AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF ASTERIOS STAMATIKOS, for the Master of Philosophy degree in Philosophy, presented on October 14, 2014, at Southern Illinois University Carbondale. "FIGHTING THE GOOD FIGHT: ΘΎΜΟϚ IN THE REPUBLIC" MAJOR PROFESSOR: Dr. Thomas Alexander This paper shows that the spirted part of the soul should be ranked above the appetitive part of the soul, according to the standards Plato set forth in The Republic. Plato exalted the rational part of the soul, but he likened the spirited part of the soul to the rational part in various ways. The moral goodness of the spirited part of the soul can be shown through the ways it is similar to the rational part. These ways include the similarities between the regimes based on the rational and spirited part of the soul, as well as the characteristics of the spirited part of the soul, which make it auxiliary to the rational part of the soul. The spirited part of the soul fights against injustice within the soul, allying itself with the rational part against the desirous part; spiritedness also rises up when it perceives evil external to the soul. The way in which Plato exalted the rational part of the soul allows for an argument like this to be made. One way he shows the superiority of the rational part of the soul is by condemning the other two parts. Plato praised the spirited part of the soul for the most part though, and some of the characteristics he attributed to the spiritedness were in accord with the virtues and social order of classical Athens.

Recent interest and scholarship in the role of emotions in politics provide an opportunity for revisiting the idea of ancient Greek thumos as understood by Aristotle. In Aristotle’s Politics, thumos is a capacity of the soul for affection; it is most clearly seen in anger and righteous indignation; and it is indispensable for understanding the nature of politics. Aristotle shows that thumos motivates political actions that can be beneficial as well as destructive to the city. This ambivalence has an enormous impact on what is possible or desirable in political life and raises important questions about the extent to which thumos should be cultivated in society and in individuals. / text

This thesis investigates the historical relationship between understandings of human emotion, and how they manifest in our understanding of the political. Specifically, this thesis returns to the presentation of individual political psychology in ancient Greece (Thucydides, Aristotle), the 17th and 18th centuries (Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant), and the 20th century (Schmitt, Fukuyama, Lebow) to illuminate how these understandings have shaped our idea of Sovereignty as an idea, institution, and practice. By turning to the rich history in political thought on emotion and affect, this thesis demonstrates a consistent and prolonged constitutive relationship between presentations of individual political psychology and international political order. This thesis also rehabilitates the full scope of affective insights into political phenomena— by turning to literature on rhetoric and aesthetics—in order to open up new space to critique common understandings of Sovereignty. Moreover, given that the institution and concept of Sovereignty is central to research in the disciplines of International Relations and Political Theory, this thesis also argues for a much-needed closure of intellectual space between these two branches of Political Science. In short, this thesis demonstrates the centrality of the politics of affect and the divergent and disparate pictures of individual political psychology that are taken for granted in defenses and critiques of the concept of Sovereignty. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

L’engagement politique constitue pour Platon un problème dans sa tentative de déterminer les caractéristiques du dirigeant idéal dans la République. Conceptualiser les motivations qui sous-tendent l’attachement au bien commun des auxiliaires et des gardiens dans la cité idéale sera l’objet de cette recherche. Pour ce faire, nous concentrerons notre analyse sur le thumoeides, partie intermédiaire de l’âme dans la théorie psychologique de la tripartition. Le thumoeides sous-tend des émotions morales, comme la réserve (aidos) et la colère, qui impliquent un rapport affectif de l’individu avec ses propres appétits et la sphère sociale qui l’entoure. Ce mémoire abordera l’un à la suite de l’autre les thèmes suivants : la définition du thumoeides comme motivation de l’âme tournée vers l’honneur, le rôle régulateur de la colère et de l’aidos vis-à-vis des appétits et de la sphère sociale, ainsi que l’influence de la musique et de l’éducation sur le thumoeides. Par cette démonstration, nous souhaitons mettre en lumière l’étroit lien qui existe pour Platon entre le thumoeides, la répression des appétits et l’attachement à la cité. C’est leur dynamique qui fonde psychologiquement la tâche politique de l’auxiliaire. / Political commitment is a problem in Plato’s attempt in the Republic to paint a picture of the ideal ruler. Identifying the motivations underlying the psychological bond between the ruling class (particularly the auxiliary class) and the city’s common good will be the object of this research. The key to this issue is the concept of thumoeides, the intermediary part of the soul in Plato’s psychological theory of tripartition. The thumoeides is the seat of a type of emotion, like awe (aidos) and anger, which commit the individual’s soul to a specific relation with both the appetites inside and the social world outside. This study will thus approach the following topics: the definition of thumoeides as a special motivation toward honor, the regulative role of anger and aidos regarding appetites and the social world, and finally the influence of music and education on the thumoeides development. Through this work, we wish to show the close link in Plato’s work between thumoeides, appetite’s control and the love for one’s own city as they all play a constitutive role for the political task of the auxiliary.