This investigation is concerned with the determination of the exact nature of Anglo-Spanish relations during World War I. It examines the nature of these relations in an attempt to define Spain's commitment to her neutrality policy and the amount of pressure placed upon Spain by Britain in order to force Spain to adopt a policy of at least "benevolent neutrality." Most historical accounts heretofore have accepted the idea that Spain simply refused to abandon her neutrality policy.

This work attempts to examine the relationship shared by two ideologically opposed groups during the post-World War I period in Germany. The officer corps is viewed as a relic of the traditional imperial state while the socialists represented the harbinger of the modern, democratic, industrialized state. Although it should seem evident that these two factions of society would be natural enemies, the chaos of World War I pushed these ideological, opposites into the same corner.

Socialite Laura Penrose and a group of wealthy businessmen founded the New Orleans Chapter of the American Red Cross in 1916. The Chapter expanded in 1917 with the addition of two black Auxiliary Branches chartered by nurses Louise Ross and Sarah Brown. Although Jim Crow dictated the division between the Chapter and its Branches within the mostly female organization, racial barriers did not prohibit them from uniting for the cause of national relief. The American Red Cross differed from other forms of biracial Progressivism by the very nature of public relief work for a national charity. American Red Cross relief work brought women into public spaces for the war effort and pushed biracial cooperation between women in the Jim Crow South in a more public and patriotic direction than earlier efforts at social reform. Black women, in particular, used the benefit of relief work to promote racial uplift and stake a claim on American citizenship despite the disenfranchisement of their men.

This dissertation examines the representation of Muslim colonial subjects in British and French commemorations of World War I. This conflict, widely remembered as a European civil war fought in the trenches of Flanders, remains a catalyst for constructing national identity in post-imperial, multicultural Britain and France. Drawing from theories of nationalism, collective memory, and race, I pose the following questions: first, how does memory change when the nation seeks to encompass members who previously had been excluded? Second, how do transgressive sites of memory unsettle the nation? Third, under what conditions are transgressive narratives of collective memory constructed? My methodology consists of a content analysis of sites and commemorations; archival research; and semi-structured interviews with stakeholders. I find, with regard to representation, that national commemorations seek to restore national unity by inverting traditions of collective memory. At the local level, national differences dissolve; sites of memory in each country produced narratives of mourning, re-memory, and melancholia. While the former two narratives restore national unity, the third unsettles the nation in three ways: first, by highlighting the historical interdependence of metropolis and empire, they challenge the idea that the nation is a discrete entity. Second, by highlighting the interconnectedness of those who belong, those who do not belong, and those whose status is contested, they disrupt the idea of the nation as a compact between citizens. Finally, by revealing the history of passive forgetting and deliberate erasure in the service of national memory, they disturb the common memory of the nation. In order to construct a narrative of melancholia, I argue that three factors are necessary: individual intentions, access to resources, and an unencumbered physical form. These findings hold implications for theory in three ways. First, I draw attention to collective memory as a means of unsettling moral unity. Second, I analyze the relationship between nationalism and memory through the lens of postcolonial theory, bringing a social scientific perspective to the literature on postcolonial memory. Third, I contribute to the literature on cultural production by emphasizing the cultural process of unsettling memory. / 2020-11-27T00:00:00Z

Treatment and advice on amoebic dysentery from case studies onboard H.M.H.S. Lanfranc, May 1916.

The development of the British air weapon on the Western Front during the First World War represented a revolution in the way that national resources were employed in exploiting a technological opportunity to achieve tactical and operational advantage. Logistic competence was the precondition for air superiority and the 'modern style of warfare' — indirect, predicted artillery fire. The Royal Flying Corps' logistic staffs, led by Brigadier-General Robert Brooke-Popham, demonstrated considerable agility in meeting the demands of three-dimensional warfare. Sustaining adequate numbers of front-line aircraft required substantial numbers of skilled and semi-skilled personnel, located largely beyond the battle zone, operating at a continuously high tempo while coping with rapid technological change and high wastage. These elements formed a complex, dynamic and integrated network that was also partly self-sustaining, in the form of salvage and repair, with the ability to compensate for shortfalls in aircraft and aero-engine production as well as unpredictable demand. The logistic principles developed on the Western Front provided the foundation for Royal Air Force success in the Second World War and anticipated the management practices that underpin today's global supply chain - as well as demonstrating the enduring interdependence of logistics and air power.

The thesis addresses the question, ‘How did the First World War affect the religious faith of the people of Britain?’ The ways in which wartime preachers, hymn-writers, diarists and letter-writers expressed their faith are examined. For the vast majority, the War was both a military and a spiritual conflict of right against might and the rhetoric of a Holy War was popular. Questions of divine omnipotence and providence troubled many, the standard response being that war was a consequence of God’s gift of free will. The language of sacrifice dominated public discourse, with many asserting that the salvation of the fallen was ensured by their own sacrifice. Prayers for the dead became widely accepted in the Church of England. Geoffrey Studdert Kennedy promoted the belief that God shares in human suffering. However, there is little evidence that his advocacy of divine impassibility was influential subsequently. Wartime ecumenical activities and attitudes are analysed, the hopes for Christian unity of the 1920 Lambeth Conference are discussed and the naïve optimism of many bishops is contrasted with the reality of ecclesiological differences. The conclusion is that the War’s influence on people’s faith was limited and reasons for this are suggested.

The British army officer commissioned from the ranks had become a rare and politically contested phenomenon in the years leading up to the First World War. This research addresses a previously unexamined phenomenon; how the conflict saw almost 10,000 commissions awarded to soldiers from the ranks of the pre-war British Army, and over 7,000, of these were ‘permanent’, constituting 42 per cent of regular army commissions. This was deeply threatening to the identity of gentleman-officers that had embedded a culture of gentlemanliness parsed into the rules and behaviours that governed army life and the homo-social space of the officers’ mess. This investigation shows the emergence of the ranker officer identity, progressively defined during the war through a process of Othering in terms of socio-cultural differences, particularly presentation and speech. The post-war officer class resumed its pre-war social and cultural character, maintaining its exclusivity and ethos and the ranker officer was increasingly caricatured in the discourses surrounding regimental officering and Englishness. The ranker officer, is fully examined for the first time in this thesis and this examination crucially informs our understanding of the persistence of an elite through the continuing gentlemanly appropriation of British army officer identity.

The Third Battle of Ypres was officially terminated by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig with the opening of the Battle of Cambrai on 20 November 1917. Nevertheless, a comparatively unknown set-piece attack – the only large-scale night operation carried out on the Flanders front during the campaign – was launched twelve days later on 2 December. This thesis, a necessary corrective to campaign narratives of what has become popularly known as ‘Passchendaele’, examines the course of events from the mid-November decision to sanction further offensive activity in the vicinity of Passchendaele village to the barren operational outcome that forced British GHQ to halt the attack within ten hours of Zero. A litany of unfortunate decisions and circumstances contributed to the profitless result. At the tactical level, a novel hybrid set-piece attack scheme was undermined by a fatal combination of snow-covered terrain and bright moonlight. At the operational level, the highly unsatisfactory local situation in the immediate aftermath of Third Ypres’ post-strategic phase (26 October-10 November) appeared to offer no other alternative to attacking from the confines of an extremely vulnerable salient. Perhaps the most tragic aspect of the affair occurred at the strategic level, where Haig’s earnest advocacy for resumption of the Flanders offensive in spring 1918 was maintained despite obvious signs that the initiative had now passed to the enemy and the crisis of the war was fast approaching.

The Battle of the Sambre was the last large-scale set-piece battle of the Great War. The German army was determined to hold a defensive line incorporating the Mormal Forest and the Sambre-Oise canal, hoping to buy time for a strategic withdrawal to the Meuse and thereby negotiate a compromise peace. This thesis analyses the battle at the operational and tactical levels: the BEF was no longer striving for a breakthrough – sequential ‘bite and hold’ was now the accepted method of advance. The difference between plan and reality is examined, highlighting the levels of tactical competence of units engaged and also the role of the Royal Engineers, whose tasks involved devising improvised bridging equipment to facilitate the crossing of the waterway. The competence of brigade and battalion commanders is examined: some proved capable of pragmatic flexibility in the face of stubborn enemy resistance and were able to adapt or even abandon original plans in order to ensure ultimate success. It was a decisive victory for the BEF, which irrevocably crushed the will of the German defenders, leading to the pursuit of a demoralised, broken and beaten army, whose means of continued resistance had been destroyed, and thus expedited the armistice.