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Moral virtues need intellectual virtues. I support this claims by (1) proposing a response in terms of intellectual virtues and other psychological factors to situationalist critiques against moral virtue, (2) arguing that intellectual virtues must assess moral contexts for proper manifestation of moral virtue, and (3) showing that interrelations between moral and intellectual virtues deem them inextricable in moral behavior. These arguments--(1), (2), and (3), respectivelyare designed to show the function, the prescriptive advantage and the descriptive accuracy of intellectual virtues in virtue theory. Further, I argue that supplementing virtue theory with intellectual virtues yields more subtle characterological assessments of agents in moral action. Finally, I demonstrate the function of intellectual virtues to fill the theoretical gap revealed by the problem of moral luck.

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This thesis argues that virtue belongs in any framework of moral philosophy, and specifies this along several lines. In the first chapter I establish that virtue is a good, or a duty. I defend this against skeptical objections which argue that virtue is only an instrumental good. In Chapter 2 I specify some features of virtue. I argue that virtue is an attitude toward the good, and also is enhance by an inclination toward action and a stable disposition. Chapter 3 argues against certain meta-ethical objections that would question the veracity of the aspects of virtue discussed in Chapter 2. These objections draw from psychological studies about traits and the telos of a life. Chapter 4 suggests a hypothesis that eudaimonia, or human flourishing defined narrowly can provide the theoretical unification for virtue. / February 2016

abstract: Recently, philosophers have charged that Aristotelian-based virtue theories are empirically inadequate because the conception of character in which they are grounded is largely unfounded by findings in psychology. These philosophers argue in favor of situationism, the theory from social psychology that situational rather than dispositional differences among individuals are in large part responsible for human behavior. Situationists dispute the existence of traits that remain consistent across time and diverse situations and argue that features of situations can better explain and predict human behavior. After analyzing the psychological literature and historical cases put forth as evidence for situationism as well as the basic premises grounding arguments against situationism, I make some conclusions about the best responses to situationism. I agree with situationists that Aristotelian-based virtue and character are not quite empirically adequate but disagree that human behavior owes more to situational rather than dispositional determinants. Basing my theory on literature from social psychology, I argue instead that a concept of character grounded in social-cognitive theory is more psychologically realistic and can explain and predict human behavior and ground a character-based virtue theory. A social-cognitive conception of character would highlight the dynamic role between situations and individual psychological factors like beliefs, values, desires and the way that an individual perceives a situation. I sketch out a non-ideal theory of virtue based in a social-cognitive conception of character that is partially dependent on social networks for its maintenance and is fragmented, or contextualized to particular types of psychological situations. However, fragmented and socially dependent virtue is not an optimal type of virtue because it is vulnerable to situational features that place strong psychological pressures on agents to behave in various ways, including ways they would not have normally endorsed. I agree with Aristotelian virtue ethicists that argue that a type of practical wisdom can help to counter the often unwanted and dangerous influence of these strong situations but also maintain that some measure of moral luck is inevitably involved, even in the development of practical wisdom. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Philosophy 2012

Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The overall aim of this study is to establish the implications, effectiveness and limitations of making Aristotelian virtue theory a meta-theory of business. The study intends to test what the business world would be like with the virtue framework as its meta-theory, i.e. if virtue theory provided the fundamental principles that underlie the formation and operation of business enterprises, thus making virtue the philosophy of business. Since virtue is concerned with moral character rather than moral principles – it is community-based rather than individualistic – the application of the virtue framework to business implies that we will have to deal with the reality that individualistic capitalism is corrosive to virtue. The virtue framework is only compatible with collective forms of capitalism, not individualistic forms. Thus, in order to nurture virtues, it is necessary to build an economic system, a type of capitalism that is compatible with the virtue framework. Such a project is morally plausible because it is congruent with human nature, which is rational and social. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die algehele doel van hierdie studie is om die implikasies, effektiwiteit en beperkings van die toepassing van die Aristoteliaanse teorie van deug as metateorie vir besigheid vas te stel. Die studie beoog om te toets hoe die besigheidswêreld sou lyk met deugdeteorie as metateorie, dit wil sê as deugdeteorie die fundamentele beginsels wat die formasie en bedryf van besigheidsondernemings onderlê voorsien en dus deug die filosofie van bedryf maak. Deugde is bemoei met morele karakter eerder as morele beginsels omdat dit gemeenskapsgegrond eerder as individualisties is. Die toepassing van ʼn deugde-raamwerk op die sakewêreld impliseer dus dat ons moet afreken met die realiteit dat individualistiese kapitalisme korrosief is vir deugde. Die deugde-raamwerk is slegs verenigbaar met kollektiewe vorme van kapitalisme, eerder as individualistiese vorme. Om die deugde te koester is dit dus nodig om ’n ekonomiese sisteem te bou in die vorm van ’n kapitalistiese stelsel wat verenigbaar is met die raamwerk. Só ʼn projek is moreel aanneemlik omdat dit ooreenstem met die menslike natuur, wat rasioneel en sosiaal is.

Abstract This paper presents the thesis that, in certain circumstances and despite the dichotomous nature of capitalism, economic self-interest, or profit, may be reconciled to ethical business practice. These circumstances require that: i) a business enterprise be conducted outside of a traditional business model, in what will be referred to as a stakeholder model of business; ii) this stakeholder model must be grounded in a Rawlsian conception of contractualism, where all players are ‘free, equal, rational and reasonable’, with the emphasis on reasonableness; and where, iii) matters of Aristotelean character are the currency for determining reasonableness and the degree to which players are able to agree, or at least not reject, a particular course of action.

In the last few decades, some scholars have questioned the moral value of forgiveness. They have argued that in order for a victim to preserve his self-respect, to not condone the wrongdoing, and to avoid unjustly pardoning the offender, he must consider forgiving only after the offender has satisfied specific conditions that have been demanded of him. Forgiveness, they claim, is morally permissible only when it is given conditionally. Unconditional forgiveness cannot be virtuous. This dissertation addresses the issues surrounding this claim. I argue that Forgivingness, which is the virtue associated with forgiving, causes its possessor to reliably offer unconditional forgiveness to every person who offends him. Further, I contend that instances of forgiveness, arising from or contributing to the development of this virtue, are never morally impermissible even though their moral quality may not be ideal. To support my thesis, I develop a model of Forgivingness that represents it as a multi-faceted virtue of cognitive, affective, motivational, and action components that, independently of the actions and attitudes of the offender, produce unilateral, unconditional forgiveness. I describe Forgivingness’s dependency on the characteristic of moral love—a quality that values an offender’s ultimate moral good and ideal self, displays good will towards him, and assimilates the virtue of self-forgetfulness into the possessor’s deliberations, desires, and actions—and explain the virtue’s relationship to ancillary or homologous emotions including hope, humility, magnanimity, and anger. I then defend the forgiveness that multi-faceted Forgivingness produces against criticisms that are commonly levied against unconditional forgiveness. In doing so, I reinforce a theme that runs throughout the entire work—that is, that virtuous forgiveness is distinct from minimal forgiveness. When relevant, I show the weaknesses in minimal forgiveness so as to emphasize the moral strength and beauty of virtuous forgiveness. Further, I distinguish virtuous forgiveness from forgetting, reconciliation, and excuse-making and explain how it can be compatible with disciplining the offender. Consequently, I demonstrate why virtuous forgiveness that is given according to my model of the virtue is immune to the criticisms that may be relevant to other forms of forgiveness.

Fragmentation, which often involves the division of one’s self into professional and personal domains that are insulated from each other, is a serious problem for soldiers in today’s Army. This type of professional-personal fragmentation arises organically in military service. Unfortunately, it also seems that the past 12 years of persistent conflict have exacerbated the problem of fragmentation for many soldiers. Given this, I argue that any program that the Army implements for moral development should recognize fragmentation and provide resources and practices to combat it. I contend that the Army Profession campaign, which is the Army’s primary program for moral development, fails to meet either of these requirements. Moreover, it seems to serve as a catalyst that further fragments soldier’s lives. I believe this follows from the manner in which the campaign limits moral aspiration to a domain-specific good, professionalism. Thus it seems that the Army Profession campaign is not sufficient for soldiers’ moral development. Some may point to the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program as the resource that the Army uses to address this problem because of its emphasis on the emotional, social, familial, and spiritual domains of soldiers. I argue, however, that neither the Army Profession campaign nor the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program construes these domains as constitutive of moral development. Furthermore, both programs rely on experts to train soldiers in their respective concepts. This is problematic because soldiers do not find these experts to be credible. I go on to claim that leaders and peers who have a relationship with their fellow soldiers, and have earned their trust and respect, should function as the center of gravity for character development in the Army. Unfortunately, many leaders and soldiers lack the resources to do so. Thus, they often refer fellow soldiers back to the experts. Instead, leaders and peers should use the resources that virtue ethics provides with respect to self-perception, virtue-relevant goals, and the emotions to promote soldiers’ moral development. Toward that end, chaplains are well-suited to help leaders and peers gather the resources and develop the practices that will contribute to these aims.

The presented master's thesis examines experiments on humans conducted in Nazi concentration camps during WWII and focuses on the conflict between the victims on one side and scientists on the other. In this conflict, which is centered around the fate of the data, both sides take a strong stand. The criteria for an ethical evaluation is to objectively articulate the main argumentation pillars from both sides and assess their validity in the contrast of two ethical theories which are virtue theory and the theory of consequentialism. To reach this objective, the thesis draws from available literal and audio-visual sources from the fields of history, philosophy, psychology, anthropology and bioethics. The paper is divided into three main parts. The first part is dedicated to terminology, technical execution, integrity, impact and logistics of the experiments. The second part analyzes victim testimonies and impact statements and arguments that had been put forward by the research community. The third part deals with the meaning of the term person's dignity/KAVOD, evaluates the argument points in the contrast of ethical theories, introduces the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance and deliberates the scientific community stance. Keywords Bioethics, cognitive dissonance, concentration camps,...