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With more and more ICs being used in sectors requiring confidentiality and integrity like payment systems, military, finance and health, there is a lot of concern in the security and privacy of ICs. The widespread adoption of Intellectual Property (IP) based designs for modern systems like system on chips has reduced the time to market and saved a lot of money for many companies. But this has also opened the gates for problems like product piracy, IP theft and fraud. It is estimated that billions of dollars are lost annually to illegal manufacturing of Integrated Circuits. A possible solution to this problem of IP theft is to insert small circuits which are like unique IDs that only the owner or the registered verifier will know and detect in case of any conflict. The circuits that are inserted are called watermarks and are in some cases kept very small so as to be hidden. In such cases, we would need detection schemes that work well even with very small watermarks. In this work, we use Electro-Magnetic (EM) based side-channels for the detection of watermarks. Since the 90s, Side-channel Analyses have attracted significant attention within the cryptographic community as they are able to obtain secret information from smart cards and ICs. The power side-channel analysis is a very powerful method but EM side-channels are very useful as they will not need a resistor in series to the power supply and just needs passive observation of the EM radiations emanated by the IC. This passive monitoring will be a big advantage in the case of automated watermark detection used by a verifier. In this work, we start with EM side-channel analysis on FPGA for smaller designs. We insert watermarks on a Micro-controller, Smartcard and an FPGA and detect these watermarks using EM side-channel information emanated from the Design under Test. We used environments with different levels of noise interference. We compare the watermarking application using EM side-channels and Power side-channels in these different setups. These watermarks are very small and are hard to attack or remove by an attacker through reverse engineering or side-channel information. Due to the robustness against such attacks and the easy access of EM side-channels when compared to power side-channels, the EM side-channel based watermarks will be a very good solution for the IP theft problem. EM side-channel based watermark detection supports automation which companies of IP cores can make use of. We also extended this work to EM Side-channel Trojans as the concepts are similar

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Globalization in semiconductor industry has surged up the trend of outsourcing component design and manufacturing process across geographical boundaries. While cost reduction and short time to market are the driving factors behind this trend, the authenticity of the final product remains a major question. Third party deliverables are solely based on mutual trust and any manufacturer with a malicious intent can fiddle with the original design to make it work otherwise than expected in certain specific situations. In case such a backfire happens, the consequences can be disastrous especially for mission critical systems such as space-explorations, defense equipments such as missiles, life saving equipments such as medical gadgets where a single failure can translate to a loss of lives or millions of dollars. Thus accompanied with outsourcing, comes the question of trustworthy design - "how to ensure that integrity of the product manufactured by a third party has not been compromised". This dissertation aims towards developing verification methodologies and implementing non-destructive testing strategies to ensure the authenticity of a third party IP. This can be accomplished at various levels in the IC product life cycle. At the design stage, special testability features can be incorporated in the circuit to enhance its overall testability thereby making the otherwise hard to test portions of the design testable at the post silicon stage. We propose two different approaches to enhance the testability of the overall circuit. The first allows improved at-speed testing for the design while the second aims to exaggerate the effect of unwanted tampering (if present) on the IC. At the verification level, techniques like sequential equivalence checking can be employed to compare the third-party IP against a genuine specification and filter out components showing any deviation from the intended behavior. At the post silicon stage power discrepancies beyond a certain threshold between two otherwise identical ICs can indicate the presence of a malicious insertion in one of them. We have addressed all of them in this dissertation and suggested techniques that can be employed at each stage. Our experiments show promising results for detecting such alterations/insertions in the original design. / Ph. D.

Pour réduire le coût des Circuits Intégrés (CIs), les entreprises de conception se tournent de plus en plus vers des fonderies basées dans des pays à faible coût de production (outsourcing). Cela a pour effet d’augmenter les menaces sur les circuits. En effet, pendant la fabrication,le CI peut être altéré avec l’insertion d’un circuit malicieux, appelé cheval de Troie Matériel (CTM). Ceci amène les vendeurs de CI à protéger leurs produits d’une potentielle insertion d’un CTM, mais également, d’en assurer l’authenticité après fabrication (pendant la phase de test).Cependant, les CTMs étant furtifs par nature, il est très difficile, voire impossible de les détecter avec les méthodes de test conventionnel, et encore moins avec des vecteurs de test aléatoires. C’est pourquoi nous proposons dans le cadre de cette thèse, des méthodes permettant de détecter et de prévenir l’insertion de CTM dans les CIs pendant leur fabrication.Ces méthodes utilisent des approches orientées test logique pour la détection de CTM aussi bien en phase de test (après fabrication du CI) qu’en fonctionnement normal (run-time).De plus, nous proposons des méthodes de prévention qui elles aussi s’appuient sur des principes de test logique pour rendre difficile, voire impossible l’insertion de CTM aussi bien au niveau netlist qu’au niveau layout. / In order to reduce the production costs of integrated circuits (ICs), outsourcing the fabrication process has become a major trend in the Integrated Circuits (ICs) industry. As an inevitable unwanted side effect, this outsourcing business model increases threats to hardware products. This process raises the issue of un-trusted foundries in which, circuit descriptions can be manipulated with the aim to possibly insert malicious circuitry or alterations, referred to as Hardware Trojan Horses (HTHs). This motivates semiconductor industries and researchers to study and investigate solutions for detecting during testing and prevent during fabrication, HTH insertion.However, considering the stealthy nature of HTs, it is quite impossible to detect them with conventional testing or even with random patterns. This motivates us to make some contributions in this thesis by proposing solutions to detect and prevent HTH after fabrication (during testing).The proposed methods help to detect HTH as well during testing as during normal mode(run-time), and they are logic testing based.Furthermore, we propose prevention methods, which are also logic testing based, in order tomake harder or quasi impossible the insertion of HTH both in netlist and layout levels.

<p>I dag kan man oftast läsa om olika säkerhetshot och risker en datoranvändare måste tänka på för att inte ge någon utomstående möjlighet att komma åt känslig och/eller privat information. Här talas det om nya virus och nya typer av trojaner som sprids som epidemier över Internet, och i bland handlar det om ett spionprogram som följer med en nedladdad fil. Det är svårt att hålla reda på alla typer av skadlig kod som nämns fast med ökad förståelse ökar också chanserna för att klara sig från smitta. Det har visat sig att utvecklingen av skadlig kod är lika stark som den inom kommersiella mjukvaror. Från persondatorns uppkomst i början av 80-talet och fram till i dag, har utveckling skett i alla områden av den skadliga kod det handlar om strategi, syfte och framförallt ren kodkomplexitet.</p><p>Dagens ledande leverantör av operativsystem och webbläsare, Microsoft, lovar allt mer sofistikerade säkerhetslösningar varje gång en ny version av ett program släpps. Framförallt nämndes det i samband med lanseringen av Windows Vista att säkerheten var det som stod högst på listan.</p><p>Vi har tillsammans med WM-data i Stockholm tagit fram en programvara för fjärradministration av Windows. Huvudmålet var att med hjälp av våra baskunskaper i programmering skapa ett program för Windows XP och Windows Vista där en rad funktioner skulle kunna fjärrstyras utan att en användare vid den drabbade datorn upptäckte intrånget.</p><p>I denna rapport beskrivs utvecklingen av programvaran och de tester som gjorts på de båda operativsystemen. Vidare delas begreppet ”skadlig kod” upp i kategorierna virus, maskar, trojaner samt rootkits och förklaras mer ingående tillsammans med en historisk bild över hur utvecklingen av skadlig kod har sett ut.</p> / <p>In media today, you often read about different security threats and risks that one has to be aware of. Many things must be taken into consideration in order to maintain your integrity and information secrecy. It might be new virus outbreak, a new trojan or some kind of spy ware that undetected finds the way to your computer. It’s hard to keep track of all terms and types of malicious code, and with greater understanding, the risk of infection decreases. The development when it comes to malicious code is as strong as the one in commercial software development. From the 80’s until present day, every area in the development of malicious code has evolved, from strategy and purpose to the pure complexity of the code.</p><p>Microsoft, the worlds leading supplier of operating systems and web browsers, ensure us with every new release, that measures has been taken in order to enhance the security features. As the new operating system Windows Vista was released, spokesmen said that the security was now the highest priority.</p><p>We have, together with WM-data in Stockholm, developed software for remote administration of Windows. The objectives where by using our limited programming skills only, to come up with a program for Windows XP and Windows Vista, where a number of functions could be remotely executed without alerting a user at the infected computer.</p><p>This report describes the development of the software together with test results of execution on both operating systems. Further on, the report discusses different types of malicious code, such as viruses, worms, Trojans and root kits, together with a historical study of the development of malicious code.</p>

Att skydda sin IT-miljö mot olika typer av intrång och attacker som till exempel trojaner,skadliga Java applets eller DoS attacker med hjälp av brandväggar och antivirusprogramär två viktiga lager i skalskyddet. I den här uppsatsen undersöks hur väl ett Intrusion Prevention System skulle kunna fungera som ett ytterligare lager i skalskyddet. Fokus ligger på hur väl IPS-systemet klarar av att avvärja attacker, hur mycket tid som går åt till konfigurering och drift för att få ett fungerande IPS samt hur prestandan i nätverket påverkas av implementationen. För att mäta hur väl IPS systemet klarar av att upptäcka och blockera attacker utförs två experiment där ett mindre nätverk attackeras på olika sätt. I det första experimentet skyddas infrastrukturen av en brandvägg och klienterna är utrustade med antivirusprogram. I det andra experimentet genomförs samma attacker igen fast med ett Snort IPS implementerat i nätverket. Resultatet av de genomförda experimenten visar att en IPS klarar att blockera ca 87% av attackerna, men nätverksprestandan påverkas negativt. Slutsatsen är att endast brandväggar och antivirusprogram inte ger ett fullgott skydd.

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