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This paper argues that a key mechanism through which greenhouse gas affects growth is via total factor productivity (TFP). We first estimate TFP based on a production function and then estimate the determinants of TFP, paying particular attention to four variables: greenhouse gas, openness of trade, inflation, saving rate ¡@¡@We major results are as follows: 1.In the fixed effect¡GThe impact of greenhouse gas and inflation on TFP to be negative, significant. The impact of openness of trade on TFP to be positive, significant. The impact of saving rate on TFP to be insignificant. 2.The relations between CO2 and TFP have in the degree change, the degree of interplay decreases progressively along with time. 3.The relationship between CO2 and TFP with the countries of OECD is lager than with the countries of Non-OECD. The impact of saving rate on TFP is significant in the countries of OECD, but insignificant in the countries of Non-OECD.

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Esta tesis analiza temas de distribución de la renta y desarrollo económico en economías caracterizadas por imperfecciones en el mercado de capitales.El primer capitulo estudia temas de distribución de la renta. La mayoría de la literatura en ese campo a sido desarrollada bajo el supuesto que IMC (esto es imperfecciones en el mercado de capitales) son exógenas. La teoría convencional es que es muy poco probable que los individuos mas pobres puedan invertir porque tomar dinero a préstamo es muy caro en presencia de asimetrías informativas. Consecuentemente, los individuos más pobres no invertirán y sus futuras generaciones permanecerán pobres. Basado en esta línea de pensamiento esta literatura concluye que IMC exógenas producen mayor desigualdad y menor movilidad intergeneracional. Contrariamente as estos análisis este artículo argumenta que cuando las IMC se endogenizan la movilidad intergeneracional aumentará entre los pobres e inteligentes individuos. En mi modelo existe un problema de selección adversa entre el prestamista y el prestatario, pues los bancos no saben la habilidad del prestatario. En este contexto los bancos ofrecen un menú de contratos que satisface la condición de auto-selección. En equilibrio bancos diferencian entre agentes forzando a los más inteligentes a invertir en educación más de lo óptimo. De esta forma el agente menos inteligente no se hace pasar por el agente más inteligente. Estos últimos obtienen más educación de la que ellos desean, aumentando movilidad intergeneracional y la acumulación de capital humano, que son mayores que en el mundo con información perfecta.Los resultados más importantes de este paper son los siguientes: cuando se endogenizan las imperfecciones del mercado de capitales obtenemos que IMC aumentan movilidad intergeneracional y aumenta el número de gente educados en el estado estacionario. Al estudiar desigualdad en renta, yo encuentro que los resultados son ambiguos. Por un lado el número de gente con rentas muy bajas ha disminuido. Por otro lado la clase media de prestatarios inteligentes tienen una renta menor.Una de las cuestiones más importantes que se hacen los economistas es porqué países pobres usan sus recursos de forma ineficiente. En el segundo capítulo nosotros (Andrés Erosa y yo) proponemos una teoría donde IMC son el origen de las diferencias en TFP entre países. En nuestra teoría los empresarios tienen información privada sobre la productividad de su tecnología. Nosotros estudiamos cómo el contrato, descrito como la habilidad de hacer respetar el contrato, afecta la provisión de incentivos, y por tanto, y de repartir los recursos entre los empresarios. Nosotros estudiamos un modelo de crecimiento donde los empresarios están dotados de una tecnología para producir un bien intermedio que es el input de la producción final de bienes. Los empresarios necesitan financiación externa para producir. Esta financiación externa está limitada por dos problemas: Primero, la productividad no es observable para los prestamistas. Segundo, los empresarios pueden pagar, como máximo, una fracción de la producción. Asumimos que los países difieren en su capacidad de hacer respetar los contratos. Demostramos que, en la presencia de asimetrías de información, países con baja capacidad de hacer respetar los contratos utilizan tecnologías ineficientes en equilibrio y es caracterizada por diferencias en productividad entre países. Nuestra teoría sugiere que los empresarios tienen intereses en mantener en status quo con baja capacidad de hacer cumplir los contratos y esto hace posible que los empresarios extraigan rentas de los servicios que contratan. Nuestra teoría tiene implicaciones sobre la distribución de los recursos entre sectores. En fin nuestra teoría implica que la tasa de impuestos sobre la renta puede ser mala para la actividad económica sobre todo cuando los mercados de capitales son imperfectos. / This dissertation analyzes income distribution and economic development issues in macroeconomies with financial frictions. Chapter 1 focuses on income distribution issues. Most of the existing literature in this area has been developed under the assumption that CMI are exogenous. Their conventional view is that since becoming borrower is expensive under high imperfections in the capital markets, poor agents are less likely to make investment decisions. As a consequence their future generations will remain poor. Based on this thought these branch of the literature conclude that exogenous CMI lead to higher inequality and lower mobility. In contrast to these analyses this paper argues that when we endogenize CMI, intergenerational mobility may be promoted among poor and talented agents. In my model there is an adverse selection problem between borrowers and banks, since banks cannot identify borrowers' ability. In this context banks offer a menu of contracts that satisfy the self-selection mechanism. In equilibrium banks differentiate between agents by forcing talented borrowers to make an investment in human capital larger than they would in the first best world. In this way low ability individuals do not pose as high ability ones. Talented children from poor families get educated even more than they wish, so that both income mobility and human capital accumulation are larger than in the first best world. The major results of this paper might be summarized as follows: when we endogenize imperfections in the capital market we obtain that CMI promotes intergenerational mobility and increases the number of educated people in the steady state. When we study inequality of wealth, we find that there are opposite effects making inequality unambiguos. On the one hand there is a small number of people in the lower bound of the wealth distribution. On the other hand the middle class of clever borrowers have a lower wealth. One of the most important research questions faced by economist is why poor countries use productive resources inefficiently. In the second chapter of the thesis we propose a theory where capital market imperfections are at the origin of cross-country TFP differences. In our theory entrepreneurs have private information about the multifactor productivity of their technology. We study how the contracting environment, as described by the ability to enforce contracts, affects the provision of incentives and, thus, resource allocation to and across entrepreneurs. We develop a growth model where entrepreneurs are endowed with a technology to produce an intermediate good that is an input in the production of final goods. Entrepreneurs need external funds in order to operate their technology. External financing is complicated by two problems: First, the productivity of the entrepreneurial technology can not be observed by lenders. Second, entrepreneurs can commit to pay, at most, a fraction of the output. We assume that countries differ in the ability to enforce loans contracts. We show that, in the presence of asymmetric information, countries with low enforcement use inefficient technologies in equilibrium and are characterized by differences in productivity across industries. Our theory also suggests that entrepreneurs have a vested interest in maintaining a status quo with low enforcement since it allows them to extract rents from the factor services they hire. Our theory has implications for the allocation of resources across industries that differ in their needs of external funds and provide some insights into why poor countries face large differences in productivity across sectors. Our theory also implies that income taxation can be more detrimental for economic activity when capital markets are imperfect.

This thesis examines the direct as well as indirect effect of foreign direct investment on Vietnam?s economy. Statistical analysis shows that a two-way linkage exists between foreign direct investment and economic growth in Vietnam. Furthermore, foreign direct investment spillovers generate strong positive impact on Vietnam?s total factor productivity through backward linkages.

Incentive regulation and benchmarking are becoming frequently used tools in tariff regulation of public utilities, including natural gas distribution companies. We present a review of existing approaches to economic regulation using benchmarking models, their advantages and disadvantages and discuss practical experience with these methods. The work also includes a comparison of the total factor produktivity (TFP) approach with frontier-based methods such as data envelopment analysis or corrected ordinary least squares and discussion of the differences, possible weaknesses and misinterpretation of results. Consequently, we analyze the development of total factor productivity of Czech natural gas distribution companies with other industries (water and sewerage, electricity distribution and transmission) using index analysis. The main outcome of the dissertation thesis is the discussion of the applicability of TFP benchmarking in the conditions of the Czech energy market, a synthesis of findings, discussion of associated issues, assumptions and recommendations for implementation of TFP benchmarking into the tariff regulation of Czech energy industries.

No / This paper studies the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on total factor productivity (TFP) for a cross sectional sample of Chinese industrial sectors. The possible determinants of TFP are sought with special focus on FDI. An endogeneity test is performed in order to avoid inconsistent results. Evidence indicates that foreign presence, the level of R&D and the firm size are the most important factors enhancing TFP in Chinese industries. The findings from this study support the argument that attracting FDI is an effective way of introducing advanced technology to host countries.

Yes / Using 2605 Chinese A-share listed companies in the mining, manufacturing, and energy production and supply sectors from 2009 to 2020, we examine the relationship between climate policy uncertainty (CPU) and firm-level total factor productivity (TFP). The main findings are as follows: First, CPU significantly reduces firm-level TFP, with a greater impact on low-productivity firms than on high-productivity firms; second, the negative effect of CPU on firm-level TFP is most pronounced for non-state-owned, labor-intensive, and capital-intensive companies; third, CPU hinders research and development investment and reduces the amount of free cash flow. These results indicate that CPU exerts negative impacts on firm-level TFP mainly via its effects on the capital status of the companies. Our findings remain valid after a series of robustness tests and controlling for endogeneity. The government should introduce forward-looking climate policies to reduce the negative impact of policy uncertainty. / This research was supported by the Natural Science Fund of Hunan Province (2022JJ40647) and Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No: LZ20G010002.

This paper concentrates on the central link between productivity and knowledge capital, and shifts attention from firms and industries to regions. The objective is to measure knowledge elasticity effects within a regional Cobb- Douglas production function framework, with an emphasis on knowledge spillovers. The analysis uses a panel of 203 European regions to estimate the effects over the period 1997-2002. The dependent variable is total factor productivity (TFP). We use a region-level relative TFP index as an approximation to the true TFP measure. This index describes how efficiently each region transforms physical capital and labour into outputs. The explanatory variables are internal and out-of-region stocks of knowledge, the latter capturing the contribution of interregional knowledge spillovers. We use patents to measure knowledge capital. Patent stocks are constructed such that patents applied at the European Patent Office in one year add to the stock in the following and then depreciate throughout the patents effective life according to a rate of knowledge obsolescence. A random effects panel data spatial error model is advocated and implemented for analyzing the productivity effects. The findings provide a fairly remarkable confirmation of the role of knowledge capital contributing to productivity differences among regions, and adding an important dimension to the discussion, showing that knowledge spillover effects increase with geographic proximity. (authors' abstract)