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This study examines the effect that divided or unified government, in the United States of America, has on the delegation of trade authority to the President. Using a qualitative analysis approach, I examine competing views and formulate an independent opinion based on the peoples’ preferences and evaluation of the principles of America’s Constitutionalism. I conclude that overemphasis on the impact of divided government is misleading because trade issues provide the primary mechanism which determines the implementation of America’s trade policies, and the principles of Constitutionalism are valuable guidelines. Blended with the discussion is the awareness of an American ethos which challenges formulation of trade agreements in an era of increased globalization.

Taiwan area has administered local autonomy for over fifty years. At first its authority was mainly based on an administrative order called the Guidelines for Local Autonomy and then the Local System Law at present. Among the powers vested by the law, veto is an important weapon for the local administration to balance legislative power. However, the veto power has yet to be further elaborated for it was used in just a little more than 500 cases all over Taiwan area in the past sixty years. This essay tries to probe both the theoretical and practical facets of the veto system. The local system of this country adopted an administration and legislature separation system. In case a conflict should occur between the two powers, its time for veto to help solve the dilemma. As a matter of fact, government is responsible for proposing important bills, the officials can defend its policies while attending the legislature for interpellation or proposal deliberation. In addition, budgets are only proposed by local administrations. Local legislatures are restrained from increasing the sizes of the proposed budgets by law. So while deliberating on draft resolutions, the legislature would consider officials¡¦ opinions and not to make less feasible resolutions. Despite an unfeasible resolution should be made, the administration would rather seek other ways out than veto it in order to maintain the harmony between the two powers. More over, the content of the Local System Law has put more weight on administration power so as to make the legislature conservative in enforcing its power lest its resolutions should be vetoed. In recent years, democracy has enrooted into the daily lives of the society; Local political environment change drastically and divided government is now a commonplace; Local cliques have either reformed or vanished; Gangsters and money politics enter local legislatures and struggle for personal interests. The administrations are facing an overwhelmingly new eco system in local legislatures. Comparing the factors that induce a veto, it is found that the conflict for personal interest is the most common cause. The veto system is a mechanism of instrument equilibrium. Administration and legislation should stand on an equal position to discuss veto dispute to reach the purposes of the separation of powers between the executive and legislature. This essay suggests the central government that the time limit, quorum, scope and method in deliberating a veto should be explicitly defined in law so as to make sure a healthier veto system.

This study examines the effect that divided or unified government, in the United States of America, has on the delegation of trade authority to the President. Using a qualitative analysis approach, I examine competing views and formulate an independent opinion based on the peoples’ preferences and evaluation of the principles of America’s Constitutionalism. I conclude that overemphasis on the impact of divided government is misleading because trade issues provide the primary mechanism which determines the implementation of America’s trade policies, and the principles of Constitutionalism are valuable guidelines. Blended with the discussion is the awareness of an American ethos which challenges formulation of trade agreements in an era of increased globalization.

Since 1996, the president of Taiwan's implementation of universal suffrage since 2010 in 14 years, There have been twice to replace the regime of peace, Taiwan's policy toward mainland China in the political division of the two major political parties - the KMT and DDP and also so the identity of the ruling and opposition parties quickly converted twice. Taiwan's political environment has undergone an unprecedented rapid changes. This article by David Easton's system theory as a general theory and approaches, Looks forward to further establishing a political party as the core of the local theory, Analysis of Taiwan's political parties since 1996 in the "internal and external environment ¡÷ demand and input ¡÷ feedback and output ¡÷ re-enter to the internal and external environment" and what role in the political process? As well as how the policies of mainland China affected? ¡@This article has found, political parties in the system theory are not only pressure groups for Political authority, And active in the political system's internal, external and boundary, And can be further repression of political authority, the completion of its own expectations of mainland policy. Political parties, both ruling party or opposition parties or unified government or divided government, the political parties can control congress, congressional paralysis, cooperation with other political system, increased support by social mobilization, the creation of political controversy and use other methods to pressure on the political authority. Finally, this article believes that with the cooperation of the KMT and the China Communist Party platform, the KMT has similar status of political authority in Taiwan's policy toward mainland China.

本研究旨在探討2000年我國中央政府政黨輪替前後，不同的政府型態對於重大法案審議的影響。我們運用統計、內容分析（content analysis）、深度訪談等方法，檢視第2屆至第6屆立法院（1993年2月至2007年1月）期間，行政院提出的249個重大法案在立法院審議的情形，屬於「貫時性分析」（longitudinal analysis）。 就分立政府（divided government）與一致政府（unified government）的比較而言，研究結果發現：台灣的分立政府之重大法案審議結果，與一致政府的確有所差異，但差異並不大。值得強調的是，吾人企圖跳脫「分立vs.一致」的二元思考，嘗試作更細膩的觀察──本研究以二元對數勝算比模型（binary logit model）檢視影響重大法案通過與否的因素，藉由兩個模型的比較，最重要的發現在於：本研究提出的「四個階段」（一致政府前期、一致政府後期、分立政府前期、分立政府後期）之分析方式，較傳統「一致政府vs.分立政府」二元對立的分類，更具意義。分析結果顯示：「分立政府後期」的重大法案通過情形，明顯較「一致政府前期」好，分立政府的重大法案生產力未必不如一致政府。而且，分立政府本身有顯著差異，一致政府後期與前期的差異則更為顯著。易言之，本研究發現：分立政府的情形不能一概而論，分立初期行政部門的重大法案在國會常遭擱置延宕，頗符合Sundquist等傳統派學者的看法，但分立後期，重大法案通過率大幅回升甚至略高於一致政府的平均數，此階段的情況大致符合修正派學者Mayhew的觀點（分立政府無損於重大法案之制定），惟國會對於法案主導權的爭奪明顯較一致政府時期嚴重。另一方面，一致政府的情形亦不能一概而論，一致政府前期的重大法案推動情形並不順暢，頗值得2008年重回一致政府「完全執政」的新政府借鏡。