Chapter 1 of the dissertation investigates the firms' restructuring choice between minority carve-outs and tracking stocks using samples during 1990-2001. The extra compensation from the restructured units, the liquidity conditions, and the preservation of synergy are the significant factors determining a firm's restructuring decision. Additional compensation seems to be a major driving force behind restructuring via tracking stock. One year after the restructuring, the executive compensation of the tracking stock group increases by 241% compared to 32% for the carve-out sample. In spite of the significant increase in the compensation, the three-year buy-and-hold return for tracking stock parents is more negative than that of the carve-out parents. Thus, if the extra compensation was designed to align the interests of managers and shareholders, the goal did not materialize. The primary motive behind restructuring through carve-outs is to control the liquidity problem. Although the operating performance of the parents of either group does not improve three years after the restructuring, the long-term stock performance of carve-out parents improves when a restructured unit is less related to the parent. Chapter 2 of the dissertation compares the degree of overreaction between value stocks and growth stocks using the implied volatility from option prices. Applying Stein's (1989) mean reversion model and Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst's (1994) GARCH and EGARCH methods, I compare the theoretical and empirical measures of reaction of longterm options in respect to short-term options for the growth and the value portfolios, which are separately classified by price-to-book and price-to-earning ratios. The evidence suggests that growth portfolios largely overreact to a greater degree than the value portfolios assuming mean reversion, GARCH, and EGARCH models. The findings potentially explain why value stocks outperform growth stocks in the long run, lending support to overreaction as an explanation for the value effect.

追蹤股係資產重組方式的一種，近年來在美國的證券市場增加許多的發行案例，追蹤股是針對多角化企業特定部門發行不同權利義務的普通股，表彰該特定企業的營運績效，提供給投資人更明確的投資評價，進而提升企業整體的價值。追蹤股的起源係於1984年General Motors在取得Ross Perot’s Electronic Data System後發行首創的追蹤股，雖然陸續有發行之個案，但追蹤股的發行熱潮主要集中於1998年至2000年，包括AT&T、Sprint Corp、Quantum Corp.及Disney等企業，且部分發行企業發行一種以上的追蹤股，因追蹤股可依發行企業的需求制定不同的投票權、轉換權、股利分配政策等，提供給投資者相當多的選擇，顯示追蹤股對企業的籌資或購併提供了新的工具。 由於追蹤股的發行案例較其他資產重組的方式(資產分拆及權益分割)相對較少，因此國外探討此專題的文獻亦不多見，國內目前亦無相關研究。故本研究的主要內容包括資產重組方式的分析及可能的考量因素，並說明追蹤股的起源、特性及優缺點，進而探討追蹤股發行時的宣告效果，觀察其累計異常報酬的顯著性，且驗證累計異常報酬與發行企業市值及市價淨值比的關係。 為提供國內研究者更清楚的了解追蹤股發行全貌，本研究將1998年在美國證券市場發行的Sprint Corp的個案，針對發行的目的、發行架構、該普通股的權利義務及可能的風險等項目加以分析研究。最後以模擬國內上市公司—中華電信發行追蹤股的可行性，提供國內主管機關作為未來研究新金融商品的建議及參考。