published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Philosophy

In this thesis a version of the ethical theory of utilitarianism is defended. The version defended is called ‘objectivist compatibilist utilitarianism’, or ‘OCtJ’. On this version, utilitarian metaethics includes the propositions that there is an objective, intrinsic property of goodness entifying, motivating, and grounding ethics, and that act and rule utilitarianism are compatible since under plausible interpretations both true. While this metaethical theory has perhaps not been stated explicitly before, theories in this vein have been popular since the mid—l9th century, and have been expounded by philosophers such as J.S. Mill and G.E. Moore. OCU will be defended by examination of six influential objections to various of its hypotheses. In each case, thorough conceptual analysis, aided by consultation of relevant scientific facts about human nature, will reveal that the objection is seriously flawed. In the process of dispatching these negative considerations, a comprehensive positive ethical theory will emerge. Most other currently popular ethical theories are not comprehensive, but instead take no position (or several, which amounts to the same thing) on one or more of the major issues that any comprehensive ethical theory must deal with. OCU thus emerges as one of only a very few contemporary comprehensive ethical theories — and on balance the most plausible of the lot.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 144-148).

In this thesis a version of the ethical theory of utilitarianism is defended. The version defended is called ‘objectivist compatibilist utilitarianism’, or ‘OCtJ’. On this version, utilitarian metaethics includes the propositions that there is an objective, intrinsic property of goodness entifying, motivating, and grounding ethics, and that act and rule utilitarianism are compatible since under plausible interpretations both true. While this metaethical theory has perhaps not been stated explicitly before, theories in this vein have been popular since the mid—l9th century, and have been expounded by philosophers such as J.S. Mill and G.E. Moore. OCU will be defended by examination of six influential objections to various of its hypotheses. In each case, thorough conceptual analysis, aided by consultation of relevant scientific facts about human nature, will reveal that the objection is seriously flawed. In the process of dispatching these negative considerations, a comprehensive positive ethical theory will emerge. Most other currently popular ethical theories are not comprehensive, but instead take no position (or several, which amounts to the same thing) on one or more of the major issues that any comprehensive ethical theory must deal with. OCU thus emerges as one of only a very few contemporary comprehensive ethical theories — and on balance the most plausible of the lot. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

No description available.

郭柏年. / "2003年7月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2003. / 參考文獻 (leaves 81-83). / 附中英文摘要. / "2003 nian 7 yue". / Guo Bonian. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2003. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 81-83). / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / 摘要 --- p.i / Chapter 第一章 --- 導論 / Chapter 1.1. --- 故事 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- 苛刻論證的結構 --- p.5 / Chapter 1.3 --- 本文的方法論和結構 --- p.6 / Chapter 第二章 --- 效益主義是苛刻的道德理論嗎？ / Chapter 2.1 --- 效益主義的特性 --- p.10 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- 後果原則 --- p.11 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- 無偏私原則 --- p.12 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- 極大化原則 --- p.13 / Chapter 2.1.4 --- 可比較原則 --- p.13 / Chapter 2.1.5 --- 消極責任 --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2 --- 效益主義如何苛刻？ --- p.16 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- 不合理的犧牲 --- p.17 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- 道德異化 --- p.19 / Chapter 2.2.2.1 --- 自我異化 --- p.21 / Chapter 2.2.2.2 --- 與他人的異化 --- p.23 / Chapter 2.3 --- 效益主義的回應 --- p.26 / Chapter 2.4 --- 小結 --- p.30 / Chapter 第三章 --- 道德規範的界限 / Chapter 3.1 --- 常識的道德觀 --- p.32 / Chapter 3.2 --- 道德界域的範圍 --- p.35 / Chapter 3.3 --- 道德理由的凌駕性 --- p.38 / Chapter 3.4 --- 道德規範的要求 --- p.42 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- 道德選擇的多樣性 --- p.44 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- 「行動者的代價」的理論困難 --- p.45 / Chapter 3.4.3 --- 「個人觀點」 --- p.46 / Chapter 3.5 --- 小結 --- p.52 / Chapter 第四章 --- 重構效益主義 / Chapter 4.1 --- 效益主義與後果主義 --- p.53 / Chapter 4.2 --- 赫爾的效益主義 --- p.55 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- 兩層道德思維 --- p.55 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- 兩層道德思維的問題 --- p.59 / Chapter 4.3 --- 滿足式後果主義 --- p.62 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- 放棄極大化原則 --- p.62 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- 滿足式後果主義的問題 --- p.66 / Chapter 4.4 --- 混合理論 --- p.69 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- 無偏私原則與個人觀點 --- p.69 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- 混合理論的問題 --- p.72 / Chapter 4.5 --- 小結 --- p.77 / Chapter 第五章 --- 結論 --- p.78 / 參考書目 --- p.81

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago.

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oklahoma, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references.