophy / Throughout the 20th century ethno-nationalism was the strongest sentiment in the Middle East. Within the past decade or so, however, Islam's two main sectarian identities, Shia and Sunni, have become extraordinarily strong, if not stronger than ethno-national identities. The common understanding of the region's politics is that Iran, as a Shia majority country, has allied with the other Shia non-Persian countries and actors, such as Iraq and Hezbollah. The Sunni countries, on the other hand, have gathered around the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) against Iran or Shias in general. There is also, however, a common perception that Kurds are the only people in the Middle East who have not become sectarian. This research is to see whether this perception towards the Kurds is true, and if it is, why? The first chapter argues that the English term "sectarianism" fails to explain the current politics of the Middle East. Instead, it is argued, there are two different forms of sectarianism in Islam; one is about theological disagreements, which in Arabic is called "madhabiya", the other is about the political competition among the various Muslim groups which in Arabic is called "taifiya". Regardless of the religious factor, states of the Middle East act rationally based on geopolitical realities. Political sectarianism comes emerges especially when those sectarian groups mobilize under political parties and armed militia groups. Sects and states sometimes cooperate for mutual interests and hence it appears that the entire conflicts of the region are driven by sectarian motivations. The second and third chapters then explore sectarianism in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) within this new understanding. The KRI acts like the state actors based on its interests and not its Sunni sectarian identity. Contrary to the common perception towards the unrecognized state which assumes that the KRI's ultimate goal should be international recognition (IR), it is here argued that the KRI prioritizes 'regional acceptance' (RA) over IR. Within the KRI there is theological sectarianism among Salafists, Sufis, and political Islamists. However, there is no political sectarianism because the Kurdish government has neutralized and unarmed the sectarian groups.

In this dissertation I examine the role played by the ancient Near Eastern serpent in apotropaic and prophylactic magic. Within this realm the serpent appears in roles in healing and protection where magic is often employed. The possibility of positive and negative roles is investigated. The study is confined to the Bronze Age in ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia and Syria-Palestine. The serpents, serpent deities and deities with ophidian aspects and associations are described. By examining these serpents and deities and their roles it is possible to incorporate a comparative element into his study on an intra- and inter-regional basis. In order to accumulate information for this study I have utilised textual and pictorial evidence, as well as artefacts (such as jewellery, pottery and other amulets) bearing serpent motifs. / Old Testament & Ancient Near Eastern Studies / M.A. (Ancient Near Eastern Studies)

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This study analyzes various perspectives of modernization theory in some Middle Eastern countries and examines the impact of modernization, both in its western and eastern formula, on the legitimacy and stability of these countries. It also examines those external factors that influenced these countries' internal and external policies. The study's major hypothesis is that Modernization + Secularization = Instability, whereas Modernization - Secularization = Stability in Middle Eastern Islamic countries. Secularization is a component of both the western and eastern paths; consequently, a Middle Eastern country that attempts to modernize and secularize along either of these paths is doomed to instability. The hypothesis suggested herein is analyzed in regard to twelve Middle Eastern countries. The principal conclusions are that the collapse of the Shah's regime in 1979 was a direct result of his western and secular policies; Egypt's political and economic instability was a result of its unsuccessful oscillation between west and east; Lebanon's limited experience with liberal democracy was a failure because of internal secularization and sectarian politics, and external interference by foreign powers; the instability of the Ba'athist regimes of Syria and Iraq is a consequence of their secular socialist policies; and South Yemen's Marxist-Leninist policies were a major cause for its unstable political regime. Even though Libya's Third International Theory of Modernization, based on an Islamic framework, seems to generate political stability for Qadhafi's regime, his latest adoption of Marxist-Leninist ideology may delegitimize his rule; on the other hand, the latest external pressures by the United States and Western European powers on Libya have legitimized Qadhafi's rule and boosted his popularity, for the time being. In contrast, Algeria's pragmatic socialism has been carefully tailored to its Islamic tradition and therefore has resulted in one of the major stable political systems in the Middle East. Contrary to the pessimist modernization theorists who predict the demise of the traditional monarchies when attempting to rapidly modernize, modernization in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco seems for the most part to have been accompanied by political stability due to their exclusion of the secular component of the western path.

This study presents a detailed examination of the Arab League's history, development, structure and roles in an effort to understand the cause of its failure as a regional security organisation. The research's point of departure is a questioning of the nature and scope of this failure in terms of the interplay between the conditions under which it was formed and the many actors and dynamics that had a long term-impact on the prospects for the League. To this end, the study looks at the League's conditions of emergence and Arab-Arab relations with the focus on Arab national security as the main concept determining its security role. The research synthesises methods of analysis from the existing literature and schools of thought so as to identify where and why failure and success occurred in relation to international relations theories, the security and international organisations literature, and comparable international models. The development and conditions affecting the League as discussed in the research demonstrate that none of the existing broad theories or approaches can fully explain the League's failure; however, the constructivist approach, although never before applied in this context, is shown to offer the most relevant approach for explaining this organisation and its unique parameters. The research also examines the role played by the Arab League in regional peacekeeping and conflict prevention in the context of Arab national security, with Palestine as a case study.

In this survey, women's roles (jobs) and their participation in the workforce in the Muslim Middle-Eastern countries will be discussed generally; moreover, some of the Middle-Eastern countries, such as Egypt and Iran, will be studied a little more specifically as a sample. The status of women, their education, skills, and profession, will be explained historically from the date of the Islamic period until today. The problems and factors that prohibited women from having outside jobs, social life, and equal rights in past and present times (from 610 A.D. to 1982) will be analyzed. On the other hand, the attempt is to make a general picture of women's conditions in the society to which they belong from the time of Muslim's Prophet until today.

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This dissertation addresses the puzzle as to why some regions in the world are engulfed in militarized disputes among member states, while other regions live under peaceful conditions. It argues that domestic regime-societal management strategies have significant explanatory value to understand variance in regional orders. These domestic factors have largely been ignored in International Relations (IR) literature. A domestic politics-based analytical framework explains how states with inclusionary governing regimes (those which account for the interests of societal actors in policy formulation and consequently give them stakes in the survival of the regime) are more likely to move the regional order towards stability. On the other hand, states with exclusionary regimes (those which do not account for the interests of societal actors in policy formulation and consequently do not give them stakes in the survival of the regime) are more likely to push the regional order toward instability. / The dissertation also addresses a frequently underexposed dimension of IR theory: exactly how do major powers influence regional orders? It argues that major powers penetrate regional states in support of either societal actors or regimes (and sometimes both). In that process major powers help alter the power asymmetries inside regional states affecting their preferences and strategies, and hence their behaviour towards the regional order. / The analytical framework is used to explain variations in Middle East regional orders through four paired comparisons of six states: Israel-Egypt, Israel-Turkey, Israel-Syria, and Iran-Saudi Arabia. The time frame under study is from 1950 to 2000. The change in the Middle East regional order post-1990 did not correspond in magnitude to the change in the international system, adding credibility to this framework which prioritizes domestic level variables in shaping regional orders.

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This thesis is an attempt to examine one of the most important on-going debates in contemporary Islamists' discourses, namely, the status and rights of religious minorities in an Islamic state. The call by Islamists for the establishment of such a state governed by the Shari'ah has given rise to criticism that Islamization would entail the revival of the discriminatory rulings of traditional Islamic law with respect to non-Muslim citizens and the negation of the modern principle of the right to equality for all citizens irrespective of religious belief. To provide a background to the problem, this study presents a brief review of the stance of traditional Islamic law on the status and rights of non-Muslims living within the domain of Islam. This tradition has informed the discourses of contemporary Islamists on the question. Two currents of thought are examined: radical and moderate Islamism. Radical Islamists assert that granting non-Muslim citizens equal status and rights with Muslims is inconsistent with the teachings of Islam, although in stating this they confirm the apprehensions that Islamization would result in institutionalizing discrimination against religious minorities. Moderate Islamists on the other hand maintain that the concept of equal rights for all citizens is compatible with the tenets of Islam. Nonetheless, their arguments are not without problems as there are limits to how far they are willing to go in offering equal status and rights to non-Muslims.