Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

M.A. (English) / This study applies st Thomas Aquinas's principles of love to William Shakespeare's Hamlet in order to establish the moral bases of the causes and effects of the actions of the characters in the play. The dissertation is divided into two parts comprising six chapters. The first part, chapter one, establishes the availability of st Thomas's precepts in the English Renaissance. The second part, comprising chapters two to six, applies st Thomas's principles relating to charitable and concupiscent love to the characters in the play. st Thomas's philosophy exerted a pervasive influence in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and was accessible to educated circles in England. In view of this influence, it is possible that Shakespeare was influenced by Thomist thought when he wrote Hamlet. In this study, the characters are grouped in terms of the Thomist principles of love that they exemplify in Hamlet, with Horatio providing a moral norm, Claudius being the epitome of evil, and the central character, Hamlet, being a source of moral ambiguity. The cast of supporting characters reflects the nuances of good and evil in the play. The study concludes that, while Shakespeare's characters are governed by established Thomist principles, the translation of moral abstracts into practice elicits moral dilemmas that are difficult to resolve.

No description available.

My dissertation gives the first analysis of misery in the thought of Aquinas and Teresa of Ávila, providing new insight into their ideas of happiness through means of contrast. I use the terms “misery” and “happiness” in a traditional sense to indicate life lived poorly or well, respectively, and I investigate these notions in Aquinas’ and Teresa’s principal texts, especially the Summa Theologiae and The Interior Castle. Both thinkers identify misery as a privation of God: a lack of the share in God’s goodness that one ought to have. Both see the escape from misery as a process of perfecting the soul’s faculties of intellect and will to unite one to God. For Aquinas, happiness is essentially an intellectual perfection: knowledge of God. Conversely, misery is an intellectual defect: lack of the knowledge of God that one ought to have. Moreover, Aquinas so analyzes “ought” that misery is a lack of what is naturally desired. Perfect happiness comes with the full understanding of God that one can only attain in heaven, but a middle ground exists between perfect happiness and misery. Even in this life, one can attain “imperfect happiness,” and the analysis of misery helps to clarify this obscure notion. The imperfectly happy have not acquired their consummate perfection, but understand as much about God as nature presently compels them to desire to know. A right will is both necessary and sufficient for escaping misery and obtaining happiness. The will depends on the intellect in such a way that it cannot desire correctly unless the intellect understands correctly. Moreover, sin colors one’s perception of reality, so that evil desire in the will causes error and ignorance in the intellect. Thus, one escapes misery if and only if one chooses to love God as one’s ultimate end. For Teresa, happiness is the union with God through knowledge and love for which the soul was made, and misery is the lack of this union. The soul escapes misery by developing a relationship with God in contemplative prayer, and Teresa illustrates happiness and misery through the titular metaphor of The Interior Castle. Notably, happiness requires that one’s union with God become perfectly secure, and I identify an intellectualist strain in Teresa that implies that the will cannot become perfectly committed to God unless the intellect can become perfectly firm in its certainty that God is the sole good. The quest for certainty is difficult, since like Descartes who will follow her, Teresa posits the existence of a deceiving demon with considerable influence over all the soul’s powers. Against that threat, Teresa claims to find certainty through mystical experience. God is Truth, containing and grounding all other truths. In the “spiritual marriage,” the soul sees God’s Triune nature as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, really three distinct persons yet one substance. The directness of this vision provides a certainty which no deception can overcome.

The aim of this study is twofold: to identify the theological purpose underlying the depiction of angels at certain key points in the history of their use, and to explore how far that deeper theological rationale can be re-appropriated for our own day. This study first traces the progression of the angelic motif in the Hebrew Scriptures. By examining numerous pericopes in the Pentateuch, major prophets and Daniel, I demonstrate that the metamorphosis of higher-order beings like the angel of the Lord, cherubim and seraphim, is directly related to the writers' desire to enhance God's transcendence. Next, I evaluate pseudo-Denys' hierarchical angelology, which prominent theologians like Luther and Calvin condemned as little more than a Neoplatonic scheme for accessing God through angels. I propose that not only has pseudo-Denys' Neoplatonism been overstated, but that his angelology is particularly noteworthy for the way it accentuates Christ's eucharistic immanence to the Church. Then I maintain that because assessments of Aquinas' angelology are often based upon the Summa Theologiae, his views are wrongly portrayed as overtly philosophical, rather than biblical and exegetical. In his lesser-known biblical commentaries, however, Aquinas pushes the semantic range of the word ‘angel' to include aspects of the physical world, which unveils an imaginative, Christocentric, and scriptural dimension of his angelology that is rarely acknowledged. The conclusion considers how contemporary figures and movements relate to these three angelologies. Barth emphasises the transcendent God but unlike Hebrew Scripture, weakens connections between God and angels. New Ageism affirms the immanent angel but unlike pseudo-Denys, does so at the expense of Christology and ecclesiology. Contemporary ecological discourse generally lacks Aquinas' appreciation for an imaginative, supernatural approach to the world. Finally, I ground the angels' relationship to transcendence, immanence and imagination in an experiential, eucharistic context.

This thesis examines a primary question raised by both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas: What constitutes the beginning of a human being? Aristotle and Aquinas raise this question for very different reasons. Modern critical commentators revisit it for their own reasons, namely for the purposes of ethical debates surrounding conception and abortion. They frequently attribute the notions of delayed ensoulment and quickening to Aristotle. Through examination of the primary texts, I demonstrate that this attribution is erroneous. Aristotle contends that ensoulment is substantially complete at conception, though subject to gradual actualization throughout the lifespan of a human being; while Thomas suggests that conception is a process, requiring several substantial changes before a human soul is infused. I argue that Aquinas adapts Aristotle in accordance with his Christian theological commitments, and modern commentators follow him to develop their own notions of delayed ensoulment and quickening.

No description available.

No description available.

The concept of matter as it is treated in the philosophical systems of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus is examined, partly to ascertain the influence which the original Aristotelian concept of matter had on the two medieval thinkers, and partly to determine which of these two thinkers remained more faithful to the original Aristotelian concept. An analysis is carried out of the views of the three philosophers regarding the ontological status of matter; the intelligibility of matter; the issue of the real distinction between matter and form; the role played by matter in individuating composite substances; and its role in defining composite substances and determining their essences. Finally, the views of Aquinas and Scotus regarding the theory of universal hylomorphism and the theory of the plurality of forms are discussed and compared. It is shown that, while most of the Franciscan philosophical tradition up to Scotus's time was far more influenced by Platonist than by Aristotelian principles, Scotus, though a Franciscan, was much closer to Aristotle than to Plato in his views regarding matter. In fact, the few deviations from the original Aristotelian concept found in Scotus's theory can be ascribed to theological concerns. It is argued, furthermore, that Scotus's views on the concept of matter are far closer to the original Aristotelian theory than our analysis shows Aquinas himself to be.

Text in Afrikaans / Aquinas's five point argument for God's existence views creation as a holistic entity in which synthesis and creative influences are initiated through the interaction between minimal and maximal acts of being. These acts are represented by the per accidens and the per se respectively. Both these acts are fundamental acts which are crucial to the outcome of the argument for the existence of God. The creature who, because of his per accidens dependency, possesses minimal status, is elevated to a place of honour by participation in creation. Both the essence and esse of creatures have their origin in the pure esse of the maximal act of being (God). Maximal being, the efficient cause, grounds the similarity between itself and minimal acts of being. Both the per accidens and the per se have crucial roles to play in the verification of tbe argument. Should any one of these two elements be lacking, the argument would be invalid. / Aquinas se Quinque Via as 'n Holistiese Beredenering is 'n vyfpunt-argument vir die bestaan van God wat die skepping as 'n eenheid beskou waarin sintese en skeppende invloede bewerkstellig word deur interaksie tussen minimale en maksimale bestaansaktes. Die bestaansaktes word deur die per accidens en die per se (wat die fundamentele boustene in die argument vorm) verteenwoordig. Die skepsel wat vanwee sy per accidens- afhanklikheid beperkte status beklee, word deur bemiddeling van die per se of maksimale bestaansakte (God) tot deelgenoot verhef en beklee ·n ereplek in die skepping. Beide die esse en essensie van menslike wesens het hul oorsprong in die suiwer esse van die maksimale bestaansakte. Maksimale bestaan, die effektiewe oorsaak, begrond die ooreenkoms tussen sigself en die minimale bestaansaktes. Die per accidens sowel as die per se vervul 'n onontbeerlike rol in die bewysvoering van die argument. Sou een van die twee fundamentele elemente ontbreek, sou die argument in geheel ongeldig wees. / Philosophy, Practical & Systematic Theology / M.A. (Wysbegeerte)