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Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / This thesis examines the relation of various areas of Bertrand Russell's epistemology to his theory of truth. It has been held that the correspondence theory of truth is the key to Russell's epistemological realism. Russell himself defines knowledge in terms of truth, and not truth in terms of knowledge. After an introductory chapter, Russell's Theory of Mind is e xamined in Chapter One. Chapter Two deals with his Theory of Matter. Chapter Three treats his Theory of Language. The fourth and concluding chapter compares Russell's correspondence theory of truth with two alternative theories of truth: the coher ence theory of truth and the pragmatic theory of truth; and summarizes the three basic meanings of correspondence in Russell's theory of truth. Since Russell defines truth as some sort of correspondence between belief and facts, and derivatively in terms of the sentences expressing beliefs, it was felt that a tracing of the development of Russell's Theories of Mind (belief), Matter (facts), and Language (sentences) would best illuminate a study of his theory of truth. Russell's Theory of Mind runs the gamut from a mindmatter dualism, to a neutral monism, to a view of mind as "perspective." The progress of his Theory of Mind involves a move in the theory of belief from an "act" of belief, to a "propositional attitude," to a "feeling." In no case is truth predicated of the subjective factor in belief, but rather of "judgment," "propositions," or "content" of belief, except in the case where what a sentence indicates is a state of mind of the believer. Russell's Theory of Matter has changed in a fashion paralleling his Theory of Mind. Thus, he begins by inferring physical objects from sense-data, and he constructs physical objects from the class of all their appearances, and finally he says that we may infer the structure of physical events on the basis of non-demonstrable principles of inference. The world of facts is in every period considered to be a pluralistic world, and hence relations among facts are external relations. Russell's Theory of Language underwent a similar evolution. In the beginning of his thought on an ideal language, as suggested in Principia, he followed Wittgenstein in holding that logic has an atomic structure which mirrors a world of atomic facts. Later, Russell comes to feel that the "picture" theory of language is inadequate. Finally, he holds that language mirrors the world in that both words and objects are universals. In conclusion, a comparison was made between alternative theories of truth, and the correspondence theory of truth was summarized. The writer of this thesis holds that Russell's correspondence theory of truth is to be preferred over the alternatives presented. / 2999-01-01

At the turn of the 21st century, truth commissions arose as a new possibility to address the violence and trauma of removing Indigenous children from their families and nations in what is now known as North America. The creation of two truth and reconciliation commissions in Canada and Maine marked an important step in addressing Indigenous demands for justice and the end of harm, alongside Indigenous calls for truth-telling. Holding Indigenous conceptions of justice at its core, this dissertation offers a comparative tracing of the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2009-2015) and the Maine Wabanaki-State Child Welfare Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2013-2015) as they investigated state practices of removing Indigenous children from their homes and nations. More specifically, this dissertation examines the ways these truth commissions have intersected with Indigenous stories and how Indigenous stories can inform how we understand the work of truth and reconciliation commissions as they move to provide a form of justice for our communities. Within both commission processes, stories of Indigenous experiences in residential schools and the child welfare system were drawn from the perceived margins of settler colonial society in an effort to move towards truth, healing, reconciliation and justice. Despite this attempted inclusion of stories of Indigenous life experiences, I argue that deeply listening to Indigenous stories ¬¬in their various forms—life/ experiential stories, and traditional stories—illuminates the ways that the practice of reconciliation has become disconnected from Indigenous understandings of justice. As such, I argue that listening to Indigenous stories, not just hearing the words but instead taking them to heart, engaging with them and allowing them to guide us, moves toward more informed understandings of what justice looks like for Indigenous communities. / Graduate / 2022-09-12

"One of the most contentious issues in aesthetics is whether or not there can be truth in art. This is so because the question of the possibility of truth in art implicitly assumes two other fundamental questions: the nature of truth and the nature of human understanding. In his treatment of truth in art, Gadamer comes down roundly on the side of the possiblity of truth in art. In this thesis, I show how Gadamer's approval of truth in art hinges on his notion of hermeneutics and his belief in art's transformative power, and propose that his account of truth in art is still a viable and creative approach to the question today. After taking a look at the Kantian, Heideggerian, and Aristotelian background with which Gadamer is operating in his treatment of truth and art, I trace where this led Gadamer, specifically in the sense of his move to have aesthetics so closely connected to hermeneutics. Through interaction with work by Mary Devereaux, I highlight some concerns over Gadamer's use of tradition and of order as a fundamental feature of the artwork, and give an account of how those concerns may be addressed."

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Orientador: Itala Maria Loffredo D'Ottaviano / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-03T19:40:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Hifume_Carlos_M.pdf: 426389 bytes, checksum: 487e63a8f673121cd57152f9b71a1d61 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2003 / Resumo: Alfred Tarski, ao apresentar sua concepção semântica de verdade - uma definição para linguagens formalizadas -, buscou capturar as intenções presentes na concepção clássica de verdade de Aristóteles - esta, uma concepção de verdade correspondencial. De forma semelhante, Mikenberg, da Costa & Chuaqui apresentam uma concepção formal de verdade pragmática - a quase-verdade -, baseados nas intenções presentes nas teorias de verdade de pragmatistas tais como C.S. Peirce, William James e John Dewey. A concepção de quase-verdade vale-se de um tipo de estrutura matemática denominada estrutura parcial. Apresentamos o sistema lógico modal QT - um tipo de lógica de Ja'skowski - , associado à lógica QV (S5Q=). QT constitui uma formalização adequada à noção de quase-verdade. Definimos uma semântica de modelos de Kripke para QT. São apresentados e demonstrados os principais metateoremas do sistema associado QT/QV. Definimos a noção de conseqüência sintática pragmática, introduzimos os conectivos pragmáticos e demonstramos que QT constitui uma lógica paraconsistente. Demonstramos a corretude e completude de QT, simplificando a demonstração valendo-nos dos metateoremas de QT/QV apresentados anteriormente / Abstract: Alfred Tarki, in presenting his semantical conception of truth - a definition for formalized languages -, captured Aristotle¿s classical conception of truth - this one, a correspondencial truth conception. Mikenberg, da Costa and Chuaqui, introduced a formal conception of pragmatic truth - da Costa¿s quasi-truth -, based on the theories of truth of some pragmatists, such as C.S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey. The conception of quasi-truth is based on a kind of mathematical structure named, by da Costa, partial structure. We present the modal logical system QT - a kind of Ja'skowski¿s discussive logic -, associated to the logic QV (S5Q=). The logic QT constitutes an adequate formalization for the notion of quasi-truth. We introduce a Kripke model semantics for QT. We prove some metatheorems relative to the associated systems QT and QV. We define the notion of pragmatic sintactical consequence, present the pragmatic connectives and prove that QT is a paraconsistent logic. By using the mentioned metatheorems, we obtain a simplified proof of soundness and completeness of QT / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

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Naturalistic philosophers aim to understand the world on the basis of science. A naturalist takes empirical evidence to be the ultimate arbiter of our beliefs. As naturalists, our investigations of the nature of truth itself should respect this empiricist methodology. In this essay, I argue that the existence and character of truth are open empirical questions, to be answered by scientific inquiry. I then argue against an a priori proof of the existence of truth. / text

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