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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

我國行政機關組織與員額管理決策之研究

廖世立, LIAO,SHI-LI Unknown Date (has links)
組織是推動政務達成施政目標的重要手段。然而為期符合管理經濟原則,對於組織與 員額應予有效管理。近年來,我國行政機關組織與員額不斷的膨脹,但行政效能卻未 相對顯著的提高,致遭致人民、與論及學術等各界之不滿與抨擊。有鑑於此,近十餘 年來主管機關不斷的研究改進管理方法,並採取各項改善措施,然收效未宏,故如何 促使行政組織及員額之管理健全合理,以適應國家施政需要,並符管理經濟,乃當前 行政革新聲中朝野共同關切矚目的重要課題。 基於以往研究均偏重制度、法規等靜態分析之缺失,本文遂採用「決策研究途徑」, 注重動態過程的研究,並輔之以傳統靜態的研究方法,以作整體的探討,俾能相輔相 成,有助於預期研究成果的達成。 全文計分七章,約十萬字,其內容要旨如次: 第一章、緒論:主要在說明本文的研究動機與目的、研究範圍與內容、研究途徑與方 法,以及研究的限制。 第二章、文獻探討:係針對決策研究途徑作文獻分析,其內容包括決策研究的概念、 決策研究的模式以及變項分析,並建構本文的研究架構。 第三章、我國行政機關組織與員額管理概述:係就我國目前行政機關組織與與員額管 理之現狀,作一整體的敘述,俾助對全盤管理狀況的了解。 第四章、影響組織與員額管理決策之內容因素:探討組織與員額管理決策問題及決策 資源等問題。 第五章、影響組織與員額管理決策之系絡因素:探討組織與員額管理決策之決策環境 及決策參與者等問題。 第十六章、組織與員額管理決策過程與回饋:係探討組織與員額管理決策權力的互動 、權力的歸屬、決策的作成以及決策執行成效的回饋等問題。 第七章、結論:係歸納研究發現並提出改進建議。
2

行政機關生產力之研究--指標建構與衡量方法的探討

楊建民, YANG, JIAN-MIN Unknown Date (has links)
在快速變遷的社會中,我國正處於關鍵性的轉型期,在此重要過程裡,政府多年來的 努力目標乃積極著重於行政革新的推動與行政效率的提升,各級行政機關也不斷地提 出各項革新措施。過去種種努力雖有一定的價值展現,但卻始終無法以具體指標與量 化資料評估出行政機關的整體績效,或與其他同性質機關相互比較。然而一般民眾則 普遍認為政府行政效率及效能實遠低於民營企業。 針對此項革新議題,本文乃以「行政機關生產力」為題進行研究,嘗試就具體指標建 構及各種衡量方法的探討,實際瞭解政府行政運作績效,進而提升行政機關生產力, 俾以帶動國家整體發展。 本文共乙冊,計約十萬字,分為六章十六節。 第一章緒論。說明研究背景及研究架構。 第二章行政機關生產力的意義。經由生產力基本內涵的討論,闡述行政機關生產力的 定義,並提出一分析模式。 第三章指標建構。分由行政效率及行政效能兩重要變項,據以建構行政機關生產力指 標及適用上的檢討。 第四章衡量方法。敘述各種生產力衡量模式,並建議一套生產力指標的衡量方法。 第五章衡量實務。引述美國政府生產力衡量經驗,再以我國「科學園區管理局「個案 進行實證研究。 第六章結論。回顧與檢討,最後提出增進行政機關生產力的努力方向。
3

領導風格對組織溝通與行政效能之調節效應-以中央研究院學術研究人員兼任行政主管之實證分析 / Organizational Communication and Administrative Effectiveness: An Empirical Analysis on the Moderating Effects of Leadership Style to Academic Researcher Concurrently in charge of Administrative Director in Academia Sinica.

虞令潔 Unknown Date (has links)
中央研究院被認為是我國最高學術機構,院內一級單位主管皆由研究人員兼任。本研究旨在探討中央研究院學術研究人員兼任行政主管的領導風格與所屬單位員工組織溝通與行政效能的關聯性,並採用問卷調查法中的配額抽樣方式,行政單位發出105份,研究單位則發出310份,合計為415份。問卷回收共計315份,其中有效問卷數為293份,可用率為93.01%。 經分析結果得出以下結論:中央研究院由研究人員兼任行政主管之所屬單位員工對於主管的領導風格、組織溝通與行政效能的感受平均得分分別為3.48、3.31、3.95,位於「李克特五點尺度法」的中上但未達同意程度。其次,組織溝通的「正式溝通」與行政效能之間具有顯著之正向關係。由此可知,中央研究院由研究人員兼任行政主管所屬單位員工的正式溝通感受程度愈高,其行政效能的知覺程度亦會愈高。最後,主管的「轉換型領導」與「交易型領導」對於組織溝通的「正式溝通」與行政效能之間具有正向之調節效果,但對於不同社會屬性特徵員工與行政效能之間則不具有調節效果。 根據研究結果,本研究提出四項實務建議,以增進單位員工的行政效能。包括:主管對於部屬應加強個別關懷及提供教育訓練、對待部屬應賞罰分明、強化與部屬之間的溝通管道以及兼任行政主管應善盡主管之職責。 / The Academia Sinica is considered the highest academic institution of the country. The researchers hold the concurrent post as the highest administration positions at the director level. The purpose of this research is to analyze the relationship of the academic researcher with administrative director’s leadership style, organizational communication, and administrative effectiveness. The method of Quota Sampling is used to distribute questionnaires to the staff. There are a total of 415 questionnaires: 105 of which are given to the administrative staff and 310 are given to the research staff. In total, there are 315 questionnaires collected and 293 of them, 93.01%, are considered as valid. There are several conclusions drawn from the analysis of the research. First, the average score of the administrators’ leadership style, organizational communication, and administrative effectiveness is 3.48, 3.31, 3.95, is located to “Likert scale” in the upper but not agree with the degree. Secondly, there is a positive relationship between the formal communication and administrative effectiveness. Lastly, administrators’ transforming leadership and transactional leadership positively moderated the relationship between formal communication and administrative effectiveness, but there is no moderating effect on the relationship between the staff’s social and demographical background and administrative effectiveness. Based on the conclusions, four practical recommendations are proposed to further enhance the administrative effectiveness: (1) The administrative director should pay more attention to the individual subordinate, and provide training programs to the staff. (2) The administrative director should have a very clear award and punishment system. (3) The administrative director should better communicate with the staff. (4) Academic researchers with administrative responsibilities should fulfill his administrative responsibility.
4

民主治理下政務官與事務官互動關係:以「是的,部長(Yes, Minister)」影集之文本分析為例 / The interaction between political appointees and civil servants in democratic governance: A text analysis of the TV series “Yes, Minister.”

林俐君, Lin, Li Chun Unknown Date (has links)
隨著民主治理的發展,有效調和民主憲政與文官專業價值,才能夠確保民主政治運作的效能。背景因素使得政務官與事務官間的互動,愈具舉足輕重的角色。從相關研究可以理解,欲直接觀察政務官與事務官細部的互動並不容易,兩者間細部的互動對外界而言始終是一個黑盒子。因此,本研究使用鮮少作為該議題研究主體的影視產品進行分析。選擇英國經典影集「Yes, Minister」,乃因該劇主要以描繪政務官與事務官互動為主,描寫程度相當細膩。藉此旁觀的角度一窺政務官與事務官的互動,確實是個能夠協助深入理解該議題的良好個案。 研究設計的基礎為文本分析法,透過建構分析路徑,分別從兩者本質、選擇偏好、表現作為,以及互動後對政策產出的討論。先將14集研究樣本進行相同路徑的文本化,再將文本化的樣本進行論述與類型化。研究發現事務官的互動技巧,包括行政權力的作為與不作為、可行性評估、影響政務體系與政務官以及納入外部勢力等,目的為提升參與決策的條件,細部列出24項互動技巧;另一方面,政務官則可透過經驗複製、行政學習、媒體與聲望經營與納入外部力量等,目的為提升統治便利性與正當性,細部列出13項互動技巧。兩者的互動呈現出互相制衡的本質,若各自無法有效負責與調和時,易形成雙重價值選擇的壓力。 本研究提出以「鐘擺效果」解釋政務官與事務官的互動,兩者在制衡關係的基礎上,隨著時序性的影響而改變互動模式。基本上的互動如鐘擺式擺盪,進而系統性因素將會因時序性遞減,激發出最適的政策結果。最終提出兩大項建議:首先,從制衡到動態平衡的關係,正視制衡現象的存在、立基於分權制衡上的信任關係、減少彼此錯誤解讀的機會,以及培養持續監督與自省能力;其二,設定政策決策的妥協底線,認知非任務型指標的超然價值,以及試著創造沒有共識的共識。 / In any democratic state’s development, how to effectively reconcile the two values of constitutional democracy and bureaucratic expertise is fundamental to ensure the proper functioning and efficacy of democratic politics. As Taiwan further consolidates its democracy, the interaction between the political appointees and senior civil servants becomes ever more important in achieving a balance of pluralistic values on the one hand, and government’s administrative efficiency, on the other. Yet past research has found that it is not easy to observe directly the details of the interaction between political appointees and civil servants; to the external world, the actual interaction between the two has always been a black box. Therefore, to shed light on that black box, this study analyzes the interaction between appointees and civil servants as depicted in film and television programs. The classic British series, “Yes Minister,” was chosen as the study’s research subject because it portrays the minister-bureaucrat interactive behavior skillfully and poignantly, which allows a deeper understanding of the issue. The study employs textual analysis as the principal research method. Each of the series’ 14 episodes had been textually reinterpreted by using the same analytical paths, which were constructed by first categorizing the nature, choice preferences, display behaviors, and post-interaction reaction to policy outputs for both political appointees and senior civil servants. The research has found that civil servants, in their pursuit for greater participation in decision-making, exhibit as many as 24 distinct interactive behaviors with their political superiors. Some of these behaviors include administrative action and inaction, call for feasibility assessment, manipulation of the political system, and incorporation of external forces. On the other hand, political appointees, in their effort to achieve political expediency and legitimacy, have 13 behaviors of their own through experience replication, administrative learning, media and reputation management, and inclusion of external forces. Both sets of interactive behaviors are essentially parts of a checks-and-balances system. When responsibilities are unclear and actions cannot be coordinated effectively, the agency then becomes vulnerable to role ambiguity and double value selection problems. This research proposes a “pendulum effect” to explain the interaction between political appointees and civil servants. Because the appointees and civil servants have a mutual checks and balances relationship, both parties will alter their interactive behavior depending on the timing of events. Essentially, the interaction between the two sides will initially swing freely like a pendulum; subsequently, system factors will cause the pendulum to progressively decrease its swing, ultimately arriving at the most optimal policy result. In conclusion, this study makes two major recommendations. First, both political appointees and civil servants need to understand that they are in a dynamic equilibrium, in which they check and balance each other’s actions. By acknowledging the check and balance nature of their relationship, both minimize the chance of misinterpreting each other, and may develop the healthy capacity of ongoing oversight and self-introspection. Second, both political appointees and civil servants must establish a baseline in any policy negotiation and compromise, recognize the (sometimes) extraordinary value of non-mission-based indicators, and attempt to create a consensus when no consensus exists.

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