本研究以民國94年至96年曾採私募增資之上市、上櫃公司為研究對象，探討私募增資決策是否影響企業之經營績效，並比較企業在採取私募或現金增資之不同增資方式下之經營績效。 實證結果發現，企業私募增資兩年後其經營績效顯著優於增資前一年；增資前私募企業之經營績效比現金增資企業之經營績效差，但其差距在增資後顯著縮小。綜合而言，私募後企業本身之經營績效不但有顯著的改善，相對於現金增資企業之經營績效，在增資後也有顯著的改善。 此外，私募普通股占原已發行普通股股數之比例越高的公司，其累計異常報酬大；而參考價格與私募實際價格間的差異，亦會影響投資人對於股價的反應，其差距越大，累計異常報酬越小。 / This study examines the effects of private placement or seasoned equity offerings on performance. Three main findings are as follows. In general, the corporate performance of firms with private equity offering is worse than that of firms with public offering, but the difference lessens after the fund raising. The evidence shows that the firm performance is improved after private placement. Moreover, the change of performance after private placement is better than public offering. The evidence also shows that the volume of private equity offering is positively associated with cumulative abnormal return, but the difference between the actual price and consultative price is negatively associated with cumulative abnormal return.

本研究以在民國96~98年間辦理私募引進策略性投資人之公司為樣本，檢視宣告日前後異常報酬之走勢，並探討私募後研發投資及會計績效是否顯著增加。 本研究以事件研究法測試企業利用私募方式引進策略性投資人，發現宣告日前後之異常報酬率確實有顯著增加，表示投資人看好私募公司未來的發展，但在利用Healy, Palepu and Rubak (1992)模型檢驗現金流量報酬率、EPS、營業利潤率、資產報酬率與股東權益報酬率及Tobin’s Q等不同的經營績效指標，比較公司私募前後經營績效時，卻發現私募後兩年內，公司之績效並未如市場之預期顯著地提升。但私募後公司在研發費用確實有顯著的提升，代表公司在投資方面有顯著的成長，或許這類私募公司需要更長的時間，會計績效才有可能會顯著的提升。 / This study investigates two issues, the abnormal return and the R&D investment and accounting performance before/after the announcement of the strategic private placement. We found that investors gain abnormal return before/after the announcement of the strategic placement. It indicates that the information leakage before the announcement is severe and, as investors expected, they gain high abnormal return even after the strategic placement. However, based on Healy, Palepu and Rubak (1992) model, we found that the accounting performances after strategic placements are not as investors expected when they are measured in terms of cash flow returns on investments, EPS, gross profit, ROA, ROI and Tobin’s Q. On the other hand, the companies do invest more R&D input after strategic private placement. Observing these two facts together, we may conclude that the strategic private placement makes firms input more R&D expenditure but couldn’t gain significant accounting performance within 2 years.

為了針對實證股價與交易量的資訊，能否作為預測未來政治事件結果提供依據，此篇論文探究四個政治事件，分別是2014年台北市長選舉國民黨黨內初選、2014年台北市長選舉、2016年總統選舉國民黨更換候選人以及2016年總統選舉。作者使用異常交易量作為判斷投資人是否將政治事件視為投資機會，並觀察個股與投資組合之累積異常報酬率是否能作為預測依據，最後以事件後五日內的異常累積報酬判斷投資人是否在事前過度反應或是反應不足。 　　本研究發現，在政治事件發生前六十日內，大部分政治相關的個股交易量皆顯著異於前一年之交易量。與勝選相關的股票在事件前60日至31日有顯著的正累積異常報酬。相較之下，與敗選相關的股票中，僅有和候選人有緊密政治連結的股票有顯著負累積異常報酬，政策相關的股票並無顯著負累計異常報酬。最後，在現行交易制度下，正異常報酬伴隨著正異常交易量，而負異常報酬卻因放空限制等因素，無顯著正異常交易量。 / This paper analyzes the last four political events, which includes KMT's Taipei Mayoral Primary, Taipei Mayor Election, KMT Presidential Candidate Replacement and Taiwan Presidential Election. We use trading volume to detect whether investors join the market due to potential political investment opportunity. Then we examine the CAR tendency with the political event results to identify its forecast ability. Last, we detect CAR within 5 days later to find if investor overreact or underreact before the event day. We find that the CAR meets voters’ political anticipation before the event window. Investors believe they can time the market through these events and gain profit. Furthermore, stocks relevant to those elects experience positive CAR. In contrast, stocks relevant to those also-rans do not experience significant returns. The only fortuneteller is the company, which has close relationship to the defeated candidate, telling with negative CAR. Because of short-sale constrains, the trading volume are not larger than before even it is a good chance to gain profit in the political events.

追蹤股係資產重組方式的一種，近年來在美國的證券市場增加許多的發行案例，追蹤股是針對多角化企業特定部門發行不同權利義務的普通股，表彰該特定企業的營運績效，提供給投資人更明確的投資評價，進而提升企業整體的價值。追蹤股的起源係於1984年General Motors在取得Ross Perot’s Electronic Data System後發行首創的追蹤股，雖然陸續有發行之個案，但追蹤股的發行熱潮主要集中於1998年至2000年，包括AT&T、Sprint Corp、Quantum Corp.及Disney等企業，且部分發行企業發行一種以上的追蹤股，因追蹤股可依發行企業的需求制定不同的投票權、轉換權、股利分配政策等，提供給投資者相當多的選擇，顯示追蹤股對企業的籌資或購併提供了新的工具。 由於追蹤股的發行案例較其他資產重組的方式(資產分拆及權益分割)相對較少，因此國外探討此專題的文獻亦不多見，國內目前亦無相關研究。故本研究的主要內容包括資產重組方式的分析及可能的考量因素，並說明追蹤股的起源、特性及優缺點，進而探討追蹤股發行時的宣告效果，觀察其累計異常報酬的顯著性，且驗證累計異常報酬與發行企業市值及市價淨值比的關係。 為提供國內研究者更清楚的了解追蹤股發行全貌，本研究將1998年在美國證券市場發行的Sprint Corp的個案，針對發行的目的、發行架構、該普通股的權利義務及可能的風險等項目加以分析研究。最後以模擬國內上市公司—中華電信發行追蹤股的可行性，提供國內主管機關作為未來研究新金融商品的建議及參考。

本研究探討台灣會計師公費揭露的市場反應，並以累計異常報酬（CAR）來衡量市場反應。第一階段針對是否揭露會計師公費研究其不同的反應；第二階段再將有揭露會計師公費的公司區分為主動揭露與被動揭露，並探討是否會造成不同的影響；第三階段更進一步將被動揭露的公司依其所符合的法規揭露原因再做細分，特別探討因為非審計公費過高而揭露公費者之市場反應。 研究結果發現，相較於不揭露會計師公費的公司，市場對於有揭露會計師公費資訊的公司會給予較正面的反應；其中，有揭露會計師公費的公司，若屬於主動揭露，市場更是會給予正面的肯定；相反的，有揭露會計師公費的公司，若是因非審計公費達審計公費之四分之一以上者而被動揭露者，市場會對此公司之會計師之獨立性有所懷疑，故給予負面的反應。可見會計師公費的資訊對投資大眾而言確實是一項有意義且重要的資訊。本研究並加入公司治理的相關變數，研究結果發現，若公司之治理程度較差，但「有揭露」會計師公費資訊者，投資大眾會給予正面的反應，此外，相對於被動揭露者，市場對於「主動揭露」之公司會給予更正面的肯定。另一方面，若公司之治理程度較佳，但其揭露原因是屬於非審計公費達審計公費四分之一以上而被動揭露者，市場會對會計師獨立性有所質疑，故對於此種公司仍給予負面的反應。 / This study attempts to examine audit fee disclosure and market reactions. We use Cumulative Abnormal Returns to measure market reactions. First, we analyze whether audit fee disclosure has any market reactions at all. Second, we divide the samples into voluntary disclosure and forced disclosure groups. Third, we make further segmentation from the forced disclosure group according to their disclosure reasons, and specially focus on the disclosure reason of high non-audit fees. We find that market reactions are significantly more positive for firms with audit fee disclosures than for firms without fee disclosure. Market reactions are also significantly better for firms with voluntary disclosure than the forced disclosure group. In contrast, market reactions are significantly lower for firms which disclose audit fees due to high levels of non-audit fees. Our evidence supports that audit fee is a piece of useful and important information to investors. Additionally, we include corporate governance variables in the analysis. We find that when firms’ corporate governance is not good, if they choose to disclose audit fee voluntarily, the market responds with positive reactions. In contrast, if a firm’s corporate governance is quite good but discloses audit fees due to high levels of non-audit fee, the market then reacts with negative returns.