本研究以力霸集團為個案研究對象，從決策及資源分配掌控者觀點定義該集團企業之最終控制者，首先分析力霸集團企業之董監結構及股權結構，並針對該集團之公司治理機制說明對內部控制議題及財務舞弊之影響。
研究結果顯示，力霸集團企業之最終控制者王又曾家族係透過交叉持股及掌握董事會席次控制權等控制途徑掌控集團企業，其集團內七家公開發行以上公司的平均直接持股率、股份控制權、盈餘分配權分別為7.72%、28.92%、6.81%，但平均席次控制權則高達95.33%，股份控制權（席次控制權）與盈餘分配權偏離差之平均值則達22.11%（88.52%）。力霸集團企業席次控制權與盈餘分配權嚴重偏離之個案研究發現，符合經營者之經營誘因不足，而財富侵佔動機較強之學術假設。此外，該集團企業亦嚴重違反內部控制制度中控制環境、風險評估、控制作業、資訊與溝通，以及監督機制等主要原則，造成投資人權益的重大損失。最後，本研究針對內部控制制度之有效性、公司治理機制、會計師責任，以及金融監理功能四層面，提出討論及建議。 / Using the Rebar Business Group as the case of this study, the present research first analyzes the ownership structures of the member firms from an ultimate controller perspective. Internal control related issues are then identified, followed by a discussion on the effect of corporate governance on internal control weakness and fraudulent reporting.
The analysis indicates that cross-holding, pyramid structure and seat control over the board members are venues utilized by the Wang Family to actively control Rebar Business Group. An analysis on the measurement of voting right, cash flow right and board seat-control shows that direct shareholding, voting rights, cash flow rights are on average 7.72%, 28.92%, 6.81%, while the board seat-control ratio is 95.33%. The deviation between voting right (board seat-control) and cash flow rights is 22.11% (88.52%). To the extent that ownership and control is highly deviated, a weaker disciplinary effect and a stronger entrenchment effect can be expected. In addition, this research also finds that all principles buttressed in building a sound internal control system are violated. Finally, suggestions for improvements on internal control system and policies are provided.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0090932311 |
| Creators | 鄒美琪 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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