現代公司走向公開發行後，公司由廣大而分散的投資股東所有，投資股東雖擁有公司所有權，卻無多餘的心力與能力去參與公司經營，公司經營交由專業經營者，於是產生企業經營與所有分離之情況，在企業經營與所有分離下，股東與經營者間乃出現代理問題，為解決代理問題，本人勢必要付出代理成本，近年來十分熱門的公司治理議題亦致力於降低代理成本問題，並從董事責任之加強著手，故而建立與釐清董事之受任人義務內涵，乃一重要的課題。
董事之受任人義務內涵，可分為注意義務與忠實義務兩個子義務，前者主要著重於董事之行為標準，後者則是關於董事與公司間有利益衝突時，董事應以公司利益為先之義務。本文先就美國相關規定分析介紹，再進一步探討我國公司法就董事受任人義務規範之不足之處，以提出相關建議。接著本文就董事對股東揭露義務將特予介紹，蓋股東必須在充足資訊揭露下才能做出最適的決定，而董事不僅是能以最低成本提供股東資訊者，且從董事與股東之受託人關係觀之，亦可作為應為股東利益最大化而提供資訊之合理性基礎。
董事相關受任人義務內涵在併購過程中是否會有所不同，亦為本文關注之重點，故區分為合意併購與敵意併購兩種情況加以分析。合意併購時著重於探討董事如何於併購過程中為公司及股東爭取最佳的利益，並藉由分析我國實務判決提出若干建議。敵意併購時則著重分析目標公司董事採行之防禦措施適法性，期能藉由參考美國實務上審查標準，將來可引用作為我國處理相關案例之一套準據。 / When corporations go public, a large number of investment shareholders who separate around everywhere own the corporation. Because shareholders don’t have enough time and talent to corporate the company, they deliver the works to professional managers. It appears “Separation of business and all”. At the same time, there come conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent, which called agency problems. In order to produce the agency problems, the principal has to pay for some costs which called agency costs. Recently, the popular corporate governance issue has emphasized the importance of the liabilities of the directors. Hence, to figure out how to build directors’ responsibilities and to know the content of fiduciary duty of the directors is a significant issue.
Fiduciary duty of the directors consists of two sub content: duty of care and duty of loyalty. The former focuses on the level of attention of the directors take when they conduct. And the later focuses on when it faces the conflicts of interest between the company and the directors, the directors should take the company’s interest for priority. In this paper, I try to analysis the lack of the fiduciary duty standard in our country through comparing the U.S relevant standard, and to give some personal suggestion. Then I want to introduce the obligation of disclose of the directors. Because the shareholders need plenty of information to help them making informed decisions. Usually the directors can provide information under relatively low cost, and the fiduciary relationship between the directors and the shareholders gives a good reason to provide any necessary information to improve the shareholders’ best interest.
If the fiduciary duty of the directors would be different during the takeover process is also what this paper wants to emphasize. In this paper I divided takeover into merger agreement and hostile takeover, and discuss under these two kind of takeover how should the directors conduct to meet the duty. When talking about merger agreement I focus on how the directors to seek for the best interest of the company and the shareholders during the whole merger course. And I try to give some suggestion through discussing one court judgment. Finally, when talking about hostile takeover I will emphasize on the anti-takeover conducts which the directors make, and try to analysis these conducts’ legality. Meanwhile I hope that with critiques and dissertations from American scholars and experts as reference can provide our court some useful and specific criterion in the future.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0097651025 |
| Creators | 林芝君 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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