There is a long-held assumption that Outdoor Adventure Education (OAE) can develop character. However, little research has explored this belief. While many practitioners, and some scholars, remain committed to character development through OAE, the literature also reveals a growing body of discomfort and suspicion surrounding this assumption. This dissent centres on the vague nature of the term “character,” and the moral philosophical complexities surrounding the concept of character itself. Until “character” is more clearly explicated, any resolution to the current confusion is unlikely. This thesis employs Aristotle’s virtue theory, as espoused in his Nicomachean Ethics, to articulate an understanding of character. Although several scholars have used virtue ethics, commonly referred to as character ethics, to support their claims of character development through OAE, these treatments have been preliminary, warranting this more detailed account. When viewed from this virtue ethical perspective, the question, “Can character be developed through OAE?,” becomes problematic. For Aristotle cautions that different subjects of inquiry yield differing levels of accuracy, and with regard to ethical investigations, such as those into character, one must be content to “indicate the truth roughly and in outline” (I 3§4). Further complicating the matter, Aristotle asserts that virtue, a disposition, and the building block of character is gradually and arduously inculcated over long periods of time (I 7§16). While virtue theory implies that radical character transformation is, in any context, unlikely over brief stints of time, this does not mean that OAE programmes are of little moral worth. To the contrary, a detailed examination into a virtue ethical understanding of character suggests that certain elements of OAE programmes may xii have strong moral relevance. This relevance is found in Aristotle’s three conditions that cultivate the development of virtue, conditions readily found within many OAE courses: moral reflection; moral practice; and sharing in the moral lives of others. Drawing on my own interest and experience within OAE, an expedition seemed an ideal setting to explore the presence and content of Aristotle’s three conditions. In hope of discovering this moral narrative, a qualitative case study was conducted on a two-week wilderness expedition in the Adirondack Mountains of New York. The expedition was a first-year transition experience for students attending a Christian liberal college in the United States. Utilising interviews as a primary method, and observations and texts as secondary methods, the research explored the participants’ expedition experience from a virtue ethical perspective. A thematic analysis revealed that participants reported reflecting on their moral lives in both formal (e.g. group reviews, solo, journals) and informal (e.g. while hiking and performing camp chores) settings. Similarly, whether through the mental and physical endurance required in off-trail navigation, or the care expressed through the acts of service and gracious tolerance necessitated by the social demands of expeditionary life, the participants viewed their wilderness travel as a constant opportunity for moral practice. Lastly, the participants identified the community formed on their expedition to be integral to their increased moral self-perception. Although a virtue ethical perspective precludes claiming anything definitive regarding the participants’ character development, at the least, the expedition can be said to have contributed to their moral journey in ways that are directly relevant to their character.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 288-297).

Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 64-66).

Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 64-66).

Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 64-66).

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2007. / Title from title page. Andrew I. Cohen, committee chair; Andrew Altman, Andrew J. Cohen, committee members. Electronic text (52 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed October 11, 2007. Includes bibliographical references.

The guiding question of this project is, "Why does it count as a critique of Heidegger that he does not defend a particular moral position?" A standard criticism levied against Heidegger is that, since he has nothing positive to say about post-Enlightenment moral theory, he has nothing to contribute to moral philosophy, and this marks his greatest shortcoming as a philosopher. Why is there a demand for Heidegger, or any other philosopher, to theorize about morality, when we do not have this expectation for, say, aesthetics, theology, or various other regional domains of human life? Why should we expect Heidegger to theorize about what humans must be like in order to care about and engage in moral thought? Answering these questions involves an extended discussion of ways of understanding ethics in Western philosophical thought, as well as, Heidegger's own view of ethics. I begin with a detailed exposition of the paradigmatic shift from premodern ethics, as it is based on an understanding of ethos (a form of life with its practical and normative dimensions), to modern conceptions of ethics based on Enlightenment (1750-1850) individualism and the fact-value distinction. This account of the history of ethics in philosophy attempts to demonstrate that the transition to modernity is marked by a schism between Being (ontology) and Ought (ethics) which makes any post-Enlightenment justification of ethics impossible (and helps us see why Heidegger always scoffs at the project of working out an ethics). My primary goal is to prove that Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle's thought not only challenges the underlying metaphysical assumptions of mainstream moral philosophy, but also shows us a way back to the unity of ethics and ontology. My claim is that Being and Time is an ethics in the same way Nicomachean Ethics is an ethics: both are based on an understanding of the human ethos and attempt to show what is characteristic of a life that is structured by the "ought." This argument sets the stage for uncovering the underlying presuppositions governing two prominent objections raised against Heidegger: the existentialist and nihilistic critiques. I find that these critiques are grounded on the assumption of "ontological individualism." In contrast to this individualistic ontology of the social world, I argue that, for Heidegger, individuality is not an ontological or biological given; rather, it is a relatively rare accomplishment of members of a linguistic community. What is important, in Heidegger's view, is that the ethos is the ontological bedrock of ethics. The ethos does not offer us universal principles or morals rules of the kind modern morality seeks, but it does provide paths, ways of being, and possibilities for living meaningful lives. In the end, all we have are understandings of life in certain domains (art, religion, love, etc.) that provide character ideals that, together with meaningful goals and projects for the whole of our lives, make possible a flourishing ethos. My secondary goal is to demonstrate that Heidegger undercuts the uncritical presuppositions of much of mainstream moral philosophy and provides an alternative account of ethics that picks up the stick from the other end. I formulate my thesis as an extension of the recent scholarship on Heidegger's work, arguing that Heidegger's emphasis on the human ethos puts forth a proper way of dwelling and Being-at-home within the current of the historical essence of a community. What is original about Heidegger's post-humanist ethics is that it denies the modern Being-Ought distinction and calls us to be ready and prepared to be claimed by Being. Refusing to give an absolute position to anthropomorphism, Heidegger's ethics serves as an attempt to specify what it is to be fully human in the sense of being a respondent who receives an understanding of Being and has to own up to the task of being claimed by Being. If I am correct, then it is a mistake to judge Heidegger's ethics according to whether he succeeds at formulating a list of responsibilities, rights, and obligations of individuals. Whereas modern moral theory is concerned with providing impartial and value-free guidelines and principles for individual behavior, Heidegger is asking about the conditions for the possibility of transforming how one lives. This puts the burden of proof on those who think there is something important about moral theory. The onus of proof rests with those who want to claim that a right way to be human exists and that there is an absolute, unchanging, timeless ground for understanding the right.

Thesis advisor: Mary Jo Iozzio / The influence of Liberation Theology within the pastoral and moral tradition of the Catholic Church has been formative to the contemporary understanding of Catholic Christianity. As a Redemptorist Missionary, the rich tradition of liberation theology is significant. The Constitution and statutes (CS) of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, the guiding document of our apostolic life, explicitly embrace the concept of liberation and the preferential option for the poor. The description of the Gospel of Salvation in article one of the the CS provides the Redemptorist missionary's understanding of the Gospel of Salvation. Article one defines how the work of evangelization is to be understood. The Constitution states: "The Congregations' mandate to evangelize the poor is directed to the liberation and salvation of the whole human person. The members have a duty to preach the Gospel explicitly and show solidarity with the poor by promoting their fundamental rights to justice and freedom." In chapter one we will examine the theory of Liberation Theology presented by Gutierrez. In that discussion, important concepts, such as theological praxis, virtue ethics and the important influence of Thomism and the legacy of virtue theory in the Catholic tradition will be presented. We will also bring into the dialogical dynamic what contemporary virtue theory brings to the context of liberation idealogy. It is through this dialogue of tradition and contemporary critique and response that we will roughly sketch the context of our theological discourse. Chapter two will engage the virtue of Charity as the foundation virtue of Gutierrez's theology of liberation. Here we will engage how Thomas Aquinas' presentation of the virtue of charity and Alphonsus Liguori's pastorally practical approach to the virtue of charity illuminate how Gutierrez engages the virtue of charity in his theology. This chapter will take these three theological points of reference to present how Gutierrez understands the onnection betwwen the virtue of charity and Christian praxis. Through this necessary connection of charity, Christian praxis we will examine Gutierrez's understanding of political charity, and how Chritistian spirituality is a constituent element of political charity and how political charity becomes an eschatological prophetic witness to the liberation of the whole person. It is through this eschatological spirit of political charity that charity becomes epistemological praxis. Chapter three will follow the structure of chapter two by dialogically engaging Aquinas, Liguori and Gutierrez's praxis of the virtue of prudence. We will also examine how prudence is reflected in scripture and how the formation of conscience in the Alphonsian tradition helps us to understand how Gutierrez's theological perspective uses the virtue of prudence through the relationship between conscientization and prudence in the context of liberation theology. The conscientization of a community is the manifestation of prudence as a social virtue. Thus, we will discuss how this dynamic demonstrates the virtue of prudence as a cultural action and a radical form of Christian praxis, which consequence is a metanoic movement of conscience through prudence. The final chapter will conclude this work by examining the implication of political charity and the heuristic praxis of conscientization of prudence, particularly in the context of the Redemptionist missionary. It is towards this end, the practical application of these theological reflections where the fruit of this theological dialogue will find value and will hopefully be an aide to the movement toward the liberation of the whole person. / Thesis (STL) — Boston College, 2023. / Submitted to: Boston College. School of Theology and Ministry. / Discipline: Sacred Theology.

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