Climate change is the first anthropogenic alteration of a global Earth system. It is globally catastrophic in terms of food production, sea level rise, fresh water availability, temperature elevation, ocean acidification, species disturbance and destruction to name just a few crisis concerns. In addition, while those changes are occurring now, they are amplifying over decadal periods and will last for centuries and possibly millennia. While there are a number of pollutants involved, carbon dioxide (CO2) which results from the combustion of any fossil fuel is the primary pollutant. It has not been considered a pollutant until recently because of its natural dissociation into oxygen and carbon compounds like wood. However, because of its molecular durability and ability to acidify water, it has become the primary pollutant as a result of the exponential increase in fossil fuel use for the production of energy by Earth’s population that has doubled over the last six decades. That increase has exceeded Earth’s ability to handle humanity’s waste CO2. Obviously, the involved changes detrimentally affect all life on Earth. Because of the evolving nature of the changes, climate change is presently denied primarily in the United States because of the costs of eliminating our carbon addiction. Because no similar global natural or anthropogenic situation has previously occurred during the lifetime of Homo sapiens, our extant ethical theories are incapable of confronting the crisis. Consequently, new ethical paradigms are necessary. This dissertation attempts to provide thoughts about the use of Aristotelian ethical theory, the aidōs feeling, Aquinian psychology and a possible new virtue of proper primility in an effort to further nurture the growth of the new climate change ethics.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 396-400). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2004. / Thesis directed by W. David Solomon for the Department of Philosophy. "May 2004." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 234-239).

This thesis argues that virtue belongs in any framework of moral philosophy, and specifies this along several lines. In the first chapter I establish that virtue is a good, or a duty. I defend this against skeptical objections which argue that virtue is only an instrumental good. In Chapter 2 I specify some features of virtue. I argue that virtue is an attitude toward the good, and also is enhance by an inclination toward action and a stable disposition. Chapter 3 argues against certain meta-ethical objections that would question the veracity of the aspects of virtue discussed in Chapter 2. These objections draw from psychological studies about traits and the telos of a life. Chapter 4 suggests a hypothesis that eudaimonia, or human flourishing defined narrowly can provide the theoretical unification for virtue. / February 2016

Tales of unethical reporting, conflict of interest, biases and corruption characterize media practice in Zambia today. The advent of technology and the mushrooming of media houses have ironically magnified this trend. Such tendencies have compromised ethical reporting, thus undermining the journalistic credibility. While some scholars call for a return to African ethics, others hanker for greater professionalism. This study offers an overview of the media in Zambia with Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation and the POST newspaper as its case study. The study looks at how virtue ethics would be effective in reclaiming media credibility. Using qualitative methods, data were collected via theoretical and methodological triangulation. Open-ended questions were designed and distributed among 10 Zambian journalists. The interviews were conducted within a period of one month. Findings indicated that media credibility in Zambia has reached unprecedented levels of suspicion and that virtue ethics, if well applied, would redeem the lost credibility.

<p>My dissertation analyzes the overlooked character types of <i>akrasia </i>(un-self-control) and <i>enkrateia </i>(self-control) in Aristotle’s ethics. In Chapter 1, I argue for the thesis that <i>akrasia </i>and <i>enkrateia </i>are character types, or settled psychological dispositions, definable in terms of unique un-self-controlled and self-controlled relations to choice-making. In Chapters 2 and 3, I argue for the thesis that agents do not express these character types only in temperance’s practical domain; rather, agents can express <i>akrasia</i> and <i>enkrateia</i> in any practical domain where one’s reason can conflict with one’s desire, so the character types have wide ranges of expression. More specifically, in Chapter 2, I develop a distinction between strict forms of the character types, which agents express in temperance’s practical domain, and loose forms of the character types, which agents express in other practical domains (e.g., in courage’s practical domain). I also argue that the strict and loose forms of each of the character types are united according to the ontological and terminological relation of metaphor, or inclusive resemblance. In Chapter 3, I draw two lines of psychological justification for the view that <i>akrasia </i>and <i>enkrateia </i>are wide-ranging character types and respond to some scholarly objections. In Chapter 4, I build an account of ethical practical syllogisms and differentiate them from non-ethical practical syllogisms; I argue that an agent expresses her character type through each feature of an ethical practical syllogism (i.e., not only through the enacted choice that concludes an ethical practical syllogism, but also through the propositions she exercises in it). Finally, in Chapter 5, I construct and analyze loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms in a variety of practical domains to show that <i>akrasia </i>and <i>enkrateia </i>are character types with wide ranges of expression.<b></b></p>

Thesis advisor: Andrea Vicini / This dissertation aims, first, to retrieve a thicker notion of kinship; second, to explore whether such a notion might counter the political exclusion of the most vulnerable; and third, to propose that kinship has potential to promote the social integration of the most vulnerable. Over the past few decades, the term kinship has often been understood in a very reductionist sense, only referring to genetic connections or family ties, and a particular type of kinship, i.e., spiritual kinship, has lost its social implications. Such a narrow understanding of kinship contributes to marginalizing and excluding frail elderly women and men from the social fabric. In particular, the frail elderly are subjected to two kinds of exclusion: personal (individual) and institutionalized (systematic). While the vices that lead to personal exclusion include anthropodenial and an aversion to human limitations, the vices responsible for the institutionalized exclusion of the frail elderly include greed and individualism, both fostered by neo-liberalism. To promote the inclusion of the frail elderly, I propose, first, the practice of solidaristic kinship as a response to personal exclusion, because this practice re-educates the emotions through habits. Second, to address institutionalized exclusion, I recommend structures of kinship, such as solidarity and fraternity, because they promote kinship within society. Finally, practices of solidaristic kinship and structures of kinship together characterize communities of solidaristic kinship with frail elderly persons. By engaging in such communities, moral agents cultivate the civic virtues needed to contribute to shaping a society that promotes the political inclusion of its vulnerable members. / Thesis (STD) — Boston College, 2020. / Submitted to: Boston College. School of Theology and Ministry. / Discipline: Sacred Theology.

This essay will research aspects of romantic love, as well as aspects of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The purpose of the essay is to discuss if romantic love can be part of virtue ethics and eudaimonia. The philosopher Raja Halwani presents two concepts of romantic love that are relevant to the discussion. The concepts are romantic love 1 and romantic love 2. The first one is a new love, where the partners only want to be with each other. The second type of love is closer to companionship where the partners are familiar with each other and have been together for a long time. To contrast this, I will use Martin Hägglund’s theory concerning romantic love. In Hägglund’s theory love is built upon the care we feel for our partners. However, it is the fear that the loved one can be taken away from us that constitutes this care. In the end, one of the two concepts Raja Halwani were determined to be virtuous and part of eudaimonia. Hägglund’s theory was partly virtuous due to the care he deems that we feel for our loved ones. / Denna uppsats kommer att undersöka aspekter av romantisk kärlek, samt aspekter av Aristoteles Nichomachean Ethics. Uppsatsen syfte är att diskutera om romantisk kärlek kan vara en del av dygdetiken och eudaimonia. Filosofen Raja Halwani presenterar två olika typer av romantisk kärlek som är relevanta för diskussionen. Dessa två typer är romantic love 1 och romantic love 2. Den första är en typ av ny kärlek där personerna endast vill vara med varandra. Den andra typen av kärlek är närmare engelskans companionship. Här är partnerna väldigt nära varandra och har varit tillsammans under en lång tid. För att kontrastera detta så kommer jag använda Martin Hägglunds teori som har att göra med romantisk kärlek. Hägglunds teori bygger kärlek på omsorgen vi känner för våra älskade. Dock är det rädslan att våra älskade kan tas ifrån oss som utgör denna omsorg. Till slut klargjordes det att en av Halwanis typer av kärlek var dygdig och del av eudaimonia. Hägglunds teori var till viss del dygdig på grund av omsorgen han fastställer att vi känner för våra älskade.

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