由於今日數位科技發達，仿冒成本日漸降低，導致仿冒產業充斥於社會中，處處可見盜版商品的蹤跡，故仿冒查緝在現今變得非常重要。本文討論本國正版廠商參與遊說的情況下，本國政府仿冒查緝率將如何制定以及本國正版廠商在何種情況下願意提供政治獻金。並且，我們為政府仿冒查緝的工作加入了查緝成本，研究其對於政府仿冒查緝率決策的影響。本文研究後發現，政府必須根據市場規模大小以決定最適查緝率為零或是查緝率上限，且惟有在市場規模為中段之時，本國正版廠商才有意願提供政治獻金進行遊說。此外，若加入仿冒查緝成本，則本國政府最適查緝率為零的可能性將會提高。 / Since the prevalence and availability of digital technologies, the cost of piracy becomes lower and lower. The society is full of counterfeiter and counterfeit, hence it is very important to protect the intellectual property. This paper assumes that the domestic company obtains the intellectual property. We try to discuss how the domestic government determines the optimal enforcement rate and to what extent is the domestic company willing to pay for political contributions if the domestic company is the only one lobbyist. Furthermore, considering the cost of crackdown on imitations, we find that the government decides the optimal enforcement rate according to the size of the market, and the domestic company has the desire to engage in lobbying only when the market is in the middle size. If there is some cost of squashing pirates, that optimal enforcement rate is more likely to be zero.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0097255003 |
| Creators | 高毓潞 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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