代理與代工雖然本質上都難逃為人作嫁的宿命，但其與品牌原廠間的關係卻是大相逕庭；尤其在工業儀表產業，代理商與原廠間除了代理人與主理人的代理合作關係外，還會因各自是否具備系統整合能力而有著另一種微妙的競爭關係。
所以，本研究是藉由探討一家具有系統整合能力的代理商，在其面對不同原廠時的各種策略邏輯，以深入了解其經營模式與成功因素，及探討代理商要如何經營與原廠的關係、如何依靠原廠資源來茁壯、如何避免辛苦耕耘的市場被原廠過河拆橋、及被終止代理權後如何繼續生存⋯⋯等，代理商與原廠間的各種經營問題，並藉由賽局理論來分析「原廠」與「代理」的各自優勢策略：
代理商的優勢策略思維－”以競促合，合中有競”：
1. 在銷售產品的同時，搭售自行創價的產品及服務，提昇代理商的不可取代性。
2. 對於銷售重心品牌／產品一定要有備案選擇。
3. 要有自知之明，最好／最強的產品不一定最適合，「門當戶對」的代理關係才能長久。
原廠的優勢策略思維－”以戰止競，順昌逆亡”：
不斷強化自身產品、技術層次為目標，使其成為市場上不論是規格、技術、價格、⋯⋯⋯等各方面都是最佳選擇，則代理商只是各種通路的選項之一，絕不會發生”尾巴搖狗”的不合理現象。
而依本研究的實際個案分析結論，發現個案中原廠與代理商的關係並非單純的”合作”或是”競爭”甚或是”雙贏“等靜態關係，其關係應是”競中有合、合中有競”的動態共生關係，而”競”與”合”的存在比例則是隨著時間、賽局、環境等因素的不同而隨時在變化。 / Generally speaking, the fate of the sales agent and the OEM agent are similar in someway, however their relationships with the principals are quite different from each other, especially when it refers to the industrial analyzer business. It will be a kind of co-opetition relationship between agent and principal while the agent or the principal has the capacity of system integration.
This study, taking a local Taiwanese company which represents multi foreigner analyzer brands and is capable of system integration, as an example, attempts to figure out the relationship between agent and principal and then develops the dominant strategies of each parties through the case study and the game theory analyzing.
The dominant strategy of agent: enforcing the principal to cooperate by competition, therefore the cooperation contains competing.
1. To strengthen the agent’s corporate image to the customers by bundling the value-added products while selling principals’ products. This is to prevent the principal to replace the agent easily while they want to change the agent or set up the local branch.
2. Agent must always have alternative products as back up, especially for the major income products.
3. A compatible principal is the optima choice, not the best one.
The dominant strategy of the principal: inhibiting the competition by empowering themselves, therefore threating the agent to obey or die. Never allow tail wagging the dog.
From this study, it shows the relationship between agent and principal is sort of dynamic “co-opetition” relationship and the existing percentages of “cooperation” and “competition” are varied in time, games, environment, …etc., instead of static one.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0102932053 |
| Creators | 吳成湖, Wu, Chen Hu |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
Page generated in 0.0015 seconds