Abstract
In this report I critically evaluate Kripke’s rejection of the possibility of contingently true
statements of identity between names. I extract his argument for this view from his book
Naming and Necessity and his article “Identity and Necessity”. I discuss debates in the
relevant literature about Kripke’s positions on naming, reference and modality, as these
issues influence Kripke’s conclusions about statements of identity between names. I
provide my own arguments for rejecting Kripke’s conclusions and accepting that there
can be contingently true statements of identity between names.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:wits/oai:wiredspace.wits.ac.za:10539/6732 |
| Date | 13 March 2009 |
| Creators | Harris, Chadwin Mark |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | application/pdf, application/pdf |
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