Reconciliation is generally studied from the perspective of how the process affects the individual. This study on the contrary, seeks to explain how the individual expectation of the process affects its outcome by investigating the relationship between motives to participate and the outcome of acceptance for your former adversary. A research gap has been identified in studying individual motives for participating in reconciliation processes between social factors as a facilitator for reconciliation and the actual joining of a process. Studying this gap has resulted in support for the hypothesis that individuals with the motive to tell the truth in a process experience high levels of acceptance towards their former adversaries, compared to individuals who participate in a process with the motive of holding the other party accountable for past sufferings. Using the method of in-depth interviews in Cambodia and thematic analysis reveals the main finding that acceptance is facilitated by the mechanisms of acknowledgment and understanding of the other party in combination with active interaction between the parties. This study presents three main recommendations for future ideas and reconciling establishments.

This thesis will explore E. E. Cummings' theory of life and the poetry which concerns this theory. This will involve: a brief explanation of the three major concepts--growth, self-fidelity, and life in the present; those aspects of life which Cummings rejects; Cummings' affirmation; and a general summary statement concerned with Cummings' "complex truth."

The diploma thesis deals with the philosophical basis of Čapek's prose. At the beginning of this work, the topic is concentrated around the personality of Čapek and his life influenced by the philosophical attitude of pragmatism. Further on in the study it has been dealt with the pragmatism itself. The work is focused on the prose such as "Boží muka" ,"Hordubal", "Povětroň", "Obyčejný život" and "Život a dílo skladatele Foltýna", where Čapek viewpoints of the truth and knowledge are being tried to search for. The influence of pragmatism on Čapek's personality along with his own conception of this philosophical theory is demonstrated on the excerpts. The work also shows humanistic values that Čapek advocated and subsequently applied into his work of art.

Through poetry of witness, this thesis explores the idea of truth as perception. The poems explore the themes of family, expatriate life, and identity in order to give voice to an alternate perspective.

Cette thèse propose une investigation sur la manière dont les sujets se constituent dans la psychanalyse à partir des discours de vérité qu’ils tiennent sur eux-mêmes. Nous basant sur la pensée de Michel Foucault, nous avons défini pour notre recherche deux orientations méthodologiques : (1) le premier axe consiste à étudier comment les discours de vérité d’une époque déterminent des modalités d’être pour des sujets ; (2) un second axe vise à analyser comment le sujet se constitue par les discours de vérité qu’il énonce à son sujet. Nous émettons l’hypothèse que les différentes modalités de rapport entre le sujet et la vérité procèdent d’une formation historique et que pour comprendre comment la pratique du dire vrai sur soi dans la psychanalyse implique un certain mode de constitution du sujet, il est nécessaire de passer par une analyse de cette pratique d’un point de vue généalogique. Dans la première partie du travail, nous considérons comment certains discours et pratiques porteurs de rapports de pouvoir dans la modernité ont formulés des vérités sur le sujet : l’élaboration d’une anthropologie avec la formation des sciences humaines ; la production d’une science du sujet à partir d’une histoire de la sexualité. Dans la deuxième partie, nous orientons notre recherche sur l’histoire des relations entre le sujet et la vérité à partir de la problématique du gouvernement. Cheminant avec Foucault le long de ses lectures successives de la tragédie Œdipe Roi de Sophocle, nous identifions un lien significatif entre des anciennes pratiques de vérité et des formes de subjectivité, au point que l’établissement de la justice exige que la vérité puisse être dite sous la forme d’un « je ». Mais si celui qui dit la vérité en première personne dans Œdipe est différent de celui qui dit la vérité dans les premiers siècles du christianisme, alors il importe de définir au moyen de quelles techniques et pratiques de vérité le christianisme a introduit une rupture dans l’histoire de la subjectivité entre les anciens modes d’être sujet et ceux qui constituent la généalogie du sujet moderne. Suivant l’hypothèse de Foucault, nous identifions dans cette rupture la formation d’une herméneutique de soi. Dans la troisième partie, nous abordons l’exigence de formulation d’un énoncé de vérité dans l'histoire de la psychiatrie et ses conséquences dans la constitution de la psychanalyse. Le dire vrai sur soi de la psychanalyse doit prendre en compte l’élaboration d’une théorie du sujet qui, en contestant la pensée anthropologique, s’insère dans une science de la sexualité. Le dire vrai sur soi de la psychanalyse pose à nouveau le problème des rapports entre le sujet et la vérité au sein d’une herméneutique de soi, dans la mesure où le sujet de la psychanalyse se constitue dans un rapport étroit à la vérité qui passe nécessairement par le langage, par l’expérience de la finitude et par l’autre. Notre recherche se clôt sur la proposition d’une alternative à ce modèle de subjectivité avec une analyse de la pratique de la parrêsia dans l’Antiquité, pratique qui se déploie à travers une esthétique de l’existence selon les dimensions d’une éthique et d’une politique de soi. / This thesis proposes an investigation on the constitution of subjects in psychoanalysis through discourses of truth. Based on the studies developed by Michel Foucault, we define two methodological orientations for our research: (1) the first one consists in analyzing how the discourses of truth of a historical period determine modalities of being for the subjects; (2) and the second aims to examine how the subject is constituted by the discourses of truth that he tells about himself. Our hypothesis is that the different modalities of relationship between subject and truth have a historical formation and that it is necessary to analyze its genealogy in order to understand how the practice of truth-telling about oneself in psychoanalysis implies a certain constitution of the subjects. In the first part, we consider how some discourses and practices involving power relations in modernity have formulated truths about the subject: the development of an anthropology with the formation of the human sciences; the production of a science of the subject from a history of sexuality. In the second part, we orient our research towards a history of the relationship between subject and truth, considering the problematic of the government. Based on Foucault’s studies on the tragedy Oedipus the King by Sophocles, we identify a significant link between practices of truth in Antiquity and forms of subjectivity; for the establishment of justice, the truth needed to be said by an “I”. But if the first person who tells the truth in Oedipus is different from the first person who tells the truth in the first centuries of Christianity, it would be necessary to define from what techniques and practices of truth Christianity has promoted a rupture in the history of subjectivity between the ways of being subject in Antiquity and those that constitute a genealogy of the modern subject. Following Foucault’s hypothesis, we see in this rupture the establishment of a hermeneutics of the self. In the third part, we discuss the requirement to formulate statements of truth in the history of psychiatry and its consequences for the constitution of psychoanalysis. Truth-telling about oneself in psychoanalysis must consider the elaboration of a theory of the subject that, contesting the anthropological thought, participates in a science of sexuality. Truth-telling about oneself in psychoanalysis relocates the problem of the relationship between subject and truth into the hermeneutics of the self, and this insofar as the psychoanalytic subject is constituted by a close relationship with the truth that necessarily passes through language, the experience of finitude and the other. Finally, we present an alternative to this model of subjectivity through the characterization of the practice of parrhêsia in Antiquity, which encompasses an aesthetic of existence related to an ethics and a politics of the self.

Outre leur caractère encyclopédique, les récits de Thomas Ruggles Pynchon Jr. empruntant le mode de la quête, la vérité et sa trouvaille s’en trouvent explicitement au fondement. La vérité est cependant aussi centrale que structurellement absente, hors-récit, relevant plutôt de la condition même d’existence du récit, se confondant presque avec la possibilité de dire, la fonction de nomination : vaut pour vérité le fait que le dit se tienne de lui-même. La connaissance, elle, choit ce faisant du côté de l’inconscient, là où le sujet s’abîme dans cette vérité extérieure à lui qu’est la garantie que son être puisse se soutenir de son dire, là où le sujet se trouve donc sans le savoir. Cet extérieur au sujet se conjoint fondamentalement avec son corps : toute parole en effet se situe à la frontière où la chair tombe sous le coup du symbolique et c’est le corps, celui de la filiation, de la reproduction, du social, qui agite le discours, celui-ci n’ayant d’autre fonction que de le retranscrire. La connaissance se dessine ainsi comme visant toujours, à travers les objets prélevés dans le réel, un corps en reste du symbolique. Ce partage du corps et du discours est cause du hiatus entre la vérité et la connaissance, la matière et l’identité, tel que plus le protagoniste, cet autre sans corps, en apprend, à son propre sujet pour commencer, moins il s’y reconnaît, en une forme de perpétuel manquement à soi-même – et n’est-ce pas, de la même façon, afin de se divertir, de se changer les idées qu’un lecteur cueille un livre, pour finalement s’apercevoir s’y être retrouvé, ou inversement s’il avait justement commencé par vouloir s’y chercher ? / Thomas Ruggles Pynchon Jr.’s narratives, beside their encyclopedic nature, use the quest mode and therefore truth and its revelation explicitly lie at their foundation. Yet truth is as central as it is structurally absent, outside of the narrative, more coming under the condition of existence of the narrative itself, almost coinciding with the possibility of saying, the nomination function: passes for truth the fact that the word holds all by itself. Knowledge, on its part, falls on the unconscious side, where the subject sinks in this truth external to him, which is the guarantee that his being can be supported by his saying, where the subject thus finds himself without knowing it. This dimension outside of the subject fundamentally conjoins with his body: every word indeed is situated on the border where the flesh falls within the symbolic, and it is the body, that of filiation, of reproduction, of the social, which moves the discourse, the latter having no other function than to transcribe it. Thus knowledge appears as always aiming, through objects extracted from the real, at a body remaining partly outside of the symbolic. This sharing between body and discourse causes the hiatus between truth and knowledge, matter and identity. Thus the more the protagonist, this other without a body, learns about himself to begin with, the less he recognizes himself, in a form of perpetual misidentification – and in the same way, doesn’t the reader pick a book in order to divert himself, to get a break, only to realize in the end that he found elements of himself in it, or conversely if he precisely intended in the first place to look for himself?

This short story collection deals with themes of race, kinship, desire, subjectivity, and appearance vs. reality.

This dissertation provides an account of the aims of rational inquiry with the purpose of explaining the value of truth, information, justification, understanding, and knowledge. I argue that inquirers ought to have two chief and competing goals: to pursue information, and to avoid error. Inquirers ought to want answers that fully satisfy their demands for information, but they should also want those answers to be true. These goals come into conflict, since an agent aiming solely to avoid error could reject any putative information, while an agent aiming solely at pursuing information could accept any putative information regardless of the evidence. Rational inquirers must, then, have some way of balancing their competing aims. I argue that rational inquirers must strike this balance by appealing to the practical reasons for which they are inquiring, which entails that the theory of inquiry has an essential pragmatic element. In pursuing her primary aims an inquirer will need to pursue justification—an account of which is provided—and also ought to be concerned to avoid the luck that is present in Gettier cases. These reflections explain why knowledge has played such a central role in epistemology, since I argue that successful inquiry will result in a form of internalist knowledge.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2004. Graduate Programme in Social and Political Thought. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 168-173). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ99248

<p><font face="Times New Roman"> <p align="left">This work is a meditation on the shaping of time and its impact on living with and understanding atrocity in South Africa in the wake of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).</p> </font></p>