M.A. / Please refer to full text to view abstract

As is clear from the title, this thesis presents a comparison of Schenkerian and Ciceronian principles. The thesis will focus mainly on the characteristics of the creative process essential for producing a sublime and intellectual work. Admittedly comparing a Roman lawyer/philosopher (Cicero) to a 20th century musician/theorist (Schenker) will bring forth many obstacles and will suffer from numerous imperfections. Stressing the commonalties between two men of time frames too far apart is an arduous task. I found it most helpful to go about this problem through three stages: first, by presenting an overview of the lives, historical circumstances, and careers of the two mentioned figures; second, by presenting a basic comparison of the two branches of thought; and third, by dealing with some of the more complicated philosophical issues for a better understanding of the two doctrines. Since many of the Schenkerian and Ciceronian principles are heavily rooted in Platonism, an overview of Plato's theory of 'forms and ideas' is presented to guide the reader toward a better grasp of the concepts. The reader may, however, be uncertain regarding the objective of this thesis: is this a comparison of the two philosophies or an evaluation of them? Of course, in order to achieve a satisfactory comparison, one must first understand the two philosophies; this demands an explicit analysis which, in my view, is a form of evaluation. I have also shown and questioned some of the ambiguities of the two philosophies without offering any solutions. This will perhaps help the reader to understand the path I had to take in completing this thesis. I have included these philosophical remarks in the endnotes. Furthermore, Schenkerian philosophy reveals many other important influences other than Platonism; although not the focus of this thesis, numerous references to great thinkers such as Nietzsche, Spinoza, Hanslick, and Freud illustrate this point. Much of the presented bibliographical material on the life of Cicero can be found in the On the Commonwealth and On the Laws. Furthermore, Michael B. Fuster's Masters of Political Thought has been used as a source of reference for a great portion of the philosophical interpretations. Much of what I have presented on Schenker and Schenkerian literature has been gathered through my studies and conversations with Dr. Benjamin, my advisor: the most reliable source with whom I am acquainted. This is perhaps the reason for not including any other philosophical writings on Schenkerian literature in the bibliography. / Arts, Faculty of / Music, School of / Graduate

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As a classical scholar and prominent founding father, James Wilson was at once statesman, judge, and political thinker, who read Cicero as an example worthy of emulation and as a philosopher whose theory could be applied to his own age. Classical reception studies have focused on questions of liberty, civic virtue, and constitutionalism in the American founding, and historians have also noted Wilson’s importance in American history and thought. Wilson’s direct engagement with Cicero’s works, however, and their significance in the formulation of his own philosophy has been long overlooked. My thesis argues that Wilson’s viewpoint was largely based on his readings of Cicero and can only be properly understood within this context. In the first two chapters of my thesis I demonstrate that Wilson not only possessed a wide-ranging knowledge of the classics in general, but also that he borrowed from Cicero’s writings and directly engaged with the texts themselves. Building upon this foundation, chapters three and four examine Cicero’s perspective on popular sovereignty and civic virtue, situate Wilson’s interpretations within contemporary discussions of Roman politics, and analyse the main ways in which he adapts Cicero’s arguments to his own era. Wilson retains a broader faith in the common people than seen in Cicero’s opinions, and he abstracts from Cicero a doctrine of sovereignty as an indivisible principle that is absent in the text; nevertheless, Cicero’s conception of a legitimate state and his insistence on the role of the people provided the foundation for Wilson’s thought and ultimately for his legitimization of the American Revolution. At the same time, like Cicero, Wilson views the stability of the state as resting in the personal virtue of the individual. While his enlightenment philosophy imparts optimism to his conception of the good citizen, his definition of virtue closely follows that of Cicero. As the final chapter of my thesis concludes, their individual interpretations of these theories of popular consent and virtue were instrumental in forming Cicero’s and Wilson’s justifications of civil disobedience.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Heidelberg, Heidelberg, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 163-170).

Traditional accounts of ancient law make the following generalizations: Athenian law was a system of amateurs and, consequently, arbitrary and irrational. Roman law, by contrast, gradually became a system of specialized professionals. Legal scholars (jurists) interpreted and developed the law and advocates represented litigants. Thanks to specialization, Roman law became rational and consistent--a foundation for Rome's imperial administration as well as many modern legal systems. Bruce Frier has argued in a landmark book that this development ("the rise of the Roman jurists") began in the last century of the republic, and that it was endorsed by Cicero. By examining how Cicero and the Attic orators discuss legal expertise and litigation, I seek to revise this standard picture in two ways. First, I argue that Athenians were not hostile to legal knowledge per se, but to expertise in litigation. I find, furthermore, that learning from the laws was part of the moral training of Athenian citizens. I then argue that Cicero's attitude towards legal expertise was not progressive, but reactionary. Litigation was a moral issue in the Roman republic no less than in democratic Athens. In Cicero's opinion, the true legal expert--whether an orator, a jurist, or a statesman--is a figure with the moral authority to resolve conflicts without debate. Cicero promulgates an ideology of law wherein litigation ideally would be unnecessary, and citizens' disputes would be resolved by their "natural" superiors. / text

Thesis--Pennsylvania, 1969. / On cover: Horace, Ciceron, et la rhétorique du seizième siècle. Bibliography: p. xi-xix.

Thesis--Pennsylvania, 1969. / On cover: Horace, Ciceron, et la rhétorique du seizième siècle. Bibliography: p. xi-xix.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of St Andrews, May 2010.