英國哲學家帕費特（Derek Parfit）在《理由與人格》（Reasons and Persons）中主張人格存活中重要的不是同一性，而是有正確原因的心理持續性與聯繫性（關係R）。這樣的化約主義式觀點，帕費特強調這不是西方國家才有的論點，他主張佛陀本來也會同意化約主義的觀點。佛陀「本來也會同意」的意思是指帕費特把佛陀所闡釋的無我思想視為比化約主義更極端的「消除式的化約主義」。在人格的本質上，帕費特反對笛卡兒的獨立精神實體，主張只有當我們是離開大腦、軀體以及各種心物理事件而單獨存在的實體，我們的同一性才是確定的。初期佛教為否定婆羅門教的「梵」，同樣是否定有常住、獨存的靈魂。在這相類似的理論基調上，是否真如帕費特所言佛教無我思想是「消除式的化約主義」的代表。又，帕費特這樣的主張是否顯現出其對佛教無我思想的理解與佛陀闡述的無我思想有所出入。這些問題將是本文所要釐清的重點。本論文的研究方向是從帕費特關於人格同一理論的化約主義式觀點切入，來審視佛陀無我思想。 / Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons (1984) claims that in survival personal identity is not what matters, what matters is psychological connectedness and/or continuity with the right kind of cause (Relation R). He asserts this reductionist view of persons that Buddha would have agreed. It means that the Buddha’s view of persons is Eliminative reductionism. Regarding the nature of persons, Parfit denies the Cartesian View (a Cartesian Ego), he says that only if we are separately existing entities can it be true that our identity must be determinate. To against ‘Brahman’, Buddha denies a permanent, separately existing Self as well. The question arises at the gap between Buddha’s view of persons and Parfit’s so-called Eliminative Reductionism. This paper starts with Parfit’s Reductionist view of persons and discusses no-self theory in Early Buddhism.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0093154004 |
| Creators | 劉姵君 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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