隨著民主治理的發展，有效調和民主憲政與文官專業價值，才能夠確保民主政治運作的效能。背景因素使得政務官與事務官間的互動，愈具舉足輕重的角色。從相關研究可以理解，欲直接觀察政務官與事務官細部的互動並不容易，兩者間細部的互動對外界而言始終是一個黑盒子。因此，本研究使用鮮少作為該議題研究主體的影視產品進行分析。選擇英國經典影集「Yes, Minister」，乃因該劇主要以描繪政務官與事務官互動為主，描寫程度相當細膩。藉此旁觀的角度一窺政務官與事務官的互動，確實是個能夠協助深入理解該議題的良好個案。 研究設計的基礎為文本分析法，透過建構分析路徑，分別從兩者本質、選擇偏好、表現作為，以及互動後對政策產出的討論。先將14集研究樣本進行相同路徑的文本化，再將文本化的樣本進行論述與類型化。研究發現事務官的互動技巧，包括行政權力的作為與不作為、可行性評估、影響政務體系與政務官以及納入外部勢力等，目的為提升參與決策的條件，細部列出24項互動技巧；另一方面，政務官則可透過經驗複製、行政學習、媒體與聲望經營與納入外部力量等，目的為提升統治便利性與正當性，細部列出13項互動技巧。兩者的互動呈現出互相制衡的本質，若各自無法有效負責與調和時，易形成雙重價值選擇的壓力。 本研究提出以「鐘擺效果」解釋政務官與事務官的互動，兩者在制衡關係的基礎上，隨著時序性的影響而改變互動模式。基本上的互動如鐘擺式擺盪，進而系統性因素將會因時序性遞減，激發出最適的政策結果。最終提出兩大項建議：首先，從制衡到動態平衡的關係，正視制衡現象的存在、立基於分權制衡上的信任關係、減少彼此錯誤解讀的機會，以及培養持續監督與自省能力；其二，設定政策決策的妥協底線，認知非任務型指標的超然價值，以及試著創造沒有共識的共識。 / In any democratic state’s development, how to effectively reconcile the two values of constitutional democracy and bureaucratic expertise is fundamental to ensure the proper functioning and efficacy of democratic politics. As Taiwan further consolidates its democracy, the interaction between the political appointees and senior civil servants becomes ever more important in achieving a balance of pluralistic values on the one hand, and government’s administrative efficiency, on the other. Yet past research has found that it is not easy to observe directly the details of the interaction between political appointees and civil servants; to the external world, the actual interaction between the two has always been a black box. Therefore, to shed light on that black box, this study analyzes the interaction between appointees and civil servants as depicted in film and television programs. The classic British series, “Yes Minister,” was chosen as the study’s research subject because it portrays the minister-bureaucrat interactive behavior skillfully and poignantly, which allows a deeper understanding of the issue. The study employs textual analysis as the principal research method. Each of the series’ 14 episodes had been textually reinterpreted by using the same analytical paths, which were constructed by first categorizing the nature, choice preferences, display behaviors, and post-interaction reaction to policy outputs for both political appointees and senior civil servants. The research has found that civil servants, in their pursuit for greater participation in decision-making, exhibit as many as 24 distinct interactive behaviors with their political superiors. Some of these behaviors include administrative action and inaction, call for feasibility assessment, manipulation of the political system, and incorporation of external forces. On the other hand, political appointees, in their effort to achieve political expediency and legitimacy, have 13 behaviors of their own through experience replication, administrative learning, media and reputation management, and inclusion of external forces. Both sets of interactive behaviors are essentially parts of a checks-and-balances system. When responsibilities are unclear and actions cannot be coordinated effectively, the agency then becomes vulnerable to role ambiguity and double value selection problems. This research proposes a “pendulum effect” to explain the interaction between political appointees and civil servants. Because the appointees and civil servants have a mutual checks and balances relationship, both parties will alter their interactive behavior depending on the timing of events. Essentially, the interaction between the two sides will initially swing freely like a pendulum; subsequently, system factors will cause the pendulum to progressively decrease its swing, ultimately arriving at the most optimal policy result. In conclusion, this study makes two major recommendations. First, both political appointees and civil servants need to understand that they are in a dynamic equilibrium, in which they check and balance each other’s actions. By acknowledging the check and balance nature of their relationship, both minimize the chance of misinterpreting each other, and may develop the healthy capacity of ongoing oversight and self-introspection. Second, both political appointees and civil servants must establish a baseline in any policy negotiation and compromise, recognize the (sometimes) extraordinary value of non-mission-based indicators, and attempt to create a consensus when no consensus exists.